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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines how and why the southern Italian city of Matera came to 
be seen as a national shame and symbol of the southern question in the post-
war period. Moreover, it traces the impact that these narratives had on the 
city’s social and urban history from 1945 to 1960. It draws on methods from the 
history of nationalism, the history of emotions, the new southern history, and 
urban history to achieve these aims. A range of primary and secondary sources 
are examined including documents from the Italian State Archives in Rome and 
Matera, the US National Archive in Maryland, Italian newspapers and 
magazines, parliamentary documents and debates, and official newsreel and 
documentary footage. The first chapter analyses the image of Matera as Other 
and a symbol of southern Italy’s civiltà contadina featured in Carlo Levi’s post-
war bestseller Cristo si è fermato a Eboli. It also assesses the book’s impact in 
shaping ideas of Matera amongst Italy’s post-war public sphere. The second 
chapter looks at how and why Matera came to be seen as a national shame in 
the immediate post-war period. It examines the distinct catholic and communist 
moral worlds which shaped this notion in a Cold War context. The third chapter 
investigates the implementation of the first special law for Matera. It assesses 
the project’s limitations and critiques the existing secondary literature on this 
topic. Finally, the fourth chapter is a case study of the purpose-built rural village 
La Martella. It examines how and why Matera and La Martella were used in 
government propaganda to promote official reforms in southern Italy. The 
thesis concludes that narratives of national shame and the southern question 
directly shaped Matera’s urban and social topography post-1945. 
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Introduction 
 
‘Nessuno sa meglio di te, saggio Kublai, che non si deve mai confondere la città 
col discorso che la descrive. Eppure tra l’una e l’altro c’è un rapporto,’  
        Italo Calvino.1  
 
The southern Italian city of Matera in Basilicata was dubbed a national shame in 
the period immediately following the Second World War. Moreover, the city 
became a symbol of Italy’s intractable southern question. This was the result of 
a period of intense political, intellectual, and media focus on Matera’s infamous 
cave dwellings, or Sassi, which housed an estimated 15,000 people in the early 
1950s. These distinctive troglodyte homes, some of which date from the 
Paeolithic era, were carved into the side of the city’s limestone gorge and then 
completed with brick façades. In the early 1950s it was estimated that only 3 
per cent of the Sassi’s dwellings had running water and there was no 
conventional sewage system.2 In many cases, three generations of one family 
lived side-by-side with their farm animals in this 29-hectare labyrinth of semi-
underground homes. In the context of Italy’s acute post-war housing crisis, 
Matera was portrayed in the national media as a low point for Italian 
civilization - a monument to southern poverty and Fascism’s neglect of the 
southern question hewn from the living rock.3   
Following political and media pressure, the Christian Democrat 
government passed a special law for the Sassi in 1951. Its primary aim was to 
                                                             
1 Italo Calvino, Le città invisibili, Mondadori, Milan, 2003, p. 60 
2  Riccardo Musatti, ‘Viaggio ai “Sassi” di Matera’, Comunità, (1950), no. 9, p. 41 
3  Official data from the immediate post-war period, however, suggests that apart from its large 
agglomeration of cave homes, housing conditions at Matera were ostensibly comparable 
with many other parts of post-war Italy. See pp. 137-138 below.  
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evacuate uninhabitable cave homes and rehouse their inhabitants in purpose-
built agricultural villages and residential quarters. There was, however, almost 
no consultation with the local population about the provisions of the special law 
and its subsequent implementation. Instead state intervention at Matera was 
carried out from above. The first special law was used to promote the twin 
reform programmes that the Christian Democrats had implemented for 
southern Italy in the early 1950s. Furthermore, the official intervention 
programme saw Matera become a testing-ground for, what was at the time 
labelled, Neorealist architecture and the decentralization theories of Italian 
town planners and architects. The Sassi were gradually emptied and most of 
their 15,000 residents rehoused in purpose-built villages and urban quarters. 
The intellectual, media and political focus on the town in the immediate post-
war years were fundamental catalysts in initiating this dramatic change to the 
city’s urban and social topography. The complicated process of closing 
dilapidated cave dwellings and rehousing residents, however, lasted over 
twenty years and was never entirely completed.  
There is a large body of secondary literature about Matera’s turbulent 
post-war history. However, hitherto there has been little research into how and 
why the city came to be viewed as a national shame and a symbol of the 
southern question post-1945. This thesis aims to fill that gap. Drawing on 
previously neglected primary source material and methods, it will examine the 
discursive construction of Matera as a national shame and emblem of southern 
backwardness in the context of post-war Italy’s complex political landscape, 
renewed interest in the southern question, and notions of Italian national 
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identity in a Cold War context.4 In addition it will endeavour to ascertain how 
and why these discourses were used politically and the concrete impact that 
they had on Matera’s social and urban fabric during the period 1945-1960. 
These themes will be examined using research methods that draw on recent 
scholarship in the history of emotions, nationalism, urban history, and the new 
southern history. Through its study of post-war Matera, this thesis aims to make 
an original contribution to these different research areas in the broader context 
of twentieth-century Italian history.  
 
Scope 
 
The decision to focus on a specific southern Italian city during the period 1945-
1960 has been made for a number of precise reasons. First, Matera was chosen 
because it constitutes a laboratory for examining notions of national shame at a 
micro-level. Italian national identity was considered to be in crisis and renewal 
in the immediate post-war period following twenty years of Fascist rule, 
military surrender, the loss of Italy’s overseas colonies, foreign occupation, and 
civil war. The onset of the Cold War saw notions of Italian nationalism reshaped 
along apparently transnational ideological lines. The narratives of national 
shame produced in the context of Matera, therefore, constitute an ideal test case 
for a micro-study of notions of the Italian nation at a moment in history when 
the country’s seemingly weak sense of national identity was believed to be in a 
                                                             
4  Stuart Hall’s work on discourse construction is helpful indefining this term in the context of 
this thesis. Drawing on Foucault, Hall has defined discourse as ‘a group of statements which 
provide language for talking about – the way of representing knowledge about - a particular 
topic at a particular moment in history.’ In addition Hall contends that discourse ‘constructs 
the topic. It defines and produces the objects of our knowledge. It governs the way a topic 
can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about.’ See Stuart Hall, ‘The Work of 
Representation’, in Stuart Hall (ed.), Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying 
Practices, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1997, pp. 13-75. 
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state of flux. Second, post-war Matera provides a test-case for examining 
notions of the southern question. Matera came to be seen as a symbol of the 
southern question post-1945 due to the success of Carlo Levi’s book Cristo si è 
fermato a Eboli. The book triggered a period of intense political, media and 
intellectual focus on the Sassi. Images of the city played a fundamental role in 
the ‘rediscovery’ of the Mezzogiorno following twenty years of Fascist rule. 
Examining how and why Matera came to be seen as a symbol of the South 
between 1945-1960 will shed light on notions of the Mezzogiorno and how they 
were used politically in the immediate post-war period. Finally, the time period 
1945-1960 was chosen because it encompasses the beginning and the end of 
the period of intense media and political focus on Matera, the implementation of 
the first special law for the city which initiated the process of emptying the 
Sassi, and Italy’s post-war economic boom and rural exodus of the late 1950s. 
By 1960 Matera had ceased to be important in terms of political propaganda 
and subsequently faded back into obscurity.  
 
Existing literature 
 
A large body of secondary literature has been published about Matera’s post-
war history in the sixty years since the risanamento programme for the Sassi 
was first implemented. There are a substantial number of works which look at 
the social and urban changes that took place in post-war Matera from 
architectural and town planning perspectives.5 Other studies have instead 
                                                             
5  See Marcello Fabbri, Matera dal sottosviluppo alla nuova città, Basilicata editrice, Matera, 
1971; Domenico Fiore, Architettura e urbanistica: Il caso matera (1841-1956), Unpublished 
graduate thesis, Istituto universitario di architettura di Venezia, 1986; Angela Raguso, 
Matera dai Sassi ai borghi (1952 – 1964), Altrimedia, Matera, 2007; Amerigo Restucci and 
Manfredo Tafuri, Un contributo alla comprensione della vicenda storica dei Sassi, BMG 
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examined aspects of the city’s social, cultural and political history from the 
enactment of the risanamento programme onwards.6 In addition three 
chronological urban biographies of Matera have been published which trace the 
city’s urban and architectural development from prehistory to the present day.7 
All of these works have made an important contribution to the on-going debate 
about Matera’s post-war history. Key texts from the existing secondary 
literature will be critiqued in detail at different points throughout this thesis, 
but it is necessary to briefly set out some of the gaps which the current research 
project aims to fill.  
First, it is generally taken as a given that Matera was seen as a national 
shame and a symbol of the southern question in the immediate post-war period. 
There has been no detailed study of the discursive construction of these 
concepts and the subsequent impact that they had on shaping the risanamento 
programme for Matera. In contrast, this thesis traces the origins of these 
notions, how and why they developed, and their subsequent impact on the city’s 
social and urban history during the period 1945-1960.  
Second, there has been a tendency to examine post-war Matera in 
isolation without taking the broader social, political and cultural changes that 
took place in Italy and the wider world into account. Writing about Italian urban 
biographies, Sergio Pace argues that by ‘focusing exclusively on the city itself, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Editrice, Matera, 1974; Anne Toxey, Materan Contradictions. Architecture, Preservation and 
Politics, Ashgate, Surrey, 2011.  
6  Leonardo A. Chisena, Matera dalla civita al piano. Stratificazione, classi sociali e costume 
politico, Congedo Editore, Galatina, 1984; Alfonso Pontrandolfi, La vergogna cancellata: 
Matera negli anni dello sfollamento dei Sassi, Altrimedia Edizioni, Rome-Matera, 2002; 
Leonardo Sacco, Matera contemporanea. Cultura e società, Basilicata editrice, Matera, 1982. 
7  See Rosalba Demetrio and Grazia Guadagno, Matera. Forma e strutture, Testo & Immagine, 
Turin, 2001; Amerigo Restucci, Matera, i Sassi, Einaudi, Milan, 1991; and Cosimo Damiano 
Fonseca, Rosalba Demetrio and Grazia Guadagno, Matera, Laterza, Rome-Bari, 1998 
published as part of Laterza’s Grandi Opere: Le città nella storia d’Italia series. 
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they tend to ignore everything that occurs beyond its confines.’8 This point is 
applicable to the historiography of post-war Matera, in which the broader 
changes that took place at a macro-level have largely been neglected. In part 
this can be attributed to the fact that many studies of Matera are essentially 
local histories written by non-professional historians. However, the same 
charge can also be levelled at a recently published academic study of the city’s 
post-war history which arguably fails to examine the risanamento programme 
in the context of broader historical processes taking place at national and 
international levels.9  
The existing literature on post-war Matera has generally neglected to 
engage with recent scholarship on Italy’s southern question. Anne Toxey’s work 
on Matera draws on revisionist studies of the Mezzogiorno. However, she 
arguably reduces the complexities of the southern question to a single and 
unified ethnocentric discourse rather than approaching it as a contested and 
fractured idea.10 This is primarily due to a lack of contextualization of 
stereotypical images of Matera and the South. As a result Toxey’s work fails to 
adequately explain how and why Matera came to be seen as a symbol of the 
southern question in the post-war period, how this idea came to be seen as 
                                                             
8  Sergio Pace, ‘Through the Looking-Glass: Research on the Italian City in Historical 
Perspective’, in Robert Lumley and John Foot (eds.) Italian Cityscapes. Culture and Urban 
Change in Contemporary Italy, University of Exeter Press, Exeter, 2004, p. 18 
9  See Anne Toxey’s recent work on post-war Matera. Toxey arguably fails to take the social 
and economic upheavals that took place in post-war Italy into account. In particular her 
work overlooks the rapid social and cultural changes that the economic miracle engendered. 
For example Toxey claims that the risanamento programme was a deliberate government 
strategy to transform Sassi residents from dialect-speaking agricultural workers into Italian-
speaking tertiary workers. This assertion overlooks the fact that Italy experienced a huge 
rural exodus in the late 1950s and that spoken Italian slowly began to replace regional 
dialects throughout the country due to a myriad of social and cultural changes in the post-
war era. Instead Toxey examines Matera in isolation without taking broader historical 
processes into consideration. Toxey, Materan Contradictions, p. 61. For a discussion of 
spoken Italian’s rapid growth in the post-war period see Tullio De Mauro, Storia linguistica 
dell’Italia unita, Laterza, Bari, 1970, pp. 51-126.  
10  See Toxey, Materan Contradictions, pp. 11-12.  
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convincing, and the impact that it had on the city’s social and urban fabric.  This 
study, in contrast, will look to make an original contribution to the new 
southern history. It will critique the existing literature on the southern question 
and historicize the concept of Matera as a symbol of the South in detail. This 
approach will shed light on the discursive construction of broader ideas of 
southern Italy in the post-war period and allow for their reception and impact 
at a micro-level to be examined in detail. 
Furthermore, the voices of Sassi residents who were transferred from 
their cave homes to new accommodation are largely absent from the existing 
historiography. A number of oral history studies have been carried out in recent 
years, but little work has been done on popular reaction to the social and urban 
changes that took place in post-war Matera and in particular the 
marginalization of Sassi residents from the risanamento programme’s 
implementation.11 In general historians of post-war Matera appear more 
interested in local politics, architecture and urban developments than the 
                                                             
11  Patrizia Zuccari interviewed a number of former Sassi residents for her chapter ‘I Sassi di 
Matera: il luogo ritrovato?’, in Lucilla Rami Ceci (ed.), Sassi e Templi. Il luogo antropologico 
tra cultura e ambiente, Armando Editore, Rome, 2003, pp. 446-460. However, arguably 
Zuccari’s work presents life in the Sassi as an idealized pre-industrial Gemeinschaft which 
ignores the class and generational conflicts that appear to have existed amongst the district’s 
15,000 residents. Pasquale Doria’s book Ritorno alla città laboratorio. I quartieri del 
risanamento cinquanta anni dopo, Antezza, Matera, 2010 also contains fragments of oral 
testimony from ex-Sassi residents. In addition Angelo Del Parigi and Rosalba Demetrio 
carried out interviews with a number of people that were transferred from the Sassi to new 
housing between 1950 and 1970. Their work examines life and culture in the Sassi from an 
anthropological perspective. See Angelo Del Parigi and Rosalba Demetrio, Antropologia di un 
labirinto urbano, i Sassi di Matera, Osanna Edizioni, Venosa, 1994. Moreover, Anne Toxey 
carried out a large number of interviews with former Sassi residents between 2000 and 
2006. She has used oral testimonies to examine the impact that narratives of shame 
associated with post-war Matera have had on collective memory of the Sassi at a local level. 
However, Toxey arguably neglects to examine the mistakes and myths found in these oral 
testimonies in favour of summarising broad themes. The subjectivity of these accounts could 
potentially shed light on the psychological impact that the risanamento programme had on 
Sassi residents. See Anne Toxey, ‘Reinventing the Cave: Competing Images, Interpretations, 
and Representations of Matera, Italy’, TDSR, vol. XV (2004), no. 2, pp. 61-78; Anne Toxey, ‘Via 
Media: The Circulation of Narratives and their Influence on Tourists’ and Residents’ Actions 
and Memories’, Material Culture Review, (2010), no. 71, pp. 67-83; and Toxey, Materan 
Contradictions, 2011. 
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people that the first special law directly affected. There is a tendency in the 
existing literature to present the estimated 15,000 people that lived in the Sassi 
as a unified block with a singular opinion and voice rather than a collection of 
individuals with varied opinions, hopes and fears. Drawing on previously 
neglected archival material this thesis will look to examine the reaction of Sassi 
residents to the risanamento programme. Although these sources are 
fragmentary and sometimes filtered through official documents and the party 
press, they represent an important contribution to the existing historiography 
of post-war Matera.12    
   
Sources 
 
This project makes extensive use of documents from Matera’s Prefecture and 
the city’s office of public works related to the first special law for the Sassi and  
the subsequent risanamento programme. These files are housed in the Archivio 
di Stato di Matera. In addition, the thesis draws on official and unofficial reports 
about the Sassi, post-war architectural and urban planning periodicals, political 
journals, as well as local and national newspaper articles published during the 
scope of this study. These different sources were crucial in examining the 
implementation of the first special law for Matera and its various problems in 
detail and from a variety of perspectives. Many of these sources have been cited 
in the existing literature on the city’s post-war history. However, it became clear 
during the research stage of the current project that a number of important 
primary sources had been underused or neglected completely in previous 
                                                             
12 It became clear halfway through this research project that an oral history component would 
have greatly contributed to including the voices of Sassi residents in the historical narrative 
on post-war Matera. Due to temporal and financial constraints, however, it was not feasible 
to carry out interviews at that point in time. This is an area which could be developed in 
future research.  
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studies of the risanamento programme - in particular the files pertaining to the 
first special law’s implementation which are held in the state archive at Matera. 
These documents show that the special law’s application was reactive rather 
than systematic and they help to shed light on the legislation’s various 
shortcomings. Instead in the existing literature on post-war Matera there had 
been an overreliance on a number of influential secondary sources which had, 
in a number of cases, substituted the historical analysis of archival material. In 
contrast this study has drawn on previously neglected primary sources located 
in the state archive at Matera as well as in additional archives located in Italy 
and the USA. These sources have allowed for a more comprehensive 
examination of the risanamento programme and the reassessment of a number 
of arguments in the existing historiography. They have also provided important 
insights into the reactions of Sassi residents to the rehousing programme that 
the first special law generated.  
Previous studies of post-war Matera have largely overlooked the body of 
relevant primary sources housed at the Archivio centrale dello Stato in Rome. In 
contrast, this study draws on the files of the Ministry of the Interior and the 
Italian Prime Minister’s office. The documents from the Ministry of the Interior 
provided supplemental details of correspondence between the Prefect of 
Matera and the Interior Ministry relating to political visits to the city and shed 
light on problems encountered during the first special law’s implementation. 
The files of the Italian Prime Minister’s office contained some important 
documents which illustrated the links made between housing conditions 
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amongst the Sassi and morality in official circles. These sources proved to be 
crucial in examining notions of Matera as a national shame.  
 Furthermore, this thesis draws on files from the US Department of 
State’s International Cooperation Administration held in the National Archives 
and Records Administration, Maryland. These documents on the construction of 
the agricultural village La Martella, built to rehouse 200 families from the Sassi, 
have not been used in any previous studies of post-war Matera. They have 
added new perspectives to the existing historical narrative and meant that a 
more comprehensive examination of La Martella’s construction could be carried 
out. Archival research was also carried out at the Archivio Storico dell’Istituto 
Luigi Sturzo in Rome. A number of important documents were located in the 
Fondo Democrazia Cristiana, Serie segreteria politica (1944-1992). They 
revealed internal rivalries and power struggles within the DC at a local level and 
enabled a number of arguments in the existing literature to be reassessed.  
This thesis has also made extensive use of the large body of newsreel and 
documentary footage produced about post-war Matera during the period 1945-
1960. These sources were crucial for examining how the Sassi were used as a 
symbol of the southern question in government propaganda promoting the 
intervento straordinario: the name given to the implementation of land reform 
legislation and a state development programme for southern Italy in the early 
1950s.13 Although a selection of this material has been examined in a recent 
study of post-war newsreels and ideas of modernization, no previous work on 
                                                             
13  See pp. 90-91 below for the history of land reform and the Cassa del Mezzogiorno.  
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Matera has drawn on these important visual texts.14 A number of relevant 
documentaries and newsreels films were consulted via the Istituto Luce’s online 
archive. This resource provided access to a selection of government-sponsored 
films that feature Matera in the context of official visits and government 
reforms for southern Italy. In addition, a number of important documentary 
films from the USIS-Trieste collection that feature Matera and the rural village 
La Martella were consulted at the Archivio centrale dello Stato in Rome.15 
Examining these visual texts provides a more comprehensive understanding of 
how the notion of Matera as national shame and symbol of the southern 
question was constructed and later appropriated for political ends. 
Finally, this thesis has collected a vast quantity of local, regional, national 
and international press articles on Matera published during the scope of this 
study. While a number of Italian press sources have been cited in the existing 
literature on post-war Matera, the actual texts themselves have rarely been 
examined in detail.16 In contrast, the present study has drawn on press material 
to examine their contribution in the creation of notions of Matera as a national 
shame and a symbol of the southern question in the immediate post-war period. 
Furthermore, the existing literature regularly alludes to international media 
coverage of Matera in the 1950s but rarely examines concrete examples. 
Conversely, this thesis has gathered a large collection of English-language 
                                                             
14  See Paola Bonifazio, Narrating Modernization: Documentary Films in Cold War Italy (1948-
1955), Unpublished PhD Thesis, New York University, 2007. 
15  For further information on this important resource see David W. Ellwood, ‘The USIS-Trieste 
collection at the Archivio centrale dello Stato, Rome’, Historical Journal of Film, Radio and 
Television, vol. 19 (1999), no. 3, pp. 399-404; and Giulia Barrera and Giovanna Tosatti (eds.), 
United States Information Service di Trieste: catalogo del fondo cinematografico, 1941-1966, 
Ministero per i beni e le attivita  culturali, Direzione generale per gli archivi, Rome, 2007. 
16  See for example Carmine Di Lena, Quando l’America scoprì i Sassi. Antefatto della Legge per il 
risanamento dei Sassi, Altrimedia, Matera, 2007. It cites and reproduces a large amount of 
newspaper coverage on the Sassi but offers no textual analysis of these important sources. 
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articles on the Sassi from physical and digital archives. This has allowed for 
Italian claims about the depiction of Matera in the foreign press to be re-
evaluated.  
The large body of primary sources consulted and examined in this thesis 
has allowed for an in-depth study of the discursive construction of Matera as a 
national shame and emblem of the southern question to be carried out. 
Furthermore, these sources have enabled a more comprehensive examination 
of the risanamento programme’s implementation and shortcomings to be 
achieved compared to the existing literature.  
 
Methods 
 
This thesis employs a number of different methods in order to examine 
narratives of Matera as a national shame and symbol of the Mezzogiorno post-
1945. In its study of how the idea of Matera as Other developed in the 
immediate post-war period, this study draws on the work of the urban historian 
Alan Mayne.17 His research into the narratives used to create the concept of the 
slum in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century provides a theoretical 
framework for examining Carlo Levi’s influential description of Matera in his 
memoir Cristo si è fermato a Eboli. In addition, this thesis draws on recent 
scholarship in the history of emotions, cultural studies, moral philosophy, 
psychology, and nationalism in order to examine national shame. Studies of 
patriotic narratives in an Italian context have primarily focused on the Liberal 
period. This study looks to broaden the scope to the post-war period and thus 
                                                             
17  See Alan Mayne, The Imagined Slum. Newspaper representations in three cities 1870-1914, 
Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1993; Alan Mayne, ‘Representing the slum’, Urban 
History, vol. 17 (1990), pp. 66-84; Alan Mayne, ‘Review Essay: Tall Tales but True?: New 
York’s “Five Points” Slum’, Journal of Urban History, vol. 33 (2007), no. 2, pp. 320-331. 
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aims to make an original contribution to the existing literature on Italian 
nationalism. The theoretical framework employed for examining patriotic 
narratives is outlined in detail in the second chapter, but the works that 
informed the current study will be briefly listed here. Emotions were a 
relatively neglected area of research for historians until the so-called ‘affective 
turn’ over the last two decades. In the context of modern Italian history, there is 
a growing body of research in this area.18 Silvana Patriarca’s work on national 
shame and the Risorgimento has been path-breaking in this regard and is one of 
the inspirations for the current study.19 Furthermore, Renaissance historian 
Barbara Rosenwein’s concept of an ‘emotional community’ is used to examine 
the parameters and norms which shaped how distinct social groups expressed 
national shame in the context of post-war Matera.20 The cultural theorist Sara 
Ahmed’s work on the cultural politics of emotion proved invaluable for 
analysing the ways in which expressions of patriotic emotion define the object 
that they purport to describe: the nation.21 Furthermore, in its study of patriotic 
narratives this thesis has drawn on John Dickie’s large body of work on notions 
of the Italian nation and national identity.22 Building upon Benedict Anderson’s 
influential concept of the nation as an ‘imagined community’, Dickie contends 
                                                             
18  The Association for the Study of Modern Italy’s annual conference in 2009 was dedicated to 
the history of emotions and a number of articles based on conference presentations were 
later published. See the articles in Modern Italy, vol. 17 (2012), no. 2, pp. 151-285. 
19  Silvana Patriarca, ‘A Patriotic Emotion: Shame and the Risorgimento’, in Silvana Patriarca 
and Lucy Riall (eds.), The Risorgimento Revisited. Nationalism and Culture in Nineteenth-
Century Italy, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2012, pp. 134-151 
20  Barbara H. Rosenwein, ‘Worrying about Emotions in History’, American Historical Review, 
vol. 107 (2002), pp. 821-845 
21   Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion, Routledge, London, 2004 
22  See for example: John Dickie, ‘Imagined Italies’, in David Forgacs and Robert Lumley (eds.), 
Italian Cultural Studies. An Introduction, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 19-33; John 
Dickie, ‘La macchina da scrivere: The Victor Emmanuel Monument in Rome and Italian 
Nationalism’, The Italianist, vol. 14 (1994), pp. 261-285; John Dickie, ‘Timing, Memory and 
Disaster: Patriotic Narratives in the Aftermath of the Messina-Reggio Calabria Earthquake, 
28 December 1908’, Modern Italy, vol. 11 (2006), no. 2, pp. 147-166; and John Dickie, Una 
catastrofe patriottica. 1908: il terremoto di Messina, Laterza, Rome, 2008. 
23 
 
that nations are in fact a myriad of competing and conflicting social fictions.23 
He advocates the need for micro-studies of patriotic expressions at specific 
moments in history in order to avoid broad generalizations about notions of 
national identity. This theoretical approach has been adopted in the current 
study. These different methodological strands are drawn together in chapter 
two which examines post-war Matera and patriotic narratives in detail.   
Furthermore, Matera provides an opportunity to examine notions of the 
South after 1945. The Sassi were an important source for images of southern 
Italian alterity in the post-war period. In order to examine notions of the 
Mezzogiorno as Other it is necessary to outline in brief the historiography of the 
South as a concept. The southern question paradigm has influenced the social, 
political and economic history of Italy since the country’s unification in 1861. In 
addition this concept has played a fundamental role in defining notions of 
Italian national identity. It is generally agreed that the framework was born in 
the Liberal period through the writings and fieldwork of the first meridionalisti 
Pasquale Villari, Leopoldo Franchetti and Sidney Sonnino.24 It is characterized 
by two fundamental components: the totalized representation of the Italian 
South as a homogeneous territory which is economically and culturally 
backward, and the use of a dualistic framework to study the Mezzogiorno: 
southern Italy is studied in direct comparison to a normative model of 
European modernity embodied by northern Italy. Through this methodological 
                                                             
23  See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, Verso, 1991, pp. 6-7. 
24  For an in-depth analysis of the birth of the southern question in the work of Villari, 
Franchetti and Sonnino see Dickie, Darkest Italy, pp. 55-82; and Nelson Moe, ‘The Emergence 
of the Southern Question in Villari, Franchetti and Sonnino’, in Jane Schneider (ed.), Italy’s 
‘Southern Question’: Orientalism in One Country, Berg Publishers, Oxford, 1998, pp. 51-77. 
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prism, the histories of the diverse regions of southern Italy have been reduced 
to a ‘single, undifferentiated and stereotyped Mezzogiorno.’25 Stereotypes of the 
South in Liberal Italy were created in the context of imagining the Italian nation 
and the putative values that it represented. As John Dickie argues: ‘to define 
Italy as civilized, one has to have a sense, albeit perhaps implicit, of where that 
civilization fades at its boundaries into the barbarous.’26 In the dichotomy 
between modernity and backwardness the Mezzogiorno was positioned as 
Other to the rest of the country. Stereotypical images of the South, therefore, 
were as much the product of narratives of the Italian nation and modernity as a 
reflection of material conditions. The southern question paradigm continued to 
dominate the historiography of the Mezzogiorno until the mid-1980s.27 
Consequently, the different histories of southern Italy’s diverse regions were 
reduced to the history of a uniform and stereotyped South; as Piero Bevilaqua 
notes: ‘la storia del Mezzogiorno contemporanea ha fatto tutt’uno con la storia 
della “questione meridionale”.’28   
 The framework of the southern question was challenged in the mid-
1980s with the emergence of the new southern history. The reassessment of 
how southern Italy had been and should be studied was spearheaded by a 
number of scholars who founded the Istituto meridionale di storia e scienze 
                                                             
25  John A. Davis, ‘Casting off the “Southern Problem”: Or the Peculiarities of the South 
Reconsidered’, in Jane Schneider (ed.), Italy’s ‘Southern Question’: Orientalism in One Country, 
Berg Publishers, Oxford, 1998, p. 207 
26  Dickie, Darkest Italy, p.12 
27  Lucy Riall provides a detailed summary of the southern question’s historiography from the 
Liberal period up to Gramsci’s Marxist interpretation and the recent challenges to the 
paradigm which are outlined below. See Lucy Riall, Sicily and the Unification of Italy: Liberal 
Policy and Local Power, 1859-1866, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, pp. 1-30. 
28  Piero Bevilacqua, Breve storia dell’Italia meridionale, Donzelli, Rome, 2005, p. 7 
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sociali (IMES) and its journal Meridiana.29 The new southern history highlighted 
the paradigm’s theoretical weaknesses and challenged many of the stereotypes 
associated with the South. Studying the Mezzogiorno in direct comparison with 
a normative concept of the North, it was argued, reduced the diverse nature of 
the regions that had made up the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies into a simplified 
and totalized territory caught in stasis, thus ignoring the complex cultural and 
economic mosaic of southern Italy. This new theoretical framework for studying 
southern Italy was adopted by a number of Anglophone scholars in the 1990s 
whose work focused on the discursive construction of stereotypical images of 
the South – a topic that hitherto had largely been ignored in Italian academic 
circles.30  
 The new southern history successfully dismantled many of the 
stereotypes associated with the Mezzogiorno in an academic context. However, 
revisionist studies of the South have not been without their shortcomings. The 
present work will outline these limitations in brief and then endeavour to avoid 
them.31 First, the new southern history has placed too much emphasis on 
refuting the validity of the southern question paradigm and not enough 
attention on historicizing the framework itself. As a result the effect that 
                                                             
29  For an unofficial manifesto of IMES’s primary aims see Carmine Donzelli, ‘Mezzogiorno tra 
“questione” e purgatorio. Opinione comune, immagine scientifica, strategie di ricerca’, 
Meridiana, vol. 9 (1990), pp. 13-53. 
30  See for example: Dickie, Darkest Italy; Moe, The View from Vesuvius; and the collected 
volumes Jane Schneider (ed.), Italy’s ‘Southern Question’: Orientalism in One Country, Berg 
Publishers, Oxford, 1998; and Robert Lumley and Jonathon Morris (eds.), The New History of 
the Italian South, University of Exeter Press, Exeter, 1997. 
31  The large body of work produced in the 1980s and 1990s which re-examined the 
historiography of southern Italy has not been adequately built upon in recent years. This 
appears, in part, a result of the fact that the Mezzogiorno is not currently fashionable in 
academic circles. While academic trends come and go, that does not make the work of the 
new southern history any less valid. This thesis aims to draw on, and critique where 
necessary, the large body of existing work previously carried out on images of southern Italy 
in an attempt to make a small contribution to this field of research. 
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discourses of the Mezzogiorno have had across time and space at intellectual 
and popular levels has often been neglected.32 In particular, the impact that 
discourses of the South have had on political decisions and on official policy has 
largely been overlooked. More work needs to be done into how and why 
specific images of the South came to be seen as convincing at specific moments 
in time. To avoid similar omissions historians of the southern question need to 
carefully weigh up the reception and impact that the texts under examination 
had on notions of the Mezzogiorno - at the time of publication and over time. 
They need to assess how texts were disseminated, who actually read them, and 
how they were received before any conclusions about their effects can be 
drawn. 
 Second, there has been a tendency to reduce the complexities of the 
southern question to a seemingly unchanging monolithic neo-Orientalist 
discourse which, it is claimed, was used to subjugate southern Italy.33 This 
argument has been taken to its extreme with assertions that the southern 
                                                             
32  Nelson Moe’s work is illustrative in this regard. His monograph The View from Vesuvius, 
offers detailed literary analysis of key texts which contributed to the formulation of the 
southern question paradigm. However, there is a failure in Moe’s book to give adequate 
space to the historical context within which these images were created. The View from 
Vesuvius focuses exclusively on how stereotypes of the Mezzogiorno were constructed, 
neglecting to explore the historical impact that these representations had, how they were 
disseminated, who read the various texts studied and how they were received at popular 
and political levels. This is primarily due to the rigidity of methodological approaches 
applied. The detailed textual and literary analysis he carries out needs to be supplemented 
with historical research. For a critique of Moe’s work see John Foot, ‘The View from 
Vesuvius. Italian Culture and the Southern Question’, Modernism/Modernity, vol. 10 (2003), 
no. 3, pp. 586-587.  
33  See in particular Jane Schneider, ‘Introduction: The Dynamics of Neo-orientalism in Italy 
(1845-1995)’, in Jane Schneider (ed.), Italy’s ‘Southern Question’: Orientalism in One Country, 
Berg Publishers, Oxford, 1998, pp. 1-23. For a detailed critique of Schneider’s neo-Orientalist 
argument see Lucy Riall, ‘Which Road to the South? Revisionists Revisit the Mezzogiorno’, 
Journal of Modern Italian Studies, vol. 5 (2000), no. 1, pp. 89-100; and John Dickie, ‘Many 
Souths: Many stereotypes’, Modern Italy, vol. 4 (1999), no. 1, pp. 79-86. 
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question was in fact the product of an imperial ideology.34 These viewpoints, 
however, overlook the fractured and disparate nature of meridionalismo. To 
view all writers on the South as part of a single neo-Orientalist discourse seems 
reductive in the extreme. This viewpoint, moreover, arguably reflects a failure 
to properly examine images of the Mezzogiorno in the various historical 
contexts in which they were produced. The neo-Orientalist framework 
therefore elides the very complexities and contradictions that historians should 
aim to uncover. As a result it appears to contradict one of IMES’s original aims: 
to examine southern Italy’s diverse territories and identities on their own 
terms.35   
 Furthermore, in terms of scope, the bulk of research carried out on 
stereotypical images of the Mezzogiorno has focused on the Liberal period. The 
post-war era has been relatively neglected in contrast.36 The Liberal period was 
undoubtedly a crucial time in the context of forging a sense of Italian national 
identity and the work carried out on southern question discourse and patriotic 
narratives in that context is exemplary.37 However, historians must be careful 
not to fall into the trap of presuming that once broad patriotic narratives are 
established they then remain fixed through time. That, in essence, is to confuse 
ideas of national identity with how ‘nations’ would like to be seen. Instead 
                                                             
34  See for example Mariella Pandolfi, ‘Before the Southern Question: “Native” Ideas on 
Backwardness and Remedies in the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, 1815-1849’, in Jane Schneider 
(ed.), Italy’s ‘Southern Question’: Orientalism in One Country, Berg Publishers, Oxford, 1998, 
pp. 27-45.  
35  See Donzelli, pp. 13-53. 
36  An exception to this point is Grazia De Michele’s important work on the impact that notions 
of the South as Other had on the experiences of southern Italian children in Turin schools 
between the 1950s and the 1970s. See Grazia De Michele, ‘At the Gates of civilization’ 
Southern children in Turin primary schools, 1950s-1970s, Unpublished PhD thesis, University 
of Reading, 2012. 
37  See Dickie, Darkest Italy. 
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historians need to examine the changing nature of nationalist discourse. If the 
‘nation’, as this thesis contends, are a series of competing social fictions, then 
these changing discourses need to be studied at various points throughout 
history. Moreover, the fact that there are a myriad of patriotic narratives at any 
one time suggests that a micro-historical approach is required. Broad claims 
about the state of a society based on nationalist discourse are redundant if not 
ahistorical.  
Italian patriotism was less vocal in the post-war period. Fascism had 
discredited the ideology of nationalism and the destruction of the Second World 
War had produced an apparent crisis of Italian national identity on the one 
hand, and a strong sense of patriotic renewal on the other.38 However, notions 
of Italy and a sense of common identity were still very much at stake post-1945. 
The different imaginings of the nation were politically inflected in the context of 
the Cold War and were one of the means through which political identities were 
forged in post-war Italy.39 With these points in mind, Matera provides an ideal 
                                                             
38  See Silvana Patriarca, Italian Vices: Nation and Character from the Risorgimento to the 
Republic, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 188-213; and Ruth Ben Ghiat, 
‘Unmaking the Fascist Man: Masculinity, Film and the Transition from Dictatorship’, Journal 
of Modern Italian Studies, vol. 3 (2005), no. 10, pp. 336-365. 
39  Gaspare Nevola argues that there was a period of intense political focus on ideas of Italian 
national identity in the immediate post-war period until the mid-1950s. He contends that ‘i 
partiti di massa [the PCI and the DC], con maggiore o minore convinzione, più o meno 
strumentalmente, hanno avuto modo di impegnarsi sulla questione nazionale italiana, sotto 
il profilo dell’elaborazione ideologica ma anche sul piano dell’azione politico-organizzativa. 
Soprattutto nei primi anni del dopoguerra, quando essi erano alla ricerca di una “legittimità 
nazionale”’. This, Nevola argues, sparked a period in which Italy’s two main post-war parties 
attempted to ‘formulare e … diffondere letture della vicenda nazionale alternative a quelle 
offerte dalla cultura politica liberal-democratica.’ This resulted in the creation of two 
ideologically opposed notions of the Italian nation. The PCI formulated the idea of the 
‘nazione popolare’ which was meant to contrast with Liberal-era ideas of the nation which 
were deemed to have been elitist and bourgeois and a betrayal of the Risorgimento. In 
contrast, the DC communicated the concept of the ‘nazione cattolica’ which emphasized the 
central role that the Catholic Church had played in Italian culture and society. In essence the 
implication was that to be Italian was to be Catholic. See Gaspare Nevola ‘La nazione italiana: 
un ritorno dopo il congedo’, in Gaspare Nevola (ed.), Una patria per gli italiani? La questione 
nazionale oggi tra storia, cultura e politica, Carocci Editore, Rome, 2003, pp. 32-41. 
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opportunity to examine notions of the nation and the Mezzogiorno after 1945. 
The city was an important source for images of southern Italian otherness in the 
post-war era. These images were generated in the context of competing and 
contrasting imaginings of the Italian nation and the putative values that defined 
it. 
 
Thesis structure  
 
This thesis is divided into four loosely chronological chapters. Chapter one 
examines Matera’s brief yet influential depiction in Carlo Levi’s best-selling 
memoir Cristo si è fermato a Eboli. This book played a fundamental role in the 
‘rebirth’ of the southern question following the end of Fascist rule. Although 
correctly cited as one of the primary reasons for political, academic and media 
focus on Matera in the immediate post-war period, the textual representation of 
the Sassi that Levi presented is rarely examined in detail or placed in its 
historical, political or biographical contexts. This chapter aims to redress that 
fact. It argues that Levi’s depiction of Matera was directly influenced by his 
political beliefs and the historical context in which his book was written. 
Furthermore, it argues that Levi’s account of the Sassi drew on a number of 
literary strategies employed in nineteenth-century slumland depictions. These 
narratives were used to denounce the Italian state’s apparent neglect of the 
Mezzogiorno. In addition, this chapter examines the reception and impact that 
Levi’s most famous work had in post-war Italy. There is an attempt to ascertain 
how the book’s success influenced media and political interest in Matera and 
shaped attitudes towards the city amongst Italy’s post-war public sphere. This 
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chapter, in addition, examines how Levi’s description of the Sassi was adopted 
and adapted by different political interests. In order to contextualize Levi’s 
political and intellectual biography the chapter draws on early political articles 
published in Piero Gobetti’s Rivoluzione Liberale, his writings for the Giustizia e 
Libertà movement and the Action Party, as well as his first book Paura della 
libertà. Furthermore, the urban historian Alan Mayne’s framework for 
examining slumland depictions is employed to study Levi’s image of the Sassi in 
detail. This chapter also makes extensive use of the large volume of press 
clippings on Carlo Levi’s work that the Fondo Levi has collected and donated to 
the Archivio centrale dello Stato in Rome.   
Chapter two examines the discursive construction of Matera as a 
national shame in the immediate post-war period. It draws on recent 
scholarship in the history of emotions, moral philosophy, psychology and 
nationalism to formulate a theoretical framework for studying national shame. 
It is argued that the distinct moral worlds of post-war Italy’s catholic and 
communist movements shaped the different patriotic narratives produced in 
the context of post-war Matera. The chapter contends that broader historical 
factors produced a number of similarities in these expressions of national 
shame which spanned the Cold War divide. The chapter draws on the large 
number of regional, national and international newspaper articles published 
about the Sassi during the scope of this study. Moreover, it analyses expressions 
of national shame found in parliamentary debates, prefect reports and 
additional official documents on Matera in the early 1950s.  
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 The third chapter examines the impact that notions of Matera as a 
national shame and a symbol of the southern question had on the city’s social 
and urban fabric. It focuses on the terms and implementation of the first special 
law for Matera in the 1950s. The special law aimed to rehouse families living in 
those cave dwellings that were deemed uninhabitable. The aim of this chapter is 
to reassess the limitations of the risanamento programme and how narratives of 
the city as a symbol of the South influenced this process. It draws on the vast 
body of archival material available in the Archivio di Stato di Matera including 
the files of the local prefect and the regional office of public works. An attempt 
is made to show that the existing secondary literature on the risanamento 
programme has neglected to examine key primary source documents in detail. 
Instead there has been an overreliance on the arguments that the architectural 
historian Manfredo Tafuri put forward in 1974. His conclusions about the first 
special law’s limitations appear to have been ideologically driven and have 
arguably stifled subsequent analysis. This chapter, therefore, aims to be a 
corrective and will re-examine the first special law using primary documents 
hitherto neglected while concurrently critiquing arguments put forward in the 
existing secondary literature on post-war Matera.  
 Chapter four is a case study of the rural village La Martella. Built in 1952 
to rehouse 200 families from the Sassi, official sources depicted this project as a 
model for the future of southern agriculture and an example of the South’s 
rebirth thanks to the combined efforts of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno and 
Marshall Plan aid. This chapter examines how and why the DC used Matera and 
La Martella to promote the effects of its twin reform programme for southern 
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Italy in the early 1950s. It aims to shed light on the way in which the concept of 
Matera as a symbol of the southern question was appropriated for political 
ends. This chapter draws on archival material from the Archivio centrale dello 
Stato in Rome (prefect’s files), the Archivio di Stato di Matera (Ministry of the 
Interior and the Italian Prime Minister’s office), the Fondo Democrazia Cristiana 
held at the Archivio Storico dell’Istituto Luigi Sturzo in Rome, and US 
Department of State files on La Martella from the National Archives and Records 
Administration in Maryland. Moreover, newsreel and documentary footage 
depicting Matera and La Martella from the Istituto Luce and the USIS-Trieste 
collection is examined in detail. 
Finally, it needs to be made clear that this thesis does not claim to be a 
comprehensive history of post-war Matera. Rather it examines a select number 
of themes and primary sources that have been hitherto overlooked in the 
existing literature using methods that no other study has employed. This 
research project aims to make an original contribution to the large body of 
work on Matera and the Sassi, but other accounts are needed to fully 
understand the city’s complex post-war history.  
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Chapter 1: Carlo Levi and the origins of the 
Matera question 
 
The city of Matera became a symbol of Italy’s southern question in the post-war 
period. Matera was also dubbed a vergogna nazionale in media and political 
circles.1 These narratives had a concrete impact on the city’s social and urban 
history post-1945. The description of Matera in the Turin writer, painter and 
political activist Carlo Levi’s book Cristo si è fermato a Eboli played a salient role 
in the discursive construction of these concepts.2 The book focused media and 
political attention on the city due to its critical and commercial success in Italy 
and overseas. Furthermore, Cristo influenced how Matera was studied and 
imagined in the immediate post-war period. Levi’s book, therefore, is a key 
source for understanding how and why the city came to be seen as a symbol of 
the southern backwardness and a vergogna nazionale. The existing literature on 
post-war Matera acknowledges that Cristo’s critical and commercial success 
was one of the main factors that generated the period of intense media and 
political interest in the city examined in this study.3 However, hitherto the 
book’s influential description of Matera, as well as how and why it shaped 
subsequent images of the city, has rarely been examined in detail. This chapter 
aims to be a corrective. It will examine Levi’s image of Matera in detail and then 
endeavour to trace its impact and reception on the Italian public sphere in the 
immediate post-war period.  
                                                             
1 Notably Carlo Levi never directly referred to Matera as a ‘national shame’. However, the 
term gained political and media currency in the context of debates surrounding the Sassi 
from the late 1940s onwards and the notion of the city as Other to putative ideas of 
modernity was central to this concept. 
2 Carlo Levi, Cristo si è fermato a Eboli, Einaudi, Turin, 1994. Hereafter Cristo. 
3  See for example Sacco, Matera contemporanea, pp. 70-71. 
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Descriptions of Matera and the Mezzogiorno from 1945 onwards were 
produced in the aftermath of almost twenty years of enforced silence regarding 
the southern question. Following the suppression of both parliament and the 
press in 1925-1926, the Fascist authorities had monopolized the mass media; 
any counter discourse was reduced to a clandestine level.4 In order to build 
political support in southern Italy, Mussolini had appropriated Francesco 
Saverio Nitti’s theories of state intervention to deal with the Mezzogiorno’s 
economic and infrastructural problems. However, the programme of public 
works that the Fascist government established for southern Italy was based on 
ruralismo rather than the industrialization policies proposed by the Nittian 
school of meridionalismo.5 The primary focus was on land reclamation schemes 
culminating in the so-called Legge Mussolini of 1928 which undertook notable 
programmes in the Agro Pontino, the Tavoliere di Puglia and the Basso 
Volturno.6 Drainage of marsh land became an integral part of Fascism’s 
programme of ruralisation embodied by the drive for agricultural self-
sufficiency, i.e. the battaglia del grano, launched on 14 January 1926.7 In 
addition, Mussolini abolished the Visocchi decree of 1920 which had assigned 
uncultivated land to cooperatives of landless rural workers in the aftermath of 
the First World War and was viewed as a threat to property rights by southern 
land owners. These policies were successful in the context of building political 
support for Fascism amongst the southern propertied classes. This led 
                                                             
4 Adrian Lyttelton, La conquista del potere. Il fascismo dal 1919 al 1929, Laterza, Bari, 1974, pp. 
381-433 & pp. 633-646 
5 Gabriella Gribaudi, ‘Images of the South: The Mezzogiorno as seen by Insiders and 
Outsiders’, in Lumley and Morris, The New History of the Italian South, p. 103 
6 For an account of the Pontine Marshes project and its place in Fascist propaganda see Frank 
M. Snowden, The Conquest of Malaria: Italy, 1900-1962, Yale University Press, London, 2006. 
7 For an outline of the battaglia del grano see Claudia Petraccone, Le due Italie. La questione 
meridionale tra realtà e rappresentazione, Laterza, Rome-Bari, 2006, pp. 183-190; and Brian 
Moloney, Italian Novels of Peasant Crisis, Four Courts Press, Dublin, 2005, pp. 52-58. 
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Mussolini to declare at the beginning of the 1930s that Italian culture had finally 
been unified and the southern question resolved.8 This position was reflected in 
newspaper coverage of southern Italy with Gaetano Polverelli, the head of 
Mussolini’s official press corps between 1931-1933, issuing a communiqué to 
Italian newspapers in 1931 advising them to avoid using the terms 
‘Mezzogiorno’ and ‘Italia meridionale’ to describe southern Italy and Islands 
and instead use them when referring to Italy’s African colonies.9 Consequently, 
the southern question disappeared from official journalistic debate. The reality 
of life in the rural South during the Fascist ventennio, however, was in stark 
contrast to the image propagated in official sources and the mass media. In fact, 
the period was marked by tax increases, a loss of income through a decrease in 
agricultural prices, restrictions on the amount of grain that could be consumed 
by rural workers, and changes in American immigration law restricting entry 
from Italy. As a result southern Italy’s population began to grow but was not 
producing sufficient resources to meet the demands caused by its demographic 
boom.10  
Peasant land occupations in Calabria, Puglia and Basilicata in 1946 were 
one of the factors which sparked the ‘rediscovery’ of the southern question in 
the immediate post-war period.11 The publication of Cristo and its subsequent 
commercial and critical success contributed to this renewed interest in the 
Mezzogiorno. Moreover, the book focused political and media attention on the 
                                                             
8 Petraccone, p. 190 
9 Polverelli’s 1931 list of instructions to the Italian press is reproduced in Phillip Cannistraro, 
La fabbrica del consenso. Fascismo e mass media, Laterza, Bari, 1975, pp. 419-424. 
10 Paul Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy. Society and Politics 1943-1988, Penguin 
Books, London, 1990, p. 35 
11  See Paolo Cinanni, Lotte per la terra nel Mezzogiorno 1943-1953, Marsilio Editori, Venice, 
1979, pp. 65-68. 
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region of Basilicata and the town of Matera in particular. Matera had been 
studied and depicted before Cristo’s publication, but Levi’s description of the 
city as a metaphor for the rural south and its relationship with the Italian state 
triggered a period of intense media and political interest in the Sassi. The image 
of Matera that the book presented influenced how the city was studied and 
imagined at political and intellectual levels. The text, therefore, is a crucial 
source for understanding how and why Matera came to be seen as a symbol of 
the southern question after 1945. Despite its important role in the discursive 
construction of Matera as a symbol of the South, however, Levi’s text is rarely 
analysed or historicized in detail in the existing literature. Given the fact that 
Cristo devotes just six pages to its description of the city there was nothing 
inevitable about the media and political interest in Matera that it subsequently 
generated. For that reason the book’s reception needs to be examined in detail 
to understand how and why its description of Matera gained political and 
cultural currency in the immediate post-war period.  
This chapter will be divided into three sections. First, it will analyse the 
political, social and biographical context which shaped Levi’s images of Matera 
and the South. Second, it will examine the depiction of Matera in Cristo to 
determine its internal logic, illustrating how it was shaped by the author’s 
intellectual formation and political vision for Italy during the uncertainty of the 
Resistance and the Second World War as well as narratives drawn from 
nineteenth-century slumland descriptions. Third, this chapter will examine 
Cristo’s reception and impact at political and intellectual levels in an attempt to 
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understand how the book shaped attitudes towards Matera within Italy’s post-
war public sphere. 
 
1.1 Cristo’s historical and political context 
 
Carlo Levi’s intellectual formation and the political context within which he 
wrote his most famous work informed the image of Matera presented in Cristo. 
The book describes the ten months that the Turinese author spent as a political 
exile, or confinato, between 3 August 1935 and 26 May 1936 in the towns of 
Grassano (where he was detained until 18 September 1935), and then Aliano 
(renamed Gagliano in the text) in the southern Italian region of Basilicata.12 A 
mixture of lyrical memoir, internal journey, reportage and socio-political 
treatise, Cristo gives an account of the social and economic conditions that its 
author witnessed during his internment. Basilicata, for Levi, became 
representative of southern Italy, a homogeneous territory characterized by ‘a 
uniform peasant society excluded from the ownership of land, immobile in its 
folkloric and near archaic culture, and cut off from history’.13 The book also 
denounced the failings of the Italian state and the southern bourgeoisie 
(personified by Aliano’s gentry and in particular the town’s mayor Don Luigi 
Magalone) which, Levi claimed, were culpable for the southern question. In 
contrast, Cristo underlines the perceived positive values of southern rural 
                                                             
12 Although Levi spent ten months in Basilicata, Cristo presents his time in political exile as a 
full calendar year. For an outline of Levi’s time in Basilicata see Gigliola De Donato and 
Sergio D’Amaro, Un torinese del Sud. Una biografia, Baldini & Castoldi, Milan, 2001, pp. 107-
132. Leonardo Sacco offers a comprehensive study of the numerous political exiles interned 
in Basilicata under Fascism, from Carlo Levi and Manlio Rossi-Doria to suspected members 
of Cosa Nostra, in his book Provincia di confine. La Lucania nel ventennio fascista, Schena 
Editore, Brindisi, 1995.  
13 Salvatore Lupo, ‘The Changing Mezzogiorno: Between Representations and Reality’, in 
Stephen Gundle and Simon Parker (eds.), The New Italian Republic, Routledge, London, 1996, 
p. 250 
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culture, albeit from the othering perspective of an outsider. The civiltà 
contadina is presented as an antidote to the belief system embodied by Western 
culture and the centralized state. One of the book’s central passages of 
reportage is a detailed description of the living conditions that the author’s 
sister Luisa Levi witnessed during her brief visit to Matera. Writing about this 
section of Cristo in the post-war period, Carlo Levi described it as ‘le pagine più 
appassionate e più nere del mio libro.’14 Although taking up just six of Cristo’s 
259 pages, this account of Matera’s cave dwellings influenced how the city was 
studied, imagined and depicted after 1945. 
 While Cristo describes the Mezzogiorno’s social and economic conditions 
in the mid-1930s, the book itself was written between December 1943 and July 
1944 in Florence at the height of the Resistance movement in northern Italy 
when the Tuscan capital was under Nazi occupation.15 From October 1943 until 
August 1944 Levi went into hiding in a safe house in Piazza Pitti in Florence. It 
was here, in a hidden room into which ‘giungeva il rumore di ferro dei passi 
delle pattuglie tedesche sul selciato,’16 that he wrote Cristo. A letter from Anna 
Maria Ichino, who ran the refuge, describes the uncertain climate in which the 
book was finished:  
                                                             
14 Carlo Levi, ‘Tre giorni a Matera’, Illustrazione italiana, December 1952, p. 39 
15 The handwritten manuscript of Cristo is held at the Harry Ransom Humanities Research 
Centre at the University of Texas, but a fascimile copy is available at the Central State 
Archive in Rome. Giovanni Falaschi has argued that not all of Cristo was written in Florence 
(the first date recorded on the 330 handwritten pages being 26 November 1940). The dates 
which appear in the finished book (December 1943 to July 1944), however, correspond to 
Levi’s time in hiding in Florence. It is believed that he wrote the final section of Cristo there 
while also carrying out revisions. Moreover, it appears that Levi had already recounted 
episodes from the book orally to friends and had kept detailed notes on his time in political 
exile too. See Giovanni Falaschi, ‘Cristo si è fermato a Eboli di Carlo Levi’, in Alberto Asor Rosa 
(ed.), Letteratura italiana. Le Opere, Volume V, Il Novevento, La ricerca letteraria, Einaudi, 
Turin, 1996, pp. 469-470. 
16 Carlo Levi, ‘Ritorno in Lucania’, in Maria Pagliara (ed.), Carlo Levi. Le tracce della memoria, 
Donzelli Editore, Rome, 2002, pp. 127-136  
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Era un periodo duro; pieno di timori, incertezze e speranze e talvolte 
nelle lunghe ore di attesa egli amava raccontarmi episodi della sua 
attività passata, e del lungo periodo di confino. Nacque così l’idea del 
libro e il lavorare ad esso fu l’unica distensione in quel periodo atroce … 
non sempre poteva lavorare la sera; non c’era luce, e non sempre 
avevamo mangiato abbastanza … Ogni giorno amici e compagni venivano 
arrestati e deportati, alcuni uccisi. Eravamo sotto le incursioni aeree ed 
ogni giorno non eravamo certi di vedere il seguente.17 
 
Levi claimed that writing Cristo had allowed him to focus on his time in 
Basilicata and momentarily escape the sense of fear and death that pervaded 
Florence.18 While he penned his most famous work ‘chiuso in una stanza’19, the 
book was produced in the context of Levi’s direct involvement with the 
Florentine Committee of National Liberation with whom he founded the 
newspaper La Nazione del Popolo. Although the book makes no explicit 
reference to the Resistance, it does reflect Levi’s political hopes and anxieties 
for the future of a post-Fascist Italian society. The ten-year gestation period 
between Levi’s exile in Basilicata and the writing of Cristo had a profound 
impact on the book’s final form. This decade allowed him to redefine and bring 
together in one place many of the themes that he had encountered and that had 
inspired him during his nascent political activism in Turin. These included the 
southern question, his belief in autonomia (collective rule at local and regional 
levels) and a rejection of the centralized state.20 The depiction of Matera that 
                                                             
17 The letter from Anna Maria Ichino, dated 16 April 1962, accompanies a photocopied version 
of Cristo’s original handwritten manuscript. ACS, FCL, busta 59, fascicolo 135. For further 
information on Levi’s time in hiding and clandestine political activities in Florence 1943-
1944 see De Donato and D’Amaro, pp. 152-174.  
18 Carlo Levi, ‘Quando scrivevo il Cristo’, in Pagliara, p. 125. Giovanni Falaschi, however, has 
argued that by 1944 Levi would have been aware of Fascism’s imminent demise and this 
would surely have impacted his morale and the tone of the book. See Falaschi, pp. 469-487 
19 Levi, Cristo, p. 3 
20 Writing about the ten-year gap between Levi’s internment in Basilicata and the writing of 
Cristo, David Bidussa has argued that ‘è un testo che si colloca alla fine di un lungo percorso, 
anche tormentato, in cui il confronto tra esperienza vissuta, capacità di comprensione e 
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the book presents needs to be examined in this historical, biographical and 
political context. 
 Despite graduating as a medical doctor at the age of twenty-two, Carlo 
Levi primarily dedicated his adult life to painting and politics. He was an acolyte 
of the Turin intellectual and journalist Piero Gobetti and wrote eight articles for 
the latter’s radical Liberal newspaper La Rivoluzione Liberale between 1922 and 
1924.21 Levi’s first article was written in 1922 at Gobetti’s behest. It was a 
critique of the southern Liberal-Conservative politician Antonio Salandra. 
Although he had joined the Associazione nazionale per gli interessi del 
Mezzogiorno in 1921, this was Levi’s first published writing on the southern 
question and foreshadowed some of the themes which would later be found in 
Cristo, i.e. the apparent mediocrity of Italy’s political class (personified by 
Salandra), an analysis of the southern question, Levi’s disdain for the southern 
middle classes, and his distrust of federal government.22  
                                                                                                                                                                            
fascino per un mondo percepito come altro obbliga a ripensare molte categorie 
interpretative precedenti, magari nella sostanza anche a confermarle ma in ogni caso a 
doverle riformulare. La scrittura del Cristo non è avvenuta di getto in una condizione di esilio 
o di clandestinità. Essa si configure come un atto testamentario, nel momento in cui viene 
scritta, in una sorta di condizione di non tempo, in cui si sovrappongono clandestinità, 
turbolenza nel privato e incertezza del futuro.’ See David Bidussa (ed.), Carlo Levi. Scritti 
politici, Einaudi, Turin, 2001, p. xv. For a detailed discussion of Levi’s ideas of local and 
regional autonomy see David Ward, Carlo Levi. Gli italiani e la paura della libertà, La Nuova 
Italia, Milan, 2002. 
21 The eight articles that Levi wrote for La Rivoluzione Liberale were: ‘Antonio Salandra’, La 
Rivoluzione Liberale , no. 25, 27 August 1922, pp. 91-92; ‘Il congresso dei popolari’, La 
Rivoluzione Liberale, no. 11, 24 April 1923, p. 48; ‘Letture’, La Rivoluzione Liberale, no. 10, 17 
April 1923, p. 42; ‘Pensiero fascista: Panunzio S., Diritto, forza, violenza’, La Rivoluzione 
Liberale, no. 10, 17 April 1923, p. 42; ‘Il cappone ripieno’, La Rivoluzione Liberale, no. 9, 26 
February 1924, p. 33; ‘L’impresario, l’asino e la scimmia’, La Rivoluzione Liberale, no. 41, 4 
November 1924, p. 165; ‘I torinesi di Carlo Felice’, La Rivoluzione Liberale, no. 17, 22 April 
1924, p. 68; ‘La vita regionale’, La Rivoluzione Liberale, no. 17, 22 April 1924, p. 68. They are 
available in original form at <http://www.erasmo.it/liberale/ricerca.asp> (accessed 
30/07/2013). 
22 Moloney, p. 147. The full article is reprinted in Gigliola De Donato, Carlo Levi. Coraggio dei 
miti. Scritti contemporanei 1922-1974, De Donato editore, Bari, 1975, pp. 3-10. 
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Through Gobetti, Levi came into contact with the meridionalista Guido 
Dorso, who also contributed to La Rivoluzione Liberale.23 Dorso’s book, La 
rivoluzione meridionale (1924) directly influenced Levi’s vision of southern 
Italy. The book called for decentralization to end what Dorso believed was 
Northern subjugation of the South from unification onwards. La rivoluzione 
meridionale argued that the southern question was a political rather than a 
socio-economic problem. The roots of this problem, for Dorso, could be traced 
back to the formation of the Italian state. Rather than building on the 
revolutionary ideals of the Risorgimento and including the masses in politics, 
Dorso viewed Italian unification as nothing more than a ‘royal conquest’: the 
extension of Piedmontese state bureaucracy throughout the peninsula.24 The 
book traced a direct line from what its author interpreted as Cavour’s politics of 
compromise to the trasformismo of Depretis and Giolitti, and ultimately the rise 
of Fascism. This, according to Dorso, had manifested itself in a mutually 
beneficial agreement between central powers and the southern middle classes: 
political power at a regional level was exchanged for support at the ballot box. 
Dorso believed that resolving the southern question would be a fundamental 
component in any process of political change in Italy. La rivoluzione meridionale 
                                                             
23 The twenty articles that Dorso wrote for La Rivoluzione Liberale can be consulted at 
http://www.erasmo.it/liberale/ricerca.asp (accessed 30/07/2013). Amongst this number 
are the articles ‘Il Mezzogiorno dopo la guerra’ and ‘Appello ai meridionali’, which although 
signed by a number of different meridionalisti, including Tommaso Fiore, appear to have 
largely been written by Dorso. Both articles contained many of the themes later found in La 
rivoluzione merdionale including the Italian state’s failure to build on the values of the 
Risorgimeno, the role of the southern middle classes in perpetuating the South’s social and 
economic problems, and the rejection of claims that state intervention would completely 
resolve the southern question. See Guido Dorso, ‘Il Mezzogiorno dopo la guerra’, La 
Rivoluzione Liberale, no. 32, 23 November 1923, pp. 129-130; and Guido Dorso, Tommaso 
Fiore et al., ‘Appello ai meridionali’, La Rivoluzione Liberale, no. 45, 2 December 1924, pp. 
181-182.  
24 Guido Dorso, La rivoluzione meridionale, Palomar, Bari, 2005, pp. 73-79 
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put forward autonomia, but not separatism, as the only possible solution to 
resolving Italy’s political malaise and as a result the southern question.25 
In a eulogy written in 1957 to mark the tenth anniversary of Dorso’s 
death, Levi directly acknowledged the influence that the latter’s writings had 
had on his own meridionalismo and by implication on Cristo. However, Brian 
Moloney argues that while the ideas presented in La rivoluzione meridionale 
influenced Levi’s theory of local and regional autonomy, it diverged from 
Dorso’s outline of how autonomous government should be implemented on a 
number of key points. Dorso’s concept of self-government placed rural 
agricultural workers in a subordinate position to small rural landowners. He 
advocated, moreover, the creation of an intellectual elite which would offer the 
political leadership that the southern middle classes had been unable to 
provide. In contrast, Levi proposed a more radical form of poltical autonomy 
which would be based on the collective values he perceived amongst the 
southern rural poor. Autonomy for Levi meant collective rule at a local level 
rather than decisions made from above by an elite group.26 This position would 
be later reflected in the political programmes of both Giustizia e Libertà (GL) 
and the Action Party (PdA) which Levi helped to formulate. 
In 1928 Levi founded an anti-Fascist political magazine in Turin entitled 
La lotta politica and from 1930 onwards became GL’s representative in Paris 
where, in 1931, he played an active part in writing the movement’s programme. 
The concept of autonomous, local and regional government was central to GL’s 
manifesto. Levi’s anti-Fascist political activity resulted in his arrest on 13 March 
                                                             
25 Ibid., pp. 261-281 
26  Moloney, p. 179 
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1934 before he was released on 9 May with a two-year suspended sentence. He 
was rearrested on 15 May 1935 and sentenced to three years internment in 
Basilicata.27 Although he received a three-year sentence, Levi was granted 
amnesty after ten months following Italy’s annexation of Abyssinia in May 1936. 
He subsequently lived in exile in France until 1941 where he wrote his first 
book Paura della libertà (1947). Between 1941 and 1944 Levi played an active 
role in the Resistance movement as a member of the Partito d’Azione and editor 
of La Nazione del Popolo in Tuscany - and later L’Italia Libera in Rome. This was 
also the period in which Levi penned Cristo. The political ideas that GL and later 
the Partito d’Azione espoused are key to understanding Levi’s political 
aspirations while he was writing his most famous work. These hopes and 
anxieties both informed and are reflected in his depiction of southern Italy and 
Matera.  
 Levi wrote a number of articles published in the Parisian edition of 
Quaderni di Giustizia e Libertà from 1932-1933.28 They focused on 
contemporary Italian politics, the nature of Italian Fascism and GL’s political 
position in contrast to other clandestine opposition parties. One theme 
dominated these writings: the concept of political autonomy. Levi rejected the 
economic argument that Fascism was simply the result of Italy’s petit 
bourgeoisie protecting its own economic interests. Paraphrasing Gobetti, Levi 
                                                             
27 For a detailed summary of Levi’s intellectual formation see Nicola Carducci, Storia 
intelletuale di Carlo Levi, Pensa MultiMedia, Lecce, 1999, pp. 11-52. Angelo d’Orsi offers a 
comprehensive account of Gobetti’s political and intellectual influence on Levi in the chapter 
‘Carlo Levi e l’aura gobettiana’, in Gigliola De Donato (ed.), Carlo Levi il tempo e la durata in 
“Cristo si è fermato a Eboli”, Edizioni Fahrenheit 451, Rome, 1999, pp. 31-64. 
28  See in particular Carlo Levi, ‘Seconda lettera dall’Italia’, Quaderni di Giustizia e Libertà, 
(1932), no. 2. Reprinted in De Donato, Carlo Levi. Coraggio dei miti, pp. 33-40; Leone 
Ginzburg and Carlo Levi, ‘Il concetto di autonomia nel programma di G.L.’, Quaderni di 
Giustizia e Libertà, (1932), no. 4 which is reproduced in Leonardo Sacco (ed.), Carlo Levi. 
L’altro mondo è il Mezzogiorno, Casa del Libro Editrice, Reggio Calabria, 1980, pp. 49-52. 
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described the Fascist party’s rise to power as an ‘autobiografia della nazione’ 
which reflected, in his opinion, the Italian people’s fear of freedom and personal 
responsibility combined with the adoration of the entity which fulfilled 
individual needs, i.e. the centralized state.29 Furthermore, Levi believed that 
without a major restructuring of Italian society, and in particular of Italian 
politics, the danger of a new form of fascism emerging post-Mussolini was a 
concrete possibility.30  
Autonomy was put forward as a means for avoiding this outcome. 
Outlining GL’s political programme in 1932, in an article co-written with Leone 
Ginzburg, Levi argued that: ‘in verità, una sola posizione è possibile, come 
assolutamente rivoluzionaria e antifascista: un integrale liberalismo. 
Rivoluzione in Italia significa libertà, capacità di libertà; autonomia nella più 
larga espressione del termine: nei riguardi dello Stato: autogoverno.’31 Notably 
GL was equally critical of what it saw as Communism’s deification of the 
centralized state. It claimed that Italian Communist Party (PCI) members 
adhered to the party line rather than taking an active role in political 
decisions.32 GL’s concept of self-government, however, was deliberately defined 
as a fluid concept. David Ward notes that this was ‘not because of any real 
vagueness in their [GL’s] thought, but simply because they are convinced that 
actual forms cannot be worked out until the specific circumstances and the 
context of the question to be resolved are clear.’33 Levi’s time as a political exile 
                                                             
29  Ward, Carlo Levi, pp. 16-18 
30  Ibid., pp. 16-18 
31  Carlo Levi, ‘Seconda lettera dall’Italia’, Quaderni di Giustizia e Libertà, (1932), no. 2. 
Reprinted in De Donato, Carlo Levi. Coraggio dei miti, p. 35 
32  Ibid., pp. 43-44 
33  David Ward, Piero Gobetti’s New World: Antifascism, Liberalism, Writing, University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 2010, p. 111 
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in Basilicata provided him with a precise context and location to expand on GL’s 
concept of autonomy. GL’s political beliefs would be central to the Action Party 
of which Levi was a key member. 
Founded in the summer of 1942 and defunct by 1946, the Action Party 
was a loose coalition of anti-Fascist Liberal Socialists involved in the Resistance 
movement which had a lasting influence on Italian political and intellectual life 
notwithstanding its short lifespan.34 The different ideological strands of the 
party were united by a number of core beliefs, closely based on the political 
programme for the GL movement which Levi had penned in 1931 and which 
punctuate his political-philosophical treatise Paura della libertà.35 First, the 
Partito d’Azione (PdA) believed that Fascism was not just a historical deviation 
as Croce claimed; rather it was a product of the Italian state’s failure from the 
Risorgimento onwards to create a fully democratic and unified state. Second the 
fall of Fascism was seen as a unique opportunity to move away from the socio-
economic and political-cultural models which had characterized the Liberal 
period - reaching their nadir with the rise of Mussolini - and instead rebuild 
Italian society, culture and identity in the post-Fascist era based on the values of 
the Resistance. Third, the PdA rejected the idolization of the monolithic state by 
mass parties, mass society and critiqued the imposition of power from above by 
                                                             
34 David Ward, AntiFascisms. Cultural Politics in Italy, 1943-46, Associate University Presses, 
London, 1996, p.124. For a comprehensive history of the Partito d’Azione see Giovanni De 
Luna, Storia del Partito d’Azione 1942-1947, Feltrinelli, Milan, 1982. 
35 Paura della libertà was written between September and December 1939 at La Baule in 
Brittany but not published until 1946. The book was a reflection on the causes of what Levi 
believed to be a crisis in Western civilization. Paura della libertà explores the themes of self-
government and the deification of the State. Notably the book contains a number of passages 
about state worship which foreshadow the style and content found in the political crescendo 
towards the end of Cristo. See Carlo Levi, Paura della libertà, in Bidussa, pp. 134-137. For an 
analysis of the intertextuality between Cristo si è fermato a Eboli and Paura della libertà see 
Lawrence Baldassaro, ‘Cristo si è fermato a Eboli e la Paura della libertà’, in De Donato, Carlo 
Levi il tempo e la durata, p. 81-86. 
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centralized government. Instead the Action Party proposed a programme of 
autonomous, local and regional government designed to meet the specific 
demands of citizens in different parts of the peninsula.36 These political beliefs 
were informed by Levi’s intellectual formation and shaped his depiction of 
southern Italy and Matera in Cristo. 
 
1.2 Matera in Cristo  
 
Levi presented the Sassi as a monument to the Italian state’s continued failure 
to resolve the southern question. Matera embodied the abyss that Levi 
perceived between the Italian state and southern rural culture. For Levi the 
centralized state was the primary cause of southern Italy’s economic problems: 
‘non può essere lo Stato … a risolvere la questione meridionale, per la ragione 
che quello che noi chiamiamo problema meridionale non è altro che il problema 
dello Stato.’37 Reflecting GL’s political programme and the influence of Dorso, 
Levi rejected the statism of mass parties on both the Left and the Right and their 
attempts to resolve the southern question through state intervention from 
above. Instead he claimed that southern Italy’s social and economic problems 
could only be resolved through a system of government which directly involved 
the rural poor, i.e. autonomous local rule.38 Levi depicted the Sassi as the 
embodiment of southern Italy’s social and economic problems; a symbol of the 
Italian state’s failure to tackle the southern question during its first eighty-years 
of existence. 
                                                             
36 These points are outlined in detail in Ward, AntiFascisms, pp. 124-173. 
37 Levi, Cristo, p. 220 
38 Ibid., pp. 222-223 
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Notably the description of Matera in Cristo is recounted to Carlo the 
protagonist by his sister Luisa using reported speech.39 This literary device 
renders the book’s account of Matera more melodramatic.40 Rather than the 
impressions of Carlo, who had already witnessed the poverty of Grassano and 
Aliano and had become acclimatized to scenes of degradation, the reader is 
presented with the thoughts of an urbane, Turin-based doctor on her first visit 
to southern Italy. This means that Luisa Levi’s sense of horror at the Sassi’s 
living conditions is heightened in the narrative.41 Furthermore, through the use 
of reported speech, the line between the author’s thoughts and those of his 
character, in this case Luisa Levi, are blurred and at times indistinguishable. 
While the description of the Sassi in Cristo comes ostensibly from the mouth of 
the protagonist’s sister, its political undertones make it clear that her voice is 
being channelled through Carlo Levi the author.  
 
Matera: symbol of the civiltà contadina 
 
Cristo presents Matera as a symbol of southern Italy’s civiltà contadina. One of 
the ways this is achieved is through the description of the city’s topography. The 
irreconcilable divide between the Italian state and the southern rural poor is a 
                                                             
39  Luisa Levi was born in 1898 and graduated with a degree in medicine in 1920.  She 
continued her studies in Paris in 1927 where she specialized in pediatric neuropsychology. 
In the 1920s and 1930s she published widely in her field of expertise and worked in a 
number of psychiatric hospitals in Italy until the application of the leggi razziali in 1938. For 
a detailed biography of Luisa Levi’s professional career and a bibliography of her work see 
http://scienzaa2voci.unibo.it/biografie/1160-levi-luisa (accessed 24/08/2013). 
40  Carlo Levi’s use of reported speech to describe Matera is briefly discussed in Restucci and 
Tafuri, p. 31. 
41  Gigliola De Donato notes that unlike the rest of Cristo’s handwritten manuscript, the six 
pages on Matera were rewritten and corrected many times. Furthermore, it is the only 
section of the book in which the author left a double space between his text. De Donato 
contends that this illustrates the difficulty that Levi experienced in inserting the section on 
Matera into the narrative and is arguably the reason why Luisa Levi rather than Carlo the 
protagonist describes the Sassi to the reader. Gigliola De Donato, Le parole del reale. Ricerca 
sulla prosa di Carlo Levi, Edizioni Dedalo, Bari, 1998, pp. 129-130. 
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recurring leitmotif in Cristo. Levi repeatedly underlined what he perceived as 
the social and cultural gap between le due Italie, i.e. the Italian state, which 
imposed its will from above, and the southern rural poor, embodied by 
Gagliano’s agricultural workers, who viewed ‘quelli di Roma’ with suspicion: 
‘per i contadini, lo Stato è piú lontano del cielo, e piú maligno, perché sta sempre 
dall’altra parte. Non importa quali siano le forme politiche, la sua struttura, i 
suoi programmi.’42 Levi explicitly outlined this perceived dualism in the 
penultimate chapter of Cristo: ‘Siamo anzitutto di fronte al coesistere di due 
civiltà diversissime, nessuna delle quali è in grado di assimilare l’altra. 
Campagna e città, civiltà precristiana e civiltà non piú cristiana, stanno di fronte; 
e finché la seconda continuerà ad imporre alla prima la sua teocrazia statale, il 
dissidio continuerà.’43 The perceived abyss between these two dissenting 
cultures was directly reflected in Levi’s description of Matera. Reflecting the 
political beliefs developed through his writings for La Rivoluzione Liberale, 
Giustizia e Libertà and later the Action Party, Matera became the architectural 
expression of what Levi believed was the state’s imposition of its political will 
on southern Italy’s rural poor.44  
 The town of Matera is divided into two different parts: the Piano, where 
the modern section of the town was built from the eighteenth century onwards, 
and the Sassi, which have been inhabited since at least the fourth century. The 
economic and social gap between the Piano and the Sassi became more marked 
                                                             
42 Levi, Cristo, p. 67. The emptiness of Fascist rhetoric in resolving the southern question is 
embodied by Gagliano’s public urinal which was built at great expense, but only used by 
Carlo the protagonist. Ibid., p. 41.   
43 Ibid., p. 221 
44 Nicola Longo, ‘I luoghi del “Cristo si è fermato a Eboli” e la loro topografia’, in De Donato, 
Carlo Levi il tempo e la durata, p. 157 
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in the nineteenth century with the former housing Matera’s middle-class 
professionals, landowners and government officials, while the latter was 
inhabited by the city’s rural poor, who became ever further marginalized from 
the town’s economic and administrative centre.45 Levi used the social, 
topographical and architectural divisions between Matera’s two distinct urban 
areas as a metaphor for his meridionalismo. The image of Matera presented in 
Cristo embodied the separation that he perceived between the Italian state and 
the civiltà contadina, i.e. those in power and the disenfranchised.  
 The Piano, accordingly, is depicted as embodying the Italian state which 
imposes its will on the southern rural poor from above with the help of the 
southern middle class. On her arrival in Matera, Luisa Levi notes that instead of 
the ‘città pittoresca’ described in her guidebook she finds herself ‘su una specie 
di altopiano deserto’ in which ‘sorgevano, sparsi qua e là, otto o dieci grandi 
palazzi di marmo, come quelli che si costrusicono ora a Roma.’46 These 
buildings represent the functions of the state: ‘questi palazzi novecenteschi 
erano la Questura, la Prefettura, le Poste, il Municipio, la Caserma dei 
Carabinieri, il Fascio, la Sede delle Corporazioni, l’Opera Balilla e così via.’47 
Echoing Dorso’s claims that the Risorgimento was merely a ‘conquista regia’48 
of southern Italy by the Piedmontese government, the Piano, with its austere 
and incongruous official buildings, is compared to a grotesque colonial outpost: 
‘Sembrava l’ambizioso progetto di una città coloniale, improvvisato a caso, e 
                                                             
45 Rosalba Demtrio and Grazia Guadagno, Matera. Forma e strutture, Testo & immagine, Turin, 
2001, pp. 47-68 
46 Levi, Cristo, p. 73. Following Matera’s promotion to provincial capital in 1927 a number of 
new official and commercial buildings were constructed on the Piano. These included 
provincial administrative buildings, the Chamber of Commerce, a new school, a Bank of 
Napoli in Piazza Vittorio Veneto and a new post office. See Restucci and Tafuri, p. 30.  
47 Levi, Cristo, p. 73 
48 Moloney, p. 151 
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interrotto sul principio per qualche pestilenza, o piuttosto lo scenario di cattivo 
gusto di un teatro all’aperto per una tragedia dannunziana.’49 The description of 
the Piano underlines one of the supplemental functions of Matera throughout 
Cristo, i.e. to represent the state’s imposition of its will upon the rural poor. This 
point is most famously depicted in the order from the Questura di Matera 
denying Levi permission to work as a doctor in Gagliano.50 Nicola Longo notes 
that: ‘Matera è semplicemente una Roma in piccolo, né migliore né peggiore: 
dovunque il potere s’incarna ed esiste perché è contro i contadini, contro il 
buonsenso, contro le stesse leggi e il diritto.’51 However, as illustrated above, it 
is the Piano which Levi presented as the embodiment of Rome’s authority and 
bureaucracy. In contrast, the Sassi and their inhabitants embodied the 
Mezzogiorno’s civiltà contadina, excluded by the Italian state’s centralized rule. 
The dire living conditions of Matera’s cave dwellings were an extreme 
manifestation of what Levi described as the ‘dissidio secolare’ between the 
Italian state and the southern rural poor.52 During the political crescendo near 
the end of Cristo, Levi warned of the potential consequences if no effort was 
made to bridge this gap. In the dichotomy between the state and the civiltà 
contadina, Matera became synonymous with southern Italy’s rural poor:  
La civiltà contadina sarà sempre vinta, ma non si lascerà mai schiacciare 
del tutto, si conserverà sotto i veli della pazienza, per esplodere di tratto; 
e la crisi mortale perpetuerà. Il brigantaggio, guerra contadina, ne è la 
prova: e quello del secolo scorso non sarà l’ultimo. Finché Roma 
governerà Matera, Matera sarà anarchica e disperata, e Roma disperata e 
tirannica.53  
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Levi expanded upon the concept of Matera as the symbolic capital of the 
Mezzogiorno’s civiltà contadina in his post-war writings. This point is 
exemplified in a talk given at the Associazione culturale italiana’s conference in 
Turin on 31 March 1950: ‘Che Matera, almeno simbolicamente, sia una capitale, 
è altrettanto fuori dubbio, tanta vi è là la chiarezza della civiltà che vi si 
manifesta, della civiltà contadina, non contaminata dai contatti storici.’54 
Notably Levi’s concept of the Mezzogiorno and contadini had at this point 
transcended the geographical confines of southern Italy and the class 
distinction of its rural workforce.55 In his 1950 novel L’Orologio Levi built 
further upon his concept of Italy’s due civiltà dividing society into two distinct 
groups: Contadini and Luigini. This first group was loosely defined as ‘tutti 
quelli che fanno le cose, che le creano, che le amano, che se ne contentano’56 and 
included not just agricultural workers but the industrial proletariat, 
intellectuals, entrepreneurs, and, in short, anyone who produced something 
tangible.57 In contrast, the Luigini, named after Gagliano’s Fascist Mayor Don 
Luigi Magalone, were described as ‘quelli che dipendono e comandano; e amano 
e odiano le gerarchie, e servono e imperano.’58 This second group was described 
as parasitic and comprised primarily of state bureaucrats and Italy’s lower 
middle classes.59 Rome, described as a city ‘fuori della vita reale e dello sviluppo 
di ogni giorno, ai nomi eterni dell’Impero e della Chiesa e dalla informe eternità 
della burocrazia’, was dubbed the Luigini’s symbolic capital.60 In contrast Levi’s 
                                                             
54 Carlo Levi, ‘Il contadino e l’Orologio’, in De Donato, Carlo Levi. Coraggio dei miti, p. 56 
55 Ibid., p. 55 
56 Carlo Levi, L’Orologio, Einaudi, Turin, 1950, p. 192 
57 Ibid., pp. 191-192 
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59 Ibid., pp. 192-193 
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post-war writing placed Matera firmly at the centre of this loosely-defined 
dichotomy as the symbolic capital of the southern Italy’s rural culture.61      
Levi further underlined the concept of Matera as the capital of the civiltà 
contadina in an interview from August 1959 that featured in Mondadori’s 
popular weekly rotocalco Epoca. The author commented that ‘fra mille luoghi 
dell’Italia meridionale, Matera ha rappresentato la prima esperienza, la più 
vera, la più completa, il primo punto di contatto reale con i problemi della vita 
del popolo del Mezzogiorno.’62 Levi continued that the town had: ‘Il carattere di 
un luogo centrale e significante ... la capitale del mondo contadino … la sua 
realtà e i suoi problemi, rappresentino un punto centrale e tipico di quel grande 
movimento che va rinnovando e modificando sostanzialmente il 
Mezzogiorno.’63 Levi positioned Matera at the centre of his imagined South. He 
transformed the Sassi into a metonym of the southern question and the decades 
of division that he perceived between the state and the rural poor, between 
Contadini and Luigini. Thus, for Levi, Matera became an idea as much as a 
geographical space. This discourse of Matera and the Sassi as the symbolic 
capital of the civiltà contadina echoed in depictions of the town in the post-war 
period. Matera became synonymous with the perceived social and economic 
problems of the entire rural Mezzogiorno. This concept would have a concrete 
impact on how the city was studied and imagined in the post-war period. 
Matera was seen as a testing ground for resolving the southern question. As a 
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result generic development models for the entire South were applied to a 
specific local case with limited results.64 
 
Matera as Other 
 
The description of Matera in Cristo served a supplemental function. It looked to 
denounce what Levi perceived as the Italian state’s neglect of southern Italy 
from unification onwards. Furthermore, the description of living conditions 
amongst Matera’s cave dwellings was designed to shock the book’s implied 
middle-class readership. The narrative strategies that Levi used to achieve 
these aims resemble slumland depictions from the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Matera’s complex network of cave dwellings is presented 
as Other to notions of the modern city. This narrative would influence how 
Matera was depicted in mass media and political sources in the post-war 
period. The literary techniques that Levi used to construct his image of Matera, 
therefore, need to be examined in detail. The work of the urban historian Alan 
Mayne is useful in this regard. His research focuses on the representation of 
slums in Britain, Australia, and the United States in the yellow press from 1870 
and 1914. He argues that the concept of the slum was a discursive construct. 
According to Mayne, slumland depictions used a set of scenarios and stock 
figures to reduce the complexities of substandard inner-city housing to a series 
of stereotypes that a middle-class audience would easily recognise and 
understand. The slum was described as Other and juxtaposed with an idealized 
notion of the modern urban city. One of the primary aims of these descriptions 
was to create a sense of alarm amongst readers and promote the need for urban 
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renewal projects. Descriptions of slums, Mayne contends, did not mirror the 
social conditions of inner-city housing; rather they used a set of literary tropes 
to create the concept of the slum in the popular imagination.65 
 In his study of slum depictions in the yellow press of Britain, Australia 
and the United States, Mayne identified a number of recurring strategies that 
were used to create and reinforce stereotypical slumland images for an implied 
middle-class audience. Levi adopted a number of similar tropes in his 
description of Matera in Cristo. First, Mayne contends that the concept of time 
was used to create a contrast between notions of the modern city and the slum. 
Visitors to slums were described as being in a hurry and working to a timetable. 
They were depicted as focused and energetic. In contrast, time in the slum was 
apparently ignored. The pace of life was lethargic and slum dwellers were 
depicted as listless and slothful.66 Furthermore, the imagined temporal 
differences between the modern city and the slum were created through the 
juxtaposition of images of light and dark. These were synonyms for day and 
night, which in turn acted as metaphors for notions of virtue and vice. Words 
such as gloomy, shadowy, dark, and black were frequently used in slumland 
descriptions. Moreover, slums were often referred to as black spots or stains 
upon the city. References to time were also used to juxtapose notions of the 
modern city with the apparent backwardness and decay of the slum. Slumland 
dwellings lacked the amenities and privacy of the ideal bourgeois home. They 
were described as relics of a bygone age. According to Mayne, these narratives 
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66  Mayne, The Imagined Slum, p. 167 
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contributed to the agenda of urban reformers who used them to argue for the 
need to carry out slum clearances.67   
 The description of Matera in Cristo echoes a number of these narratives. 
Luisa Levi is described as being pressed for time during her visit to Basilicata 
and complains about having to waste a day waiting for a bus in Matera before 
travelling on to Gagliano.68 This creates a clear temporal divide between the 
apparently timeless world of the South, and Matera in particular, and the 
implied modernity of Turin and the North from which she has travelled. There 
appears to be no sense of ordered time during Luisa Levi’s visit to the Sassi. The 
women encountered are described as exhausted due to malnourishment and 
the children depicted are described as either listless due to disease or swarming 
wildly in large groups. Cristo uses images of light and dark in its description of 
the Sassi. This implies a divide between Matera and notions of the modern city. 
The valley in which the Sassi are situated is described as being ‘un brutto colore 
grigiastro’ as well as having ‘un’aria cupa e cattiva’.69 Furthermore, Matera’s 
cave dwellings are labelled ‘buchi neri’ and ‘grotte scure’.70 In slumland 
literature darkness inferred night-time and was often employed as a metaphor 
for vice. It was a means for creating an image of the slum as a stain upon the 
modern city. This narrative trope is further implied in Cristo through Luisa 
Levi’s initial impression of Sasso Caveoso and Sasso Barisano: ‘Hanno la forma 
con cui, a scuola, immaginavamo l’inferno di Dante.’71 Matera, therefore, is 
presented to the implied middle-class reader as resembling hell on earth. In 
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addition, the description of Matera’s cave homes in Cristo implies a temporal 
divide between the Sassi and notions of the modern city: ‘Passava sui tetti delle 
case, se cosí quelle si possono chiamare. Sono grotte scavate nella parete di 
argilla indurita del burrone.’72 The implication is that the Sassi’s troglodyte 
dwellings resemble a bourgeois understanding of what constitutes a home, but 
are in fact not worthy of that title. The contrast with the implied home of the 
putative modern city is developed further through the interior description of 
Matera’s distinctive housing. Luisa Levi notes that ‘vedevo l’interno delle grotte, 
che non prendono altra luce e aria se non dalla porta. Alcune non hanno 
neppure quella: si entra dall’alto, attraverso botole e scalette. Dentro quei buchi 
neri, dalle pareti di terra, vedevo i letti, le misere suppellettili, i cenci stesi.’73 
The families that lived in these caves, moreover, shared their homes with farm 
animals: ‘Ogni famiglia ha, in genere, una sola di quelle grotte per tutta 
abitazione e ci dormono tutti insieme, uomini, donne, bambini e bestie.’74 The 
inference from this description is that Matera’s cave homes were a remnant of a 
previous age and an affront to what would have been considered acceptable 
housing conditions amongst the book’s implied bourgeois reader.  
Smell was an additional narrative used to depict the slum as alien to the 
idea of the salubrious modern city according to Mayne’s thesis. Frequent 
references were made in slumland depictions to bad smells, stenches, and foul 
odours. In the mid-nineteenth century, before the emergence of germ-disease 
theory, it was believed that illnesses such as malaria and cholera were caused 
by miasmas or ‘bad air’. As a result bad smells were associated with dirt, 
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disease, and unsanitary living conditions.75 Mayne’s research shows that slums 
in Britain and the USA were depicted as stench-filled and overcrowded. They 
were presented as a potential danger to the health of the modern city and its 
inhabitants. Newspaper references to slums as ‘plague spots’ and ‘hot beds of 
disease’ were commonplace. In addition, links were made between physical and 
social ills. Bad smells were associated with moral degeneracy. Mayne argues 
that the concept of slums as malodorous and filthy breeding grounds for 
infectious and moral disease played an important role in the promotion of slum 
clearances.76 Levi employed similar narrative techniques in his description of 
the Sassi. Matera’s cave homes are described as ‘scure e puzzolenti’.77 Moreover, 
they are presented as airless and filthy. The link between bad smells, dirt and 
disease is further elaborated in the description of health conditions that Luisa 
Levi witnesses. She sees malnourished children suffering from tracoma, 
malaria, dysentery and possibly black fever.78 The Sassi are compared to ‘una 
città colpita dalla peste.’79 These narratives help to create an image of Matera as 
Other; the antithesis to the putative notion of the modern city which is implied 
throughout Carlo Levi’s text. 
 According to Mayne’s thesis slumland depictions featured five stock 
characters appropriate to the stylized setting in which they resided. He argues 
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that these theatrical types were adapted from popular literature to illustrate the 
hardship of slum living and thus promote the need for urban reforms to a mass 
audience. The five characters were: the Woman, the Child, the Foreigner; the 
Landlord, and the Inspector.80 The first two feature in Levi’s description of the 
Sassi. Mayne contends that Woman was the main character that slum visitors 
encountered in journalistic accounts. Most slumland descriptions were set 
during the day when men would be at work. As a result women were the 
spokespeople for the slum. There were two main types of women in slumland 
depictions: the Good Woman and the Bad Woman. The Good Woman 
personified the concept of the deserving poor. She was an industrious and 
honest housewife but impoverished. Typically this character was portrayed as 
keeping a clean home despite their surroundings. The implication was that with 
improved housing conditions the Good Woman would be a respectable member 
of society. The Good Woman was contrasted with her lazy neighbour the Bad 
Woman. This figure personified urban degeneracy.81 The Bad Woman is 
unkempt, sullen, and wizened in appearance. She was described as having loose 
morals and being a drunkard.82 The female character in Cristo’s depiction of 
Matera is the figure of the Good Woman. The women that Luisa Levi encounters 
during her journey through the Sassi are described as malnourished, 
impoverished and dejected yet at the same time ‘gentili’.83 The implication from 
the text is that the women living in the Sassi are members of the deserving poor 
who despite their surroundings live with grace and dignity.  
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 The Child was another stock character used to create the divide between 
notions of the modern city and the slum according to Mayne’s research. The 
image of ill-clad children swarming together in large groups was a regular trope 
in slumland depictions. The difficulties of slum living was communicated 
through the description of slum children’s thin and haggard faces. Children, 
Mayne contends, also personified the potential for future regeneration. 
Descriptions of childhood innocence were common and contrasted with the 
harshness of slum life. Mayne argues that reformers used these images to 
mobilize community support for urban regeneration projects. The character of 
the slum child appealed to the implied bourgeois reader’s emotions and echoed 
tropes that were common in urban fiction, theatre and illustration.84 The 
character of the Child is central to Carlo Levi’s depiction of Matera and appears 
to draw on many of the literary techniques that Mayne has identified in his 
research. The text creates the impression that the Sassi are overrun with packs 
of seemingly feral children: ‘Di bambini ce n’era un’infinità. In quel caldo, in 
mezzo alle mosche, nella polvere, spuntavano da tutte le parti, nudi del tutto e 
coperti di stracci.’85 Moreover, the physical description of the Sassi’s child 
population is used to convey the hardship of life in Matera’s cave homes: ‘altri 
bambini incontravano, coi visini grinzosi come dei vecchi, e scheletriti per la 
fame; i capelli pieni di pidocchi e di croste. Ma la maggior parte avevano delle 
grandi pance gonfie, enormi, e la faccia gialla e patita per la malaria.’86 This 
sense of indigence and disease is further heightened through a comparison 
between the health conditions of Matera’s child population and that of Turin’s 
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urban poor. Luisa Levi notes that: ‘io non ho mai visto una tale immagine di 
miseria: eppure sono abituata, è il mio mestiere, a vedere ogni giorno diecine di 
bambini poveri, malati e maltenuti. Ma uno spettacolo come quello di ieri non 
l’avevo mai neppure immaginato.’87 The text infers that Matera’s child poverty 
is worse than the urban poverty of the modern city, in this case Turin. It was 
arguably an attempt to create anger towards the Italian state’s neglect of 
southern Italy in the implied middle-class reader.   
 Levi’s description of the Sassi presents them as Other to notions of the 
modern city which were pervasive in the Western public sphere in the early 
twentieth century. Matera’s cave homes are depicted as a symbol of Fascism’s 
failure to resolve the southern question. A number of narratives prevalent in 
slumland descriptions appear to have influenced this image. Arguably these 
literary tropes were used because they would have been familiar to the implied 
bourgeois and learned audience for whom Levi wrote his book. These 
narratives were employed to create an image of poverty which would shock and 
anger the reader. However, there is a clear tension between Levi’s depiction of 
southern rural culture in Cristo and the image of Matera that the book presents. 
Southern rural culture is described as a positive value system which needs to be 
protected and Matera as the symbolic capital of this world. The image of the 
Sassi that Levi presented, however, conveys the idea that the city is Other to 
notions of modernity. This description implies that some form of intervention is 
needed to improve the living conditions amongst Matera’s cave dwellers. 
Although Levi advocated a system of autonomous local rule to resolve the 
southern question, his description of the Sassi played a salient role in focusing 
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media and political attention on Matera. This process ultimately resulted in the 
implementation of the risanamento programme for Matera in the 1950s from 
above without the consultation of the local population.  
The notion that Matera was a symbol of the Italian state’s continued 
neglect of the Mezzogiorno, would be highly influential in subsequent 
descriptions of the city. Images of Matera produced in media and political 
sources would appropriate many of the same narrative threads that Levi 
employed in his description of the Sassi. These concepts were important tools in 
the discursive construction of Matera as a symbol of the southern question and 
laid the foundation for notions of the city as a national shame which emerged in 
the late 1940s. Writing about Cristo’s impact on post-war Matera, Anne Toxey 
has argued that ‘following the descriptions in Levi’s book, Matera became 
known as the “symbol of peasant misery,” the very emblem of the Southern 
Question.’88 Her work, however, does not explore how and why this narrative 
became part of the repertoire of stock images of the Mezzogiorno at both 
political and intellectual levels in the post-war period. The next section, in 
contrast, will examine this point in detail. 
 
1.3 Cristo’s reception and impact 
 
Einaudi published Cristo in June 1945 in three different series simultaneously: 
Saggi, Testimonianze and Narratori contemporanei.89 Along with Gramsci’s 
Lettere dal carcere, the book was one of the publishing house’s major successes 
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in the immediate post-war period.90 Exact Italian sales figures for Cristo in its 
first two years of publication were not forthcoming, but Einaudi’s quarterly 
bulletin for winter 1946 showed that the book was already in its fifth 
pressing.91 A letter by Giulio Einaudi to Franco Venturi dated the 25 September 
1947 noted that the publishing house expected to have sold at least 40,000 
copies of Cristo by the end of the year in contrast to 30,000 copies of Gramsci's 
Lettere dal carcere.92 Gigliola De Donato and Sergio D’Amaro claim that Levi 
took special care to ensure his book was distributed in southern Italy.93 
Statistics on Italian literacy levels in the post-war period, however, suggest that 
Cristo was primarily read by a learned and urban intellectual class during the 
scope of this study.94 
                                                             
90 See Luisa Mangoni, ‘Da Cristo si è fermato a Eboli a L’Orologio: note su Carlo Levi e la casa 
editrice Einaudi’, in Piero Brunello and Pia Vivarelli (eds.), Carlo Levi: gli anni fiorentini 1941-
1945, Donzelli, Rome, 2003, p. 198. Moreover, a catalogue for the Rome based bookshop 
Dedalo published on 15 January 1946 illustrates Cristo’s immediate success. It shows that 
the book, which cost 180 lire, was the retailer’s best-selling product between December 
1945 and January 1946. See ACS, FCL, busta 103, fasciolo 2415.   
91 De Donato and D’Amaro, p. 184 
92 Ibid., p. 198 
93 The reliability of these claims, however, is questionable as no documentary evidence is given 
to back them up. See De Donato and D’Amaro, p. 184. 
94  Approximately 12.9 per cent of Italians were illiterate in 1951 with that figure almost double 
in southern Italy and Islands for the same year at 24.8 per cent of the population. The same 
set of statistics reveals that illiteracy rates were as high as 29 per cent in Basilicata, second 
only to Calabria on 32 per cent. In addition, ISTAT statistics reveal that in 1951 only one per 
cent of the Italian population, and just 0.9 per cent in the South and islands, had completed 
third level education with 76.9 per cent of Italians leaving education after elementary school. 
While illiteracy rates in Italy had dropped to 8.3 per cent by 1961, the figure in the South and 
islands was still nearly twice the national average at 16.3 per cent. The diffusion of print 
media in rural areas of Italy in the immediate post-war period was limited by what David 
Forgacs has called ‘spatial inequality’ between city and country. The book selling market was 
primarily restricted to areas of urban growth with the distribution of printed materials in 
large parts of rural Italy virtually non-existent. The limited dissemination of books in rural 
Italy was caused by a number of specific factors: lower literacy levels, a lack of disposable 
income, a restricted amount of free time, and poor communications networks in many parts 
of the peninsula. These statistics underline that the Italian reading public from 1945-1960 
was predominately an urban intellectual class with disposable income and access to centres 
of book publishing. See Ginsborg, p. 440 and David Forgacs, Italian Culture in the Industrial 
Era 1880-1980. Cultural Industries, Politics and the Public, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1990, pp. 18-23. 
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 The Fondazione Carlo Levi has collected a vast array of press cuttings on 
Cristo from the period 1945-1950. These articles reveal that the book was a 
commercial and a critical success in Italy during the scope of this study. 
Moreover, they illustrate how Cristo became a cultural reference point for 
articles addressing the renewed interest in the southern question. The book 
was reviewed widely on its release in a vast number of publications, from 
national to local newspapers, weekly and monthly publications as well as party 
organs. Cristo was widely praised in the Italian press for its detailed and 
sympathetic account of the Mezzogiorno. Levi’s depiction of southern rural 
culture, in addition, was hailed as revelatory.95 Writing in the Turin-based 
Christian Democrat daily Il Popolo Nuovo, Augusta Grosso Guidetti commented 
that: ‘per molti di noi questo libro [Cristo] … ha rivelato, nella interpretazione e 
trasfigurazione personale di un artista, un mondo di cui non sospettavamo 
l’esistenza così vicino.’96 Moreover, Cristo was acclaimed for its role in 
refocusing intellectual and political attention on the southern question 
following the fall of Fascism. Particular merit was attributed to Levi’s ability to 
spread the debate about the South beyond the limited readership of the various 
political studies and social scientific reports previously published on the 
subject.97 Owing to the book’s critical and commercial success, therefore, it 
                                                             
95  See Massimo Mila, ‘Esplorare l’Italia’, Giustizia e libertà, 27 December 1945, page number not 
available; Tommaso Fiore, ‘La piccolo borghesia. Voilà l’ennemi’, La Gazzetta del 
Mezzogiorno, 14 February 1946, page number not available; Giuseppe Petronio, ‘Cristo si è 
fermato a Eboli’, La Nuova Europa, 24 February 1946, page number not available; Nera 
Gnolli-Fuzzi, ‘Triste e cupa vita di un confinato politico’, La Voce Libera, 4 March 1946, page 
number not available; Marcello Maestro, ‘Fra i libri’, Il Mondo, July 1946, page number not 
available (Newspaper cuttings found in ACS, FCL, busta 103, fascicolo 2415). 
96  Augusta Grosso Guidetti, ‘Cristo si è fermato a Eboli’, Il Popolo Nuovo, 21 April, 1946, page 
number not available (ACS, FCL, Busta 103, Fascicolo 2415) 
97  This point was expressed succinctly in L’Italia Nuova in May 1946: ‘Molti fiumi d’inchiostro 
sono stati versati sulla “questione meridionale”, ma non esitiamo ad affermare che 
quest’opera [Cristo] gioverà ad essa più di mille trattati di politica e di economia.’ See ‘Cristo 
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became a cultural reference point for the renewed debate regarding the 
southern question amongst members of post-war Italy’s public sphere. This 
point is reflected by the fact that Cristo’s enigmatic title was routinely cited and 
recycled in various articles and publications which focused their attention on 
southern Italy’s economic, social and political conditions after 1945.98  
Furthermore, Cristo enjoyed relative commercial and critical success in 
the USA and the UK during the scope of this study. This had a direct impact on 
foreign interest in Matera at intellectual, journalistic and academic levels.99 The 
book’s American edition was released on 18 April 1947 by Farrar, Straus and 
Company. It sold 13,785 copies in its first year and had had reached an 
estimated 96,285 by 1950. Cassell published the book in the UK in 1948.100 
Russell King has noted the substantial impact that Cristo made at an intellectual 
and academic level in both the US and the UK during the scope of this study. The 
book’s Italian edition was widely used in Italian departments in the English-
speaking world. The English translation was read more as a document of 
southern Italy’s social and cultural topography than the diary of an internal 
                                                                                                                                                                            
si è fermato a Eboli’, L’Italia Nuova. La voce dei giovani, 27 May 1946, page number not 
available. See also Antonio Romano, ‘Cristo si è fermato a Eboli’, Il Risorgimento, 22 August 
1946, page number not available; Piero Gadda Conti, ‘Un libro premiato. “Cristo si è fermato 
a Eboli”, Il Popolo, 8 March 1946, page number not available; ‘Aspetti della questione 
meridionale’, Il Giornale del Popolo, 22 April 1946, page number not available (ACS, FCL, 
busta 103, fascicolo 2415). 
98  For example Giuseppe Isnardi, ‘La questione meridionale. Cristo si è fermato a Eboli’, Libertà, 
1 September 1946; Edoardo Rossi, ‘La via del Mezzogiorno. Cristo al di là di Eboli’, Avanti!, 
23 November 1946; Raimondo Collino Pansa, ‘Un formidabile problema: la questione 
meridionale’, Paese Libero; 27 January 1947; Giuseppe Saragat, ‘Il problema del 
Mezzogiorno’, L’Umanità, 22 January 1947 (Newspaper cuttings found in ACS, FCL, busta 
103). 
99  For example Vincent Barnett (the head of the European Cooperation Administration in Italy 
which administered Marshall Plan funding) cited Cristo as ‘a very widely-read’ book in the 
post-war period which focused foreign attention on southern Italy and Matera in particular. 
Interview by Eric Christenson and Linda Christenson with Dr. Vincent Barnett (European 
Cooperation Administration Program Chief Italy), August 19 1993. 
100  Cormac Ó Cuilleanáin, ‘Christ Stopped at Eboli: Fortunes of an American Translation’, in 
Joseph Farrell (ed.), The Voices of Carlo Levi, Peter Lang, Bern, 2007, p. 188 
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political exile. As a result Cristo became a reference point for researchers and 
intellectuals interested in studying southern Italy and its so-called ‘peasant 
culture’.101 Levi’s book drew a number of foreign academics and journalists to 
Basilicata and Matera in the 1940s and 1950s. These included the sociologist 
George Peck, the political scientist Edward Banfield, the photographer Henri 
Cartier-Bresson and the philosopher Friedrich George Friedmann.102 This 
international interest appears to have fed back into the sense amongst Italy’s 
public sphere that the country was being watched and judged by overseas 
visitors and commentators.103  
Italian reaction to Cristo’s political content was divided along ideological 
lines. Predictably Action Party and Giustizia e libertà affiliated publications and 
writers agreed with Levi’s rejection of state intervention from above, the 
distance he perceived between the southern rural poor and the Italian state, 
and his call for self-government to resolve the southern question.104 In contrast 
                                                             
101  Russell King, ‘Basilicata Anglofona’, in Lida Viganoni (ed.), Lo sviluppo possibile. Basilicata 
oltre il Sud, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli, 1997, p. 444 
102  For a summary of the different overseas researchers who worked in Basilicata during the 
post-war period see King, ‘Basilicata Anglofona’, p. 443-458. For an overview of George 
Peck’s work in Basilicata see Gilberto-Antonio Marselli, ‘Sociologia del Vecchio e Nuovo 
Mezzogiorno’, in Storia del Mezzogiorno, Volume XIII, Dal fascismo alla Repubblica, Edizioni 
del Sole, Napoli, 1991, pp. 218-219; Maria Minicuci, ‘Antropologi e Mezzogiorno’, Meridiana, 
(2003), no. 48-49, pp. 139-174; and Eugenio Imbriani, ‘Gli studi di comunità in Basilicata’, 
Studi etno-antropologici e sociologici, vol. 25 (1997), pp. 24-25. For an overview of Edward 
Banfield’s controversial research at Chiaromonte and the ensuing academic debate see 
Edward Banfield, Le basi morali di una società arretrata, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1976; Gilberto A. 
Marselli, ‘Sociologi nordamericani e società contadina italiana: a proposito del libro di 
Banfield’, Quaderni di Sociologia Rurale, (1962), no. 1, pp. 109-130; Alessandro Pizzorno, 
‘Amoral familism and historical marginality’, Community Development, (1966), no. 15-16, pp. 
55-66; John Davis, ‘Morals and backwardness’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 
vol. 12 (1970), no. 3, pp. 340-353; and Edward Banfield, ‘Reply to Davis’, Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, vol. 12 (1970), no. 3, pp. 354-359. Henri Cartier-Bresson’s trips 
to Basilicata in the 1950s and 1970s are profiled, along with a selection of his photos, in 
Rocco Mazzarone and Giuseppe Appella (eds.), La Lucania di Henri Cartier-Bresson, Edizioni 
della Cometa, Rome, 1999. Friedmann’s work is examined in section 3.2 below. 
103 This point is examined in detail in section 2.3 below.  
104  Massimo Mila, ‘Esplorare l’Italia’, Giustizia e libertà, 27 December 1945, page number not 
available; Vittore Branca, ‘Lucania magica e desolata’, La Nazione del Popolo, 21 February 
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the PCI rejected Levi’s political vision. Post-war cultural criticism in Communist 
Party circles was marked by the adoption ‘of a cultural value system centred 
upon realism and collective solidarity and a corresponding critique of 
“decadence” and mass culture.’105 Levi was accused of romanticizing and 
idolizing the southern rural poor as well as failing to offer a concrete 
explanation for the socio-economic reasons behind southern Italy’s 
backwardness in comparison to the North. PCI critics completely rejected the 
claim that southern society could be rebuilt through the positive values of the 
civiltà contadina. 
These points are exemplified in Carlo Muscetta’s critique of Cristo in 
Fiera Letteraria in 1946 and his review of L’Orologio from 1950 which was 
published in the PCI organ L’Unità. Muscetta criticized Levi’s depiction of 
southern Italy as ‘un mondo senza Storia, chiuso alla Libertà e alla Ragione’ 
which ‘tende ad allontanare il Mezzogiorno più che l’India e la Cina,’at the very 
moment in which southern Italy ‘sollecitato da opposti interessi reazionari e 
democratici, tende ad uscire dalla sua immobilità, ed è politicamente e 
socialmente vivo, in agitazione e in movimento per avvicinarsi e ricongiungersi 
all’“altra” Italia’.106 The Communist intellectual and parliamentarian Mario 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1946, page number not available; Tommaso Fiore, ‘La piccolo borghesia. Voilà l’ennemi’, La 
Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno, 14 February 1946, page number not available (ACS, FCL, busta 
103, fascicolo 2415). 
105 Forgacs, Italian Culture in the Industrial Era, p. 159 
106  See Carlo Muscetta, Realismo, neorealismo, controrealismo, Garzanti, Milan, 1976, p. 60. 
Notably Muscetta worked in Einaudi’s Rome office in the 1940s and had been actively 
involved in publishing the first edition of Cristo. Moreover, Muscetta had been a member of 
the PdA until March 1946 before joining the PCI later that same year. He was a personal 
acquaintance of Levi’s and appears in L’Orologio as the figure of Moneta. See Leonardo Sacco, 
L’Orologio della Repubblica. Carlo Levi e il caso Italia con 37 disegni politici di Carlo Levi, Argo, 
Lecce, 1996, pp. 7-19 & 67-73.  
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Alicata was even harsher in his criticism of Levi.107 Writing in Cronache 
Meridionali in 1954, Alicata branded Levi as the leading exponent of a school of 
meridionalismo which ‘vorrebbe che non solo “Cristo” ma anche il moderno 
pensiero critico si fermasse a Eboli.’108 Furthermore, the article accused Levi of 
failing to historicize southern Italy’s social backwardness and thus being unable 
to provide a coherent solution to the southern question.109 Alicata rejected 
Levi’s theory of poltical autonomy based on the positive values identified in 
southern rural culture. In fact Alicata contested the idea of a homogenous 
southern rural culture. Instead he claimed that there were a myriad of different 
cultures whose historical origins and social development needed to be studied 
individually.110 
Despite their ideological misgivings over Levi’s vision of southern Italy 
and proposed solution for the southern question, the PCI appropriated his 
image of Matera as a symbol of the southern question and Other to notions of 
modernity into its political propaganda. They used the city to denounce social 
conditions in the entire Mezzogiorno and promote the need for modernization 
                                                             
107  Mario Alicata was also a personal acquaintance of Carlo Levi and appeared in L’Orologio as 
Nardelli. See Sacco, L’Orologio della Repubblica, pp. 175-196. 
108  Mario Alicata, ‘Il meridionalismo non si può fermare a Eboli’, in Mario Alicata (ed.),  Scritti 
letterari, Mondadori, Milan, 1968, p. 314  
109 Alicata claimed that Levi’s book had had an insidious influence on subsequent writers who 
focused their attention on southern rural culture. In particular Alicata critiqued Rocco 
Scotellaro’s Contadini del Sud and path-breaking intellectual and PCI member Ernesto De 
Martino’s research for failing to historicize the community’s they studied and in the case of 
De Martino for abandoning the PCI’s ideological position vis-à-vis the southern question. The 
case of De Martino is of particular interest as the Neapolitan intellectual had drawn heavily 
on Gramsci’s Osservazioni sul folclore in his own work. As a result De Martino outlined a 
distinction between folklore tradizionale and folklore progressivo in his writing with the 
latter defined as a manifestation of the southern rural poor’s nascent social consciousness. 
Moreover, De Martino had criticized Levi’s view of southern rural culture for many of the 
same reasons as Muscetta and Alicata. See Ernesto De Martino, ‘Intorno a una polemica. 
Postilla a considerazioni storiche sul lamento funebre lucano’, in Carla Pasquinelli (ed.), 
Antropologia culturale e questione meridionale: Ernesto De Martino e il dibattito sul mondo 
popolare subalterno negli anni 1948-1955, La Nuova Italia Editrice, Florence, 1977, p. 223 
and Ernesto De Martino, ‘Il folklore progressivo’, in Pasquinelli, p. 144. 
110  Alicata, ‘Il meridionalismo’, pp. 315-322. 
68 
 
and agrarian reform in southern Italy. This point is illustrated in the depiction 
of Matera in the Communist weekly magazine Vie Nuove.111 On 6 October 1946 
the magazine featured an unsigned editorial entitled ‘Matera Città dei Sassi’ in 
which Matera was dubbed ‘la più disgraziata città di Italia.’112 The image of the 
Sassi that Vie Nuove presented clearly evoked Levi’s description in Cristo. 
Matera’s cave homes were described as ‘abitazioni trogloditiche, primitive’ in 
which ‘brulica la popolazione dei contadini e degli operai la quale, quando torna 
dal lavoro, è costretta ad abitare in promiscuità tra uomini, donne e animali.’113 
Furthermore, the city was described as a symbol of the entire Mezzogiorno: 
‘Ecco qua Matera: campeggia in questa pagina col suo biancore calcinato, i suoi 
sassi di calvario. Le sue pene antiche e recenti, il suo doloroso risentimento. 
Matera: l’Italia Meridionale.’114 In contrast to Levi’s call for autonomous local 
government to solve the southern question, however, Vie Nuove advocated a 
programme of direct state intervention in line with PCI policy. Accordingly, the 
editorial called for ‘un progetto concreto per la demolizione dei “Sassi” e la 
costruzione di nuove case’ which should be realized ‘attraverso un fattivo 
intervento dello Stato.’115 Notably the description of the Sassi featured in Cristo 
was reprinted in Vie Nuove under the heading ‘La Testimonianza di uno 
                                                             
111  Vie Nuove was a glossy weekly magazine (rotocalco) which juxtaposed features on social and 
political current affairs with photos of film stars and articles on popular culture. Although it 
started out as a pedagogical publication intended to provide a Communist counterpart to the 
Famiglia Cristiana, Vie Nuove developed into a more commercial magazine in an attempt to 
compete with its rivals Epoca and Oggi. Furthermore, Vie Nuove was a successful publication 
within the relevant confines of Italian Communist subculture. Despite being sold exclusively 
through subscription or by party volunteers, the weekly magazine had a print run of 30,000 
in 1946 peaking at 350,000 in 1952.  See David Forgacs and Stephen Gundle, Mass Culture 
and Italian Society from Fascism to the Cold War, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 
2007, pp. 267-268. 
112  ‘Matera Città dei Sassi’, Vie Nuove, 6 October 1946, p. 3 
113  Ibid., p. 3 
114  Gianni Puccini, ‘Nuovo corso per il Mezzogiorno’, Vie Nuove, 6 October 1946, p. 3 
115  ‘Matera Città dei Sassi’, Vie Nuove, 6 October 1946, p. 3 
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scrittore.’116 Presenting Levi’s image of Matera out of context with the rest of 
the book, specifically his rejection of direct state intervention, rendered it part 
of the PCI’s catalogue of stock images of southern backwardness. As a result, the 
image of Matera presented in Cristo was placed within the context of the 
Communist Party’s call for redevelopment of the Mezzogiorno through a 
process of economic modernization from above.117  
Examining local reaction to Levi’s book in the post-war period it is clear 
that Cristo was generally viewed as an attack on southern society. The idea that 
southern rural culture was a positive value system which could act as a 
potential antidote to Western civilization’s failings appears to have had little 
resonance amongst critics in Basilicata and Matera. Instead local commentators 
believed that the book was a denigration of the South. This suggests that they 
were reacting as much to opinions about the book in Italy’s public sphere as to 
the actual text itself. Contemporary regional press reviews offer an insight into 
local middle-class attitudes towards Cristo. Although the book’s artistic merit 
was widely praised, Levi was accused of denigrating the region and its 
inhabitants. Cristo’s commercial and critical success seems to have added to this 
sense of injustice. Levi was charged with disseminating a distorted picture of 
Basilicata to the wider world on the one hand, while commercially exploiting 
the region’s poverty on the other. Writing in Matera’s weekly Il Gazzettino on 7 
                                                             
116  See Puccini, p. 3 and ‘Matera Città dei Sassi’, Vie Nuove, 6 October 1946, p. 3. 
117  The image of Matera as Other to ideas of modernity was central to the PCI propaganda film 
Nel Mezzogiorno qualcosa è cambiato. Carlo Lizzani’s documentary presents Matera as a 
symbol of the southern question. The Sassi are utilized to denounce the abject poverty of the 
entire South and promote the need for land reform. See Carlo Lizzani, Nel Mezzogiorno 
qualcosa è cambiato (Italy, 1949). 
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October 1946, the paper’s editor Tommaso Calulli took it upon himself to 
summarize local reaction to Cristo:  
Il lancio iniziale di ‘Cristo si è fermato a Eboli’ ha fatto piovere su questo 
povero mondo Lucano, da tutte le parti del mondo, insulti, parole di 
pseudo comprensione, incorraggiamenti mistificatori, spregiudicati 
inaccettabili, consigli e suggerimenti. La nostra povera Lucania, sempre 
odiosamente bistrattata, è stata proiettata violentamente, di punto in 
bianco alla ribalta di una celebrità assolutamente non sognata nè 
tantomeno ambita.118 
 
In an attempt to gauge local reaction to Levi’s book, Calulli offered the pages of 
Il Gazzettino to any disgruntled readers wishing to air their grievances towards 
Levi as well as anyone willing to defend his book.119 Amongst those who took up 
Calulli’s proposal was Luigi Gambalone, the man upon whom Levi had based the 
figure of Gagliano’s Fascist mayor Don Luigi. Gambalone contested his portrayal 
in the book and described Cristo as ‘una serie di quadri belli deturpati’ in which 
Levi had managed to ‘disprezzare la nostra purezza di vita semplice ed onesta e 
a sentire il nostalgico ricordo del vizio e della menzogna.’120 Local priest and 
historian of Matera Marcello Morelli also expressed his displeasure about Levi’s 
depiction of Basilicata in Il Gazzettino. He described the book as ‘non 
documento d’una realtà obiettiva’, but rather a ‘libro fantastica di pura arte, cioè 
libro in cui tutto sotto l’occhio deformatore d’un moderno creatore di miti si 
                                                             
118  Tommaso Calulli, ‘Vogliamo conoscere la vera Lucania’, Il Gazzettino. Economic commerciale 
della Lucania, 7 October 1946, p. 1 
119  Ibid., p. 1 
120  Luigi Garambone, Il Gazzettino. Economico commercial della Lucania, 14 October 1946, page 
number not available (ACS, FCL, busta 103). In an interview from 1956, Gambalone was 
more forgiving of Levi’s portrait putting it down to artistic interpretation. However, he 
claimed that Levi’s apparent betrayal of trust had hurt Aliano’s residents: ‘Valore letterario a 
parte, il libro più che ingiusto lo hanno trovato indiscreto … una forma di scorettezza … che 
disturba un poco l’antica e severa civiltà di questa gente’. Ugo Lombardo, ‘Tra l’autore e i 
personaggi non corre buon sangue’, Visto, 21 August 1954, page number not available (ACS, 
FCL, busta 104). 
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altera e prende proporzione mostruose.’121 Morelli concluded that ‘i lucani a 
leggerlo [Cristo] soffrono come d’uno schiaffo dato loro in pieno viso.’122 Even a 
more analytical local review such as Alfredo Toscano’s booklet ‘Dopo aver letto 
“Cristo si è fermato a Eboli” di Carlo Levi’, which engaged with the book’s 
political dimension and critiqued Levi’s appraisal of the southern question, 
concluded that he had sullied Basilicata and southern Italy’s reputation in the 
eyes of northern Italian and foreign readers despite the author’s noble 
intentions.123    
 Regional politicians added their voices to the chorus of disapproval 
towards Cristo. Interviewed in 1947, Communist deputy Luigi De Filpo 
described Levi as ‘il più cinico e temerario imprenditore di trasfigurazioni 
liriche e pittoriche dei tempi moderni … egli è un affossatore e la sua arte 
maligna e sottile, ha un portentoso potere nebbiogeno.’124 When asked his 
opinion about Levi’s book in the same article the Christian Democrat 
parliamentarian Emilio Colombo replied that: ‘Cristo non si è fermato a Eboli … 
nell’anima del più oscuro dei nostri contadini tanta speranza, tanta volontà di 
lottare, tanto attaccamento alla propria terra, alla famiglia, alla onestà della vita, 
                                                             
121  Marcello Morelli, ‘Di Carlo Levi e del suo libro’, Il Gazzettino. Economico commerciale della 
Lucania, 21, October, 1946, page number not available (ACS, FCL, busta 103) 
122  Ibid., (ACS, FCL, busta 103) 
123  In his review of Cristo, Toscano claimed that: ‘L’A. ha voluto, con questo libro, fare 
principalmente dell’arte, e, dove arte c’è, si applauda. Ma quando pensiamo che al 
settentrione d’Italia si vede nella Lucania e in tutto il Mezzogiorno una terra di cafoni, di 
terroni, di ignoranti, di retrogradi, possiamo immaginare l’impressione che produrrà ai 
lettori del nord o meglio “dell’al di là”, a quegli “dei [sic] stranieri”.’ Alfredo Toscano, Dopo 
aver letto “Cristo si è fermato a Eboli” di Carlo Levi, Angelo Lodeserto, Taranto, 1946, p. 10 
(ACS, FCL, busta 103). 
124  De Filpo’s criticism of Levi has undertones of anti-Semitism with the PCI deputy concluding 
that ‘poiché [Levi] mostra tanto ardore e tanta pena per i paesi tagliati fuori dalla 
predicazione evangelica, se ne torni in Palestina, la patria dei suoi maggiori.’ Giuseppe 
Selvaggi, ‘Un paese aspetta’, Il Sud, 19 October 1947, page number not available (ACS, FCL, 
busta 103) 
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tanta tenacia fede in Dio.’125 Local and regional reaction to Cristo arguably 
reflects Giovanni Russo’s claim that many of the book’s critics were angered 
because they recognized themselves in the negative depiction of southern 
Italy’s petit bourgeoisie.126 However, it also suggests that in many cases local 
figures were reacting to the image of the South they believed the book had 
disseminated among Italy’s public sphere rather than the actual text itself. The 
implication is that Cristo played a salient role in constructing and spreading 
notions of the backward South in the post-war period. In the context of Matera 
and the Sassi it is clear from press coverage and the numerous reports 
produced in the context of the first special law that Levi’s brief description 
played a salient role in focusing media and political attention on the city. For 
example, writing in 1953 about the rediscovery of the southern question in the 
immediate post-war period, the Commissione di studio sulla comunità di Matera 
attributed the intense political and media focus on Matera to the city’s 
description in Cristo. It claimed that ‘in particolare la grave condizione edilizia e 
sociale della città di Matera si era già imposta da tempo all’attenzione 
dell’opinione pubblica italiana: dopo le drammatiche, rivelatrici pagine di Carlo 
Levi nel “Cristo si è fermato a Eboli”, fu nel 1949 che questo interesse cominciò 
a concretarsi in forma di programme di intervento.’127 But Levi did more than 
                                                             
125  Ibid., (ACS, FCL, busta 103) 
126  ‘È facile comprendere … come il libro sia stato accolto con diffidenza e quasi con rancore in 
certi ambienti, fino a condannarlo come cattivo e malevolo. Molti sono stati colpiti, molti 
hanno visto con stupore il loro vero volto riflesso nel volto di qualcuno di quei personaggi 
descritti dall’autore e hanno avuto paura e meraviglia che si fosse riuscito a sollevare la 
maschera secolare della loro ipocrisia e a mettere a nudo la cancrena. Ma la calunnia di Carlo 
Levi, nemico del povero terrone del sud non merita di essere raccolta. Carlo Levi prova non 
solo carità ma amore per questa umanità derelitta, abbandonata da secoli nelle mani della 
miseria, della malaria e della morte.’ See Giovanni Russo, ‘Un incontro in Lucania’, La Voce, 
18 February 1946, page number not available (ACS, FCL, busta 103). 
127  See Commissione di studio sulla comunità di Matera, Matera: uno studio, Istituzione 
Nazionale di Urbanistica and UNRRA-CASAS, 1953, p. 3. 
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merely focus attention on Matera. He provided two concepts which would 
directly influence subsequent descriptions of the city post-1945. Matera as 
Other to notions of modernity and a symbol of the southern question were 
recurring tropes found in mass media and political depictions of the 
Mezzogiorno during the scope of this study. These two concepts would come to 
dominate how Matera was studied and imagined in the post-war era and 
ultimately influenced the course of the city’s social and urban history. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Speaking in 2012 about the media and political interest in Matera in the 
immediate post-war period the journalist and historian Leonardo Sacco argued 
that ‘c’è da dire che Matera era stata “inventata” da Carlo Levi, col Cristo.’128 The 
book’s commercial and critical success undoubtedly played a salient role in 
focusing political, intellectual and media attention on Matera from the late-
1940s onwards in the context of renewed interest in the southern question. 
Levi’s bestseller was invariably cited as the source text from which political and 
intellectual interest in the Sassi arose during the scope of this study. But as 
Sacco implies, the book did more than just focus attention on Matera. It created 
the notion that the city was representative of southern rural culture, an idea 
which became familiar to Italy’s book-reading population and political class. 
Levi’s depiction of Matera, however, was removed from the political context 
within which it was written, i.e. the values of the Resistance and his aspirations 
for a state which would make a clean break from Italy’s Liberal and Fascist past. 
Cristo was released in the same month that Action Party leader, Ferruccio Parri, 
                                                             
128  Federico Bilò and Ettore Vadini (eds.), Matera e Adriano Olivetti. Conversazioni con Albino 
Sacco e Leonardo Sacco, Fondazione Adriano Olivetti, Ivrea, 2013, p. 81 
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became Prime Minister of the post-war coalition government. The hopes of Levi 
and the PdA, however, would last just five months. Parri’s government was 
undermined by the political manoeuvrings of the PCI and the Partito Socialista 
Italiano di Unità Proletaria, as well as by internal divisions within his own party 
- which ultimately dissolved in 1946.129 Despite Levi’s opposition to direct state 
intervention and his call for autonomous local government in the South, the PCI 
and the DC appropriated his image of Matera to promote policies of state 
intervention from above. Levi had presented the image of a not entirely 
undifferentiated, immobile and pre-modern Mezzogiorno. Matera was depicted 
as its symbolic capital. Levi had outlined a programme for the Mezzogiorno’s 
rebirth based on the values he perceived in southern rural poor. In contrast, the 
PCI viewed the idealization of rural culture as a potential obstacle to southern 
Italy’s social and economic development. Moreover, the DC and the PCI 
constructed the image of a South incapable of generating its own renewal and 
thus in need of state intervention. Images of Matera played an important role in 
this process. The model of the city that Levi had created in Cristo was 
transferred into party propaganda to suit the rapidly changing political terrain 
of the post-war period and had concrete effects at a political level. In political 
and media sources Matera became a symbol of all that was wrong with the 
South. This idea influenced the course of the city’s post-war history. The 
concept that Matera was emblematic of southern agriculture shaped the 
provisions of government intervention in the city in the 1950s. Generic 
                                                             
129  Levi outlined his disillusionment over the collapse of PdA in his post-war novel L’Orologio 
(1950) in which he lamented the return to power of what he considered Italy’s ancien 
régime. For a summary of the PdA’s demise see Ginsborg, p. 89. For a discussion of 
L’Orologio’s historical, biographical and political context see Sacco, L’Orologio della 
Repubblica. 
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development models for the entire Mezzogiorno were applied to a distinct type 
of agricultural economy. Furthermore, the image of Matera as Other to ideas of 
modernity was the starting point for notions that the city constituted a national 
shame. This narrative became a commonplace in Italian media and political 
circles between 1948 and 1952 and would influence the decision to implement 
special legislation for the city in the 1950s. The next chapter will examine this 
process in detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
76 
 
Chapter 2: Matera and national shame 
 
Seicentomila abitanti della Basilicata vivono tuttora in condizioni di vita 
inferiori a quelle dei popoli africani, come prova, dandone la misura, la 
sempre più grave vergogna dei “sassi” materani ... in queste tane vivono 
in media sei esseri umani per vano, con punte spaventose, insieme a 
muli, asini, maiali, pecore, oltre a tutti gli animali di bassa corte. Queste 
sono, dunque, le abitazioni che stanno ancora là a denotare da quanta 
miseria sia afflitto il nostro paese e di quanta vergogna sia ricoperta 
questa vostra civiltà occidentale di cui ci parlate continuamente.1 
 
The above quotation is taken from a parliamentary intervention in 1951 by 
Michele Bianco, a PCI deputy for Potenza. It is just one of the numerous 
expressions of national shame that were generated in the context of post-war 
Matera. The notion that the city constituted a national shame gained a wide 
discursive currency in Italian political and public spheres in the immediate 
post-war period.2 In the early 1950s an estimated 15,000 people were living in 
troglodyte dwellings carved out of limestone which, in many cases, had no 
running water or sewage system. Families shared their airless subterranean 
homes with farm animals. These distinctive cave homes were brought to 
national and international attention by their brief, yet evocative, description in 
Carlo Levi’s post-war best seller Cristo si è fermato a Eboli and the resultant 
media interest in the Sassi. Expressions of shame over the living conditions 
witnessed at Matera in contemporary newspaper articles and official reports 
were almost universally couched in the terminology of nationhood. In the 
context of the post-war reconstruction effort and a country facing a severe 
                                                             
1  Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, 27 February 1951, pp. 26560-26562 
2  The term shame is used to translate the Italian word vergogna. Although it can also be 
translated as embarrassment or disgrace, Silvana Patriarca notes that ‘according to the 
Oxford English Dictionary, the pre-Teutonic root of shame has a meaning similar to that of 
the romance languages as it refers to the act of covering or looking for cover.’ See Patriarca, 
‘A Patriotic Emotion’, p. 148, n. 5. Sara Ahmed also briefly examines the origins of the term 
shame in the English language in Ahmed, p. 104. 
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housing shortage, Matera’s slums were branded a national shame. The Sassi 
became a symbol of Italy’s southern question which had once again become an 
important issue in mainstream political discourse. Tackling this so-called 
vergogna nazionale took on symbolic importance in the context of the new 
Italian Republic and the start of the Cold War as Communism and Christian 
Democracy looked to lay claim to notions of national identity.  
There have been countless books and articles published on Matera’s 
post-war history. To date, however, no study has examined the patriotic 
narratives generated in the context of the Sassi in detail. The question of why 
overcrowded cave homes were seen as an affront to notions of the Italian nation 
at that specific moment in history has remained unanswered. This is all the 
more surprising as post-war Matera provides an ideal opportunity for 
examining the workings of patriotism in a country that is generally considered 
to ‘lack’ national identity. These patriotic narratives were produced at a point in 
time when Italian nationalism was considered to be in crisis following twenty 
years of Fascist rule and the turmoil of foreign occupation and civil war. The 
expressions of national shame that Matera’s cave homes generated suggest that 
Italian patriotism may have been more prominent in the immediate post-war 
period than previously thought. This chapter aims to examine the workings of 
these emotional scenarios, the social and political context that shaped them, the 
image of the Italian nation they created, and their impact on Matera’s social and 
urban history in the 1950s. First it will sketch the historical milieu within which 
discourses of national shame were produced. Next it will outline a theoretical 
framework for examining national shame drawing on recent scholarship from 
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the history of emotions and the history of nationalism. Finally it will examine a 
representative sample from the numerous expressions of national shame in the 
context of post-war Matera found in the Italian press and official documents.  
 
2.1 Historical context 
 
The expressions of national shame examined below were produced in the 
context of the developing Cold War with the Christian Democrats and the Italian 
Communist Party looking to establish themselves as the country’s two main 
political parties. The Truman Doctrine was announced in March 1947 with the 
European Recovery Programme, better known as the Marshall Plan, established 
in June of the same year. In May 1947 the Italian Prime Minister, Alcide De 
Gasperi, expelled both the Communist and Socialist parties from the Constituent 
Assembly, the immediate post-war coalition government. The DC leader’s 
strategy paid off and on 18 April 1948, following a bitter election campaign 
punctuated by Cold War propaganda, his party achieved a landslide victory 
collecting 48.9 per cent of the vote.3 The result marked the division of Italian 
political and cultural life into two opposing poles and the beginning of almost 
fifty years of political domination in Italy by the DC. Concurrently, the PCI 
emerged as the dominant party on the Left. As a result from the late 1940s 
onwards the DC controlled the ‘key state cultural apparatuses: broadcasting, 
censorship and the body responsible for the performance arts and 
entertainments, the Sottosegretario per lo Spettacolo.’4 Conversely, influenced 
by the Gramscian strategy of attempting to penetrate all aspects of Italian civil 
                                                             
3 For a summary of the Italian political terrain in the immediate post-war period see Ginsborg, 
pp. 112-120. 
4 The culture of the Left and specifically the PCI is outlined in Forgacs and Gundle, pp. 259-270 
and Forgacs, Italian Culture in the Industrial Era, p. 105. 
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life, the PCI built its own independent cultural networks including party 
newspapers, publishers, libraries and the Case del Popolo.5 As a result, images of 
Matera and the South produced in the party press were shaped by the ideology 
of the publication in which they appeared as well as developments in the Italian 
political landscape in the immediate post-war period.  
Matera was one of the key images that the PCI and the DC used to 
promote their distinctive political strategies in southern Italy. Both parties 
proposed policies for the South based on modernization through public works 
programmes and industrialization. These reforms were promoted and justified 
through images of the Mezzogiorno disseminated through various channels of 
party propaganda, from print to newsreels and documentaries. Moreover, the 
different souths that the PCI and DC presented in print and film were filtered 
through the southern question paradigm and featured a number of shared 
characteristics. Southern Italy was depicted as economically backward in 
comparison to the North; it was a vast impoverished territory where society 
was still characterized by the residue of feudalism. In short, the South was a 
problem that needed to be solved. To justify the proposal of reform policies in 
the Mezzogiorno, Italy’s two main parties had to illustrate the perceived 
economic divide that existed between North and South. The Sassi became one of 
the primary sources for portraying the Mezzogiorno’s economic and social 
problems in this context during the immediate post-war years.  
Carlo Levi’s description of the Sassi in Cristo si è fermato a Eboli and its 
widespread dissemination directly influenced the political focus on Matera. The 
                                                             
5 Forgacs, Italian Culture in the Industrial Era, p. 154 
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town received an unprecedented amount of political and media attention in the 
post-war period, but Levi’s image of Matera and the South was removed from 
the political context within which it was created.6 His depiction of Matera as the 
capitale contadina and the embodiment of southern poverty provided post-war 
Italy’s two main parties with a ready-made cultural reference point which could 
be adapted to suit their specific ideological needs. Accordingly, representations 
of Matera and the Sassi produced in the party press reflected political attitudes 
towards southern Italy as well as the specific historical context within which 
they were created. Concurrently these images further cemented and 
disseminated the concept of Matera as a symbol of the southern question. 
The Italian Communist Party adopted a two pronged strategy in the 
South: first, it espoused a policy of economic modernization from above for 
southern Italy. This was to be achieved through a programme of public 
investment and agrarian reform with the aim of resolving the perceived 
economic divide between North and South.7 Second, it promoted the 
transformation of southern society through the political mobilization of the 
southern rural poor.8 The aim of this second strategy was to create class 
consciousness amongst southern Italy’s agricultural workforce.9 In order to 
achieve these aims the PCI established the Movimento per la rinascita del 
                                                             
6  See Chapter 1, pp. 38-51. 
7 Sidney Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy, Yale University Press, London, 1967, 
p. 256 
8  From 1945 to 1962 the Italian Communist Party instigated what Sidney Tarrow has dubbed 
‘an organizational revolution’ in southern Italy. It introduced the party section, the 
secretariat, and the secondary association into Italy’s southern regions and produced an 
unprecedented level of political participation at a popular level. Party membership grew 
from 400,000 in 1944 to 2,245,000 by 1947 (278,000 to 430,000 during the same period in 
southern Italy). See Tarrow, p. 198.  
9 Percy Allum, ‘The South and National Politics, 1945-50’, in Stewart Joseph Woolf (ed.), The 
Rebirth of Italy 1943-50, Longman Group Limited, London, 1972, p. 100 
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Mezzogiorno in 1947. This was an agglomeration of provincial and regional 
assemblies organized to push for land reform legislation and build party 
consensus in southern Italy. It organized demonstrations, regional assizes and 
coordinated the election campaign of 1948 in the South.10  
At a national level the PCI pursued a strategy of progressive democracy 
in the immediate post-war period. This policy entailed the party’s continued 
participation in government and the maintenance of its alliance with the DC as 
part of the post-war Constituent Assembly. However, this position changed 
following the expulsion of the Left in May 1947 and the start of the Cold War. As 
Claudia Petraccone notes: ‘la fine dei governi di unità nazionale spinse i 
communisti a considerare nuovamente la questione meridionale come uno 
strumento di lotta politica.’11 Following the defeat of the Popular Front (a 
coalition between the Italian Communist and Socialist Parties) in the 1948 
general election, the PCI focused its southern strategy on the political 
mobilization of rural workers. Despite the failure of the coalition between 
socialists and communists to challenge the DC at a national level, the Popular 
Front had increased its vote in southern Italy.12 Consequently, the southern 
question was seen as a fundamental component of the PCI’s political strategy 
for building consensus in southern Italy. The South’s renewal was to be 
achieved through agricultural reform. The Communist Party viewed the feudal 
residues of the latifondi as the primary cause of southern Italy’s economic 
stagnation.13 According to the PCI leader Palmiro Togliatti, the party needed to 
                                                             
10 Petraccone, p. 215-216 
11 Ibid., p. 220 
12 Ginsborg, p. 35 
13 Tarrow, pp. 256-257 
82 
 
create a political climate in the South which would allow the southern working 
class to ‘sottrarla all’influenza dei gruppi reazionari che ancora la tengono sotto 
il loro potere e dirigerla nella lotta per il benessere e per il bene di tutto il 
paese.’14 In order to achieve this aim the PCI sought to organize the southern 
rural poor according to the framework set out by Gramsci in Alcuni temi della 
quistione meridionale (1926), i.e. the unification of the northern proletariat and 
the southern peasantry under the auspices of the Party.15 Togliatti had outlined 
this strategy in the pages of Rinascita in 1944: ‘incominciamo con l’organizzare 
seriamente queste masse, tanto in formazioni politiche quanto in formazioni 
economiche più larghe (sindacati, leghe contadine ecc.) e appoggiandoci su 
queste forze diamo battaglia per la rinascita politica dell’Italia meridionale.’16 
Following the renewal of the peasant land occupations in the winter of 1949, 
the PCI organized the Assise per la rinascita del Mezzogiorno which were held on 
3-4 December 1949 at four different venues: Salerno, Crotone, Bari and Matera. 
Moreover, in rural areas Land Committees and Consulate popolari were 
established. The aim of these initiatives was to coordinate the numerous land 
occupations of 1949-1950 in Calabria, Puglia, Campania and Basilicata in an 
attempt to consolidate what had started out as spontaneous movements and 
push for agrarian reform in the South.17 
The PCI’s strategy of organizing the southern rural poor through the 
renewed occupation of the latifondi was a success in the short term. The DC 
                                                             
14 Giorgio Amendola, Gli anni della Repubblica, Editori Riuniti, Rome, 1976, p. 283 
15 For Gramsci’s discussion of the alliance between northern workers and the southern 
peasantry see David Forgacs (ed.), The Antonio Gramsci Reader. Selected Writings 1916-1935, 
Lawrence and Wishart Limited, London, 1988, pp. 120; 172-173; and 184-185. 
16 Amendola, Gli anni della Repubblica, p. 283 
17 See Petraccone, pp. 215-216; and Donald Sassoon, The Strategy of the Italian Communist 
Party. From the Resistance to the Historic Compromise, Frances Pinter Publishers Ltd., 
London, 1981, p. 74. 
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passed land reform legislation in 1950. However, this came at the price of a 
number of lives and, in the long term, land reform was one of the means 
through which the Christian Democrats built its electoral consensus in southern 
Italy.18 The Italian police killed three landless peasants in the Calabrian town of 
Melissa on 29 October 1949 following the occupation of the Berlingieri estates 
near Crotone. Furthermore, another rural worker, Giuseppe Noviello, was shot 
by a carabiniere in December 1949 at the town of Montescaglioso in the 
province of Matera and later died.19 By the end of 1949 approximately 20,000 
landless rural workers had occupied 15,000 hectares of land around Matera and 
its environs.20 Faced with the prospect of more violent reprisals against landless 
peasants Alcide De Gasperi, the Italian Prime Minister, decided to implement a 
limited land reform programme. The aim was to appease Italy’s landless rural 
poor and reduce the PCI’s growing influence in the South. As Paul Ginsborg has 
argued: ‘to the Communist thrust from below for fundamental change in the 
countryside, the DC responded from above with a reorganization and 
reformulation of its own making.’21  
 The Italian government passed an agrarian reform bill for Calabria, the 
so-called Legge Sila, on 12 May 1950. The Legge stralcio, which covered 
Basilicata, Campania, Sardinia and Puglia in the South as well as the Fucino 
                                                             
18  Sidney Tarrow argues that the PCI’s decision to broaden its electorate in 1948 to include 
small landowners, artisans, and middle class professionals as part of the Via italiana al 
socialismo strategy softened the party’s stance on land reform. He contends that the PCI’s 
decision not to back a peasant revolution inevitably led to the transformation of a potentially 
revolutionary group of landless day labourers into conservative small land owners. See 
Tarrow, pp. 273-299. 
19  Corrispondence between the Prefect of Matera and the Ministry of the Interior reveals that 
Noviello’s death triggered popular protest throughout Italy: see ACS, MI, Gabinetto, Fascicoli 
Correnti, 1950-1952, busta 15, fascicolo 12646. 
20 For an outline of post-war land occupations in southern Italy see Ginsborg, pp. 60-63 and pp. 
122-127; and Cinanni, pp. 65-68.  
21 Ginsborg, p. 140 
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basin in Abruzzo, the Po delta and parts of Tuscany, was passed on 28 July of 
the same year.22 Under the measures of the reform, uncultivated land on estates 
over 300 hectares was to be confiscated and redistributed amongst landless 
workers.23 As a result over 417,000 hectares of land was expropriated and 
distributed to over 120,000 families from 1950 to 1960.24 However, these 
measures were reformist rather than revolutionary and characterized by a 
number of problems. First, proprietors of great estates were able to avoid the 
expropriation of land by dividing their property amongst family members. 
Second, the land that the new peasant proprietors received was often of bad 
quality making it difficult to establish a working farm. Finally, there were no 
peasant representatives on the reform boards which controlled the distribution 
of land.25 As a result the Enti di riforma became one of the avenues through 
which the DC built political consensus amongst the southern rural poor. 
                                                             
22  The primary focus of the so-called legge stralcio was on southern Italy where 13,000 land 
owners possessed 4.5 million hectares of land. In contrast, four million small landowners 
and semi-landless workers owned just one million hectares between them. The Puglia-
Molise-Lucania land reform area, which covered a total of 1.5 million hectares, was the 
largest comprensorio, i.e. reform territory, established under the provisions of the legge 
stralcio. As the title suggests it included parts of three regions (Puglia, Molise and Basilicata) 
and extended over eight different provinces (Foggia, Bari, Brindisi, Taranto and Lecce in 
Puglia; Campobasso in Molise; and Potenza and Matera in Basilicata). The reform area 
included 129 communes and stretched from the Trigano river in the north to the Adriatic 
coast in the east and the southern Appenines near Potenza in the west. However, the 
western half of the Province of Potenza was largely excluded from the comprensorio. This 
predominately mountainous territory was worked by small-land owning farmers and 
deemed unsuitable for land reform. The majority of the 1.5 million hectares of land 
expropriated by the Ente di riforma was cash-crop producing agricultural land worked by 
day labourers and owned by absentee landlords: the so-called latifondo capitalistico. A total 
of 42,727 hectares of land was expropriated in the Province of Matera (12.4 per cent of the 
total provincial territory). In contrast, in the Province of Potenza the land reform board 
redistributed just 17,081 hectares, or 2.6 per cent of the province. Although land reform 
transformed the coastal area of the Metapontino from a malarial plain into a successful 
market gardening zone, its results were limited at a regional level. Agricultural reform 
directly affected just thirteen per cent of the total area of the Puglia-Lucania-Molise 
comprensorio. Moreover, the land was distributed to just ten per cent of agricultural families 
residing in the reform zone. For a detailed analysis of land reform in Basilicata see Russell 
King, Land Reform: The Italian Experience, Butterworths, London, 1973, pp. 31-123. 
23 Piero Bevilacqua, p. 135 
24 Ginsborg, p. 130 
25 John Foot, Modern Italy, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2003, p. 116 
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Grantees were required to declare their support for the ruling party while in 
contrast many of those that had participated in the land occupations were 
refused land.26 Conversely, the implementation of agricultural reform alienated 
the agrarian elites of southern Italy, many of whom had previously supported 
the DC. As Paul Ginsborg notes: ‘The Christian Democrats, therefore, had to 
construct a new system of social alliances in the agrarian South, based not so 
much upon traditional domination of the land as upon control of the resources 
of the state.’27 This was partly achieved through the implementation of the 
Cassa del Mezzogiorno – a development programme for southern Italy. 
Together with agrarian reform, the Cassa was fundamental in the DC’s 
construction and maintenance of political consent in southern Italy through the 
distribution of state investment. 
 De Gasperi presented a draft version of the Cassa del Mezzogiorno to 
parliament on 30 March 1950. The bill was passed into legislation on 10 August 
1950.28 The law made provision for the investment of 1,000 billion lire over ten 
years and was to be financed through funds from the ERP and a loan from the 
World Bank. The theories of the Associazione per lo sviluppo dell’industria nel 
Mezzogiorno (SVIMEZ) and the Tennessee Valley Authority’s concept of 
‘depressed areas’ influenced the Cassa’s initial phase which focused on pre-
industrialization.29 The aim was to create the structural and economic 
conditions needed to implement a programme of industrialization in southern 
                                                             
26 Piero Bevilacqua, p. 135 
27 Ginsborg, p. 139 
28 Piero Bevilacqua, p. 140 
29  For information on SVIMEZ see Petraccone, pp. 221-227. For a detailed discussion of the 
philosophy behind the Tennessee Valley Authority see David Ekbladh, ‘Mr TVA: Grass-Roots 
Development, David Lilienthal, and the Rise and Fall of the Tennessee Valley Authority as a 
Symbol for U.S. Overseas Development’, Diplomatic History, vol. 26 (2002), no. 3, pp. 335-
374. 
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Italy.30 As a result, the Cassa’s primary focus in its first ten years was on public 
works including land reclamation, the building of road infrastructure, irrigation 
and sewage systems. There was no investment in industry until 1957. On paper 
the Cassa appeared similar to the CGIL’s Labour Plan of 1949 which had put 
forward a Keynesian programme for economic development.31 In fact the DC’s 
development fund for the South, in conjunction with agrarian reform, formed 
the basis of the party’s political and social hegemony in southern Italy until its 
liquidation in the early 1990s. This position of power was achieved through 
mass clientelism. Investment funds were distributed through a complex 
patronage network as part of a political exchange: state jobs, pensions and 
welfare contracts were traded for electoral support for the DC. A new political 
class of brokers made up of local politicians, lawyers and bureaucrats replaced 
the former landed notables as the mediators between the central state and the 
local community.32 Resources, power and influence were transmitted from top 
to bottom in a hierarchical structure headed by capi correnti, such as Aldo Moro 
in Puglia, Giovanni Leone in Campania and Emilio Colombo in Basilicata, who 
controlled the distribution and flow of state resources in their region.33 The 
result of the Cassa del Mezzogiorno’s transformation into a patronage machine 
was twofold. First, the DC succeeded in diffusing the peasant agitations from 
                                                             
30 Allum, ‘The South and National Politics’, p. 104 
31 Foot, Modern Italy, p.116 
32 For an in-depth analysis of these new political elites see Gabriella Gribaudi, Mediatori. 
Antropologia del potere democristiano nel Mezzogiorno, Rosenberg and Sellier, Turin, 1980, 
pp. 25-29 and pp. 77-80. 
33 For a succinct outline of the networks that distributed state funds in southern Italy see 
Ginsborg, pp. 178-181. The process of constructing political clienteles in the South in the 
post-war period is examined at a local level in Percy Allum, Politics and Society in Post-war 
Naples, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973; and Judith Chubb, Patronage, Power, 
and Poverty in Southern Italy: A Tale of Two Cities, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1982. For a study of political patronage in Basilicata see Leonardo Sacco’s Il cemento del 
potere, De Donato, Bari, 1982, which examines the career of the region’s most influential 
post-war politician Emilio Colombo. 
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1949-50, and second it embedded the foundations of its long term political 
consensus in southern Italy. Conversely, the Communist party found itself in the 
difficult position of opposing reforms which, at least on paper, closely 
resembled its own proposals for southern Italy. It was in this social and political 
context that discourses of Matera as a national shame were produced. The next 
section will outline a theoretical framework for examining these patriotic 
narratives.  
 
2.2 Studying national shame 
 
The notable media and political focus on post-war Matera was framed within 
the context of national shame. These numerous expressions of patriotism in a 
country that is generally considered to have a ‘weak’ sense of national identity 
provide an ideal test-case for examining patriotic narratives and notions of 
national identity in post-war Italy. Over the last decade historians of the 
Risorgimento have increasingly focused their attention on the emotions of 
national-patriotism.34 Some exemplary work on patriotic narratives in the 
Giolittian era has also been carried out.35 The post-war period, by contrast, has 
been relatively neglected in this context. This seems to reflect the widely held 
historiographical consensus that Italy’s ‘lack’ of patriotism was even more 
marked in the era of the first republic. Nationalism as an ideology, it is argued, 
had been tainted and discredited by Fascism. Furthermore, military surrender, 
the loss of Italy’s overseas colonies, the trauma of foreign occupation and civil 
war had combined to create a crisis of national identity and an apparent 
                                                             
34  See for example Alberto Mario Banti and Paul Ginsborg (eds.), Storia d’Italia. Annali, 22, Il 
Risorgimento, Einaudi, Turin, 2007. 
35  For a pathbreaking work in this regard see Dickie, Una catastrofe patriottica. 
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widespread sense of shame.36 Consequently, it is argued, patriotism ceased to 
play a central role in mainstream political discourse until the seismic events of 
Tangentopoli in the early 1990s and the emergence of Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza 
Italia party. Instead, as Silvana Patriaca has argued, ‘the ideologies of the two 
main political parties of the [post-war] era, Christian Democracy and the Italian 
Communist Party, were ostensibly supra-national and the issue of Italian 
character was marginal in their political rhetoric.’37 Christopher Duggan has 
claimed that the lure of Moscow for the Italian left on the one hand, and the 
attraction of the United States for the DC on the other, was in part a reaction to 
Fascism’s focus on nationalism. However, he also contends that this reflected 
the Italian state’s failure to create a strong sense of national identity in the post-
war period. Instead, Duggan argues, the Christian Democrats were more 
interested in retaining political power than forging a new sense of Italian 
nationalism.38 Patriotism as an ideology, it is argued, was no longer central to 
mainstream Italian politics and was instead primarily associated with far-right 
and neo-fascist groups.39 This line of argument, however, arguably reduces 
ideas of national identity to an ideological programme. It ignores the fact that 
the concept of the nation is a discursive construct which is being constantly 
contested and reimagined.40 Writing about Cold War divisions in post-war Italy 
John Foot has argued that ‘what was up for grabs was the type of nation itself 
                                                             
36  Ben Ghiat, p. 337 
37  Patriarca, Italian Vices, p. 214 
38  Christopher Duggan, ‘Italy in the Cold War Years and the Legacy of Fascism’, in Christopher 
Duggan and Christopher Wagstaff (eds.), Italy in the Cold War. Politics, Culture and Society 
1948-58, Berg Publishers Limited, 1995, pp. 1-24 
39  Patriarca, Italian Vices, p. 214 
40  See for example Manlio Graziano, The Failure of Italian Nationhood, Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke, 2010. Graziano focuses on Italy’s apparent ‘failure’ to become a nation. His 
argument ignores that nations are in fact discursive constructs and instead implies an ideal 
concept of national cohesiveness based on a normative understanding of modernity and the 
perceived requirements of nationhood.   
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and the national identity of all Italians. Both Communism and Christian 
democracy looked to defend or create a particular kind of nation, partly drawn 
from international models.’41 The intense media and political focus on the Sassi 
in the 1950s and the associated narratives of national shame provide an ideal 
laboratory for a micro-analysis of contested notions of Italian patriotism in a 
Cold War context. Alberto Banti has argued that historians have tended to 
neglect Italian national identity as an object of study.42 Although there have 
been a number of important contributions to the history of Italian nationalism 
in the last two decades, arguably more work needs to be done in this area. This 
chapter, therefore, aims to make a small contribution to that field of study in the 
context of post-war Italy. The following section will outline a framework for 
examining national shame in the context of post-war Matera. First it will 
critique the existing literature which has dealt with this topic. Second it will 
provide a working definition of shame drawing on literature from the fields of 
psychology and moral philosophy. Third, it will outline a theoretical framework 
for examining national shame in the context of post-war Matera using methods 
from the history of emotions and the history of nationalism. 
 
Existing literature 
 
Despite the large amount of research on post-war Matera, little work has been 
done to examine the concept of national shame in any depth. The small amount 
of existing literature that analyses Matera in this context, moreover, fails to 
draw on the existing literature on the history of emotions and the history of 
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nationalism. Writing about post-war Matera, Alfonso Pontrandolfi argues that 
‘nella coscienza collettiva della comunità materana … la realtà ambientale dei 
Sassi ha rappresentato per un verso, e soprattutto per i ceti medi e borghesi, la 
vergogna da cancellare.’43 However, his book on the Sassi, Una vergogna 
cancellata, provides no further evidence to back up this assertion. The concept 
of shame is not analysed at any point. Brief reference is made to a number of 
press reports which dubbed Matera a vergogna nazionale in the 1950s, but 
these expressions of national sentiment are at no point examined. Instead the 
reader is left with the implied notion that national shame is a fixed concept 
which requires no further explanation. Finally, the labelling of the Sassi as a 
national shame appears to have been axiomatic for Pontrandolfi. The inference 
is that people lived in caves in the 1950s and this situation defied the norms of 
Italian society. There is no attempt to understand why Matera was dubbed a 
national shame at that particular point in time and how the rapidly changing 
post-war historical context shaped the numerous patriotic expressions that the 
city generated.     
Similar oversights can be found in Anne Toxey’s work on post-war 
Matera. Ostensibly her research addresses the Sassi as a national shame in more 
depth.44 Her analysis, however, overlooks the existing literature on shame, the 
history of emotions and nationalism. As a result these concepts are under 
theorized. Again the implication is that shame has a universal and fixed 
meaning and thus requires no further explanation, rather than being a 
normative idea which is conditioned and expressed differently across time and 
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44  See Toxey, Materan Contradictions, pp. 52-56 and 82-85 in particular. 
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cultures, as the most recent scholarship on the history of emotions contends.45 
Toxey’s work on contemporary attitudes towards the Sassi amongst a selection 
of Matera’s residents, however, is noteworthy. She argues that narratives of 
shame, heightened in the 1950s through increased political and media 
attention, have shaped the predominately negative attitudes towards the Sassi 
found amongst former residents and their progeny today. Toxey, however, also 
contends that the same residents were made to feel ashamed for their 
troglodyte living conditions in the immediate post-war period through media 
and political focus on the city. The only evidence offered for this assertion is a 
series of contemporary interviews that the author carried out. This is 
problematic for a number of reasons. It assumes that attitudes towards the 
Sassi in contemporary Matera were the same as those from the 1950s. In 
addition it takes for granted that the public and private memories of the people 
interviewed have not changed across time and space in the intervening sixty 
years. The latter point is particularly surprising as Toxey draws on the vast 
body of existing literature in the field of memory studies to examine 
contemporary attitudes towards the Sassi.46   
Furthermore, Toxey’s work neglects to theorise notions of the Italian 
nation and Italian nationalism. Instead it is inferred that there was a shared and 
fixed sense of what these concepts constituted for Italians in the post-war era. 
She continually uses the term ‘nation’ to mean the ‘Italian population’ or ‘Italian 
people’ and thus neglects to examine the contested nature of patriotic 
narratives. Recognizing these points is fundamental to any examination of 
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national shame. The various texts produced on Matera in this context should 
provide an insight into how a certain number of journalists and politicians 
imagined the Italian nation in the 1950s and why the Sassi were presented as 
an affront to this idea. This point has been completely overlooked in the existing 
research. Finally, Toxey claims that the Italian media ‘defiled Matera with 
shame’ in the post-war period following the publication of Cristo si è fermato a 
Eboli and the subsequent interest that the book created in the Sassi.47 However, 
her work only makes fleeting references to the key sources that she argues 
shaped and disseminated discourses of shame associated with Matera in the 
post-war period: newspapers. As a result it is not clear exactly how notions of 
Matera as a national shame were created and how the rapidly changing 
historical and political contexts of post-war Italy informed these discourses. The 
contested nature of different expressions of national shame is overlooked. 
Instead the implication is that there was a unified discourse of national shame 
rather than a fractured and politically contested concept. In addition, Toxey’s 
claim that a narrative created primarily in the Italian press permeated through 
the entire Italian ‘nation’ needs to be backed up with a rudimentary 
examination of newspaper circulation and readership levels at the very least, 
neither of which are supplied.48 This chapter, therefore, aims to be a corrective. 
It will draw on the most recent scholarship in the history of emotions and 
nationalism to examine the concept of national shame in the context of post-war 
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mean ‘the Italian people’. Again the use of such a contentious term in this way suggests that 
the large body of existing scholarship on nationalism has been overlooked, in particular 
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Matera. Furthermore, it will draw on the vast amount of newspaper and 
archival material which has been hitherto neglected in the existing scholarship.  
 
Theoretical framework  
 
For psychologists and social theorists, shame is part of a group of emotions that 
are social, self-reflexive, self-conscious and have a strong moral element. These 
include guilt, humiliation, disgrace, and embarrassment.49 Guilt, however, lacks 
the social component that shame, humiliation, disgrace and embarrassment 
require.50 These emotions need the gaze of others, be they real or imagined, in 
order to be triggered. Shame involves the perception of having lost face in front 
of others and being affected by this occurrence. While guilt focuses primarily on 
specific misdeeds, shame in contrast contains a negative sense of the self.51 The 
individual that feels shame experiences painful feelings of inadequacy. Shame 
occurs at a moment of social consciousness, when an individual perceives the 
gaze of others. Hence, as Michael L. Morgan argues, rather than the actual 
opinion of others, shame can be the result of an individual’s estimate of 
themselves, a projection of how others might see them and how they see 
themselves.52 It is implicit, therefore, that shame requires an individual to have 
notions of how they should act, the type of person they ought to be, and that 
others expect them to be. Their actions can then be judged to have gone against 
                                                             
49  See Michael L. Morgan, On Shame, Routledge, London, 2008; Michael Lewis, ‘Self-conscious 
emotions. Embarrassment, Pride, Shame, and Guilt’, in Michael Lewis, Jeanette M. Haviland-
Jones and Lisa Feldman Barrett (eds.), Handbook of Emotions, The Guilford Press, London, 
2008, pp. 742-756; and Karen Caplovitz Barrett, ‘A Functionalist Approach to Shame and 
Guilt’, in June Price Tangey and Kurt W. Fischer (eds.), Self-Conscious Emotions. The 
Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride, The Guildford Press, New York, 1995, 
pp. 25-63. 
50  See Martha C. Nussbam, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law, Princeton 
University Press, New Jersey, 2004, pp. 207-209.  
51  See Barrett, pp. 25-63.   
52  Morgan, p. 15 
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these perceived values or not, and in the former case may trigger feelings of 
shame.53 Psychologists and moral philosophers further subdivide shame into 
two categories: acknowledged and unacknowledged. The latter, it is claimed, 
can have severe negative effects at an individual level, while at a collective level 
it can be used as a tool of social and political control.54 Shame, however, can also 
have positive effects according to Michael L. Morgan. It can act as an instrument 
which shames people into action. As a result, Morgan contends, shame can be 
used as an important tool of political motivation.55  
Expressions of national shame occur when the ‘nation’ is judged to have 
violated its putative values and ideals.56 Shame in these instances involves the 
desire to be seen to fulfil a national ideal. The desire for national pride, 
therefore, is crucial to expressions of national shame. National shame instead 
exposes the nation’s apparent failure to live up to its perceived values. In order 
to be triggered, someone needs to catch the nation out, to witness its failed 
attempt to uphold specific values. As with personal shame, this witness can be 
real or imagined. The implication is that the eyes of the ‘civilized world’ are on 
‘us’, i.e. national citizens. Expressions of patriotic shame are one of the ways 
through which ideas of the nation are created. Sara Ahmed’s work is exemplary 
in developing this hypothesis. She argues that expressions of national shame 
‘make’ the nation. Ahmed contends that ‘naming emotions often involves 
differentiating between the subject and the object of feeling.’57 For example, 
claiming that an action or an object is ‘a stain upon the nation’ implies that the 
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54  Patriarca, ‘A Patriotic Emotion’, pp. 135-136  
55  This is Morgan’s central thesis, however, arguably some of the author’s conclusions display a 
normative model of what Western moral values should constitute.  
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nation can be wronged. It therefore becomes a subject which can seemingly feel 
emotion. At the same time expressions of patriotic shame generate the nation as 
the object of ‘our’ feelings. ‘We’ apparently experience shame on behalf of the 
nation. Furthermore, Ahmed notes ‘the feeling does not simply exist before the 
utterance, but becomes “real” as an effect, shaping different kinds of actions and 
orientations.’58 Claiming that something is a ‘stain upon the nation’, therefore, 
generates the nation as if it were an entity which can feel emotion.59 
Ahmed contends that national shame acts as a narrative of reproduction 
for heteronormative values, i.e. norms based on the belief that heterosexuality 
is both the normal and preferred sexual orientation. She argues that there are at 
least two specific ways in which expressions of shame contribute to the 
construction of the nation in this context. The first instance involves shame 
produced by what she terms ‘illegitimate others’ such as homosexuals or 
immigrants who are judged to have failed to live up to and reproduce notions of 
the national ideal. The second case, in contrast, is when the nation shames itself 
in its treatment of others. It may be exposed as failing to live up to the values 
that it purports to hold dear.60 The latter example is relevant in the context of 
post-war Matera. Shame was expressed for the Italian state’s failure to rehouse 
the estimated 15,000 people living in cave homes in the early 1950s. This 
reflected fears over the link between morality and housing conditions as will be 
examined in detail below. 
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Moreover, Ahmed identifies an apparent lack of remorse as a potential 
source of national shame. She uses the example of the Australian government’s 
refusal to acknowledge that the country’s indigenous population had been 
mistreated and the subsequent popular reaction. Witnessing the government’s 
lack of shame can be in itself shaming: ‘the shame of the absence of shame’ as 
Ahmed terms it.61 The demand is for the nation to appear ashamed. The charge 
is of being shamed by the shameless. Shame expressed over a lack of shame in 
others is linked to notions of national pride. The implication of this narrative is 
that if shameful actions in the past are acknowledged then pride can be 
restored.62  
Furthermore, Ahmed argues that expressions of national shame can 
foster a sense of national identity. Recognising the nation’s failure to live up to 
its perceived ideals is a means through which individuals identify with the 
nation. A citizen may be ashamed for their country’s failure to meet the 
standard of its perceived national ideals. The shame expressed underlines the 
individual’s apparent love for their nation. If notions of the nation are 
considered to be normative rather than descriptive, as ‘ought to’ concepts, then 
expressions of shame can be seen as an important means through which nations 
are imagined. Shame, nonetheless, can produce a sense of belonging through an 
identity’s failure to live up to an apparent model of national values.63 Identifying 
and acknowledging wrongdoing can help to restore national pride which is 
threatened when shameful acts are perceived and then acknowledged. The ‘we’ 
who identify and express national shame identify themselves as part of a 
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national community with shared values. If ‘you’ are ashamed of certain past 
action or inaction ‘you’ are a true patriot. Expressions of national shame for past 
wrongs, therefore, show that ‘we’ are now well-meaning citizens who recognise 
right from wrong. According to Ahmed acknowledging these failures and their 
temporary nature allows for a narrative of recovery to begin. The nation, 
therefore, can return towards embodying the putative values that define its 
identity in the present.64 The appropriation of the national ‘we’, however, is 
arguably an important means through which political groups can look to define 
themselves as ‘good’ patriots and denounce their opponents as ‘bad’ 
nationalists. These ideologically charged ideas of national identity, therefore, 
can play an important role in the shaping of political identities.  
In her work on shame and the Risorgimento, Silvana Patriarca argues 
that, given its social and political nature, the study of national shame should be 
of particular interest to historians. However, she adds that they need to be wary 
of the ahistorical theories of moral philosophers and psychologists. Instead 
historians should draw on the burgeoning field of the history of emotions when 
examining shame – or any other emotion.65 But how should historians study 
emotional expressions in the past? The primary question raised is whether 
emotions are innate or cultural.66 There is much disagreement over this point, 
but Susan J. Matt has noted the essential idea which grounds the growing, yet 
theoretically problematic, field of the history of emotions:  
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Historians of the emotions share the conviction that feelings are never 
strictly biological or chemical occurrences; neither are they wholly 
created by language and society. Instead feelings are something in 
between. They have a neurological basis but are shaped, repressed, 
expressed differently from place to place and era to era.67  
 
The exact object of study when examining emotions in a historical context, 
however, remains a contentious issue. This thesis argues that it is impossible to 
tell exactly what people felt in the past. But that does not mean emotional 
expressions cannot be the object of historical analysis. Emotional activity 
involves imagining the expectations and reactions of others. This process 
involves the creation of emotional scenarios which may be genuinely felt but 
can also be manipulated for a specific purpose. One means for examining these 
emotional scripts is to try and understand the cultural frameworks which 
shaped them and the implied moral world and audience for which they were 
created. 
 Barbara Rosenwein’s concept of ‘emotional communities’ provides a 
theoretical framework for analysing narratives of national shame in this 
context. Rosenwein defines the concept thus: 
People lived – and live – in what I propose to call ‘emotional 
communities.’ These are precisely the same social communities – 
families, neighborhoods [sic], parliaments, guilds, monasteries, parish 
church memberships – but the researcher looking at them seeks above 
all to uncover systems of feeling: what these communities (and the 
individuals within them) define and assess as valuable or harmful to 
them; the evaluations that they make about others’ emotions; the nature 
of the affective bonds between people that they recognize; and the 
modes of emotional expression that they expect, encourage, tolerate, and 
deplore.68 
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Furthermore, Rosenwein argues that people are not fixed in one emotional 
community, rather they move between different groups depending on the social 
context. Their emotional expression and judgements are tailored to these 
diverse circumstances. Thus it can be argued that ‘not only does each society 
call forth, shape, constrain, and express emotions differently, but even within 
the same society contradictory values and models, not to mention deviant 
individuals find their place.’69 In order to identify and study emotional 
communities, historians need to examine the primary documents of the social 
groups of interest in an attempt to ascertain the language used to express 
emotion. The context in which emotions were expressed is fundamental to 
examining an emotional community. As Rosenwein argues: ‘[Emotional 
expressions] depend on the values and situations that elicit them, on the 
narratives that people use to make sense of themselves and their world, and on 
the accepted or idiosyncratic modes of expression that are employed to 
communicate them.’70 The historical context, in which emotional scripts were 
created, therefore, needs to be established in order to better understand how 
and why people expressed their emotions in a particular way at a specific 
moment in time.  
 Clearly it is impossible to study the emotional expressions of an entire 
‘nation’, society, social group, or even emotional community. Historians can only 
rely on the sources available and examine representative examples. This point, 
however, should not diminish the importance of studying emotion scenarios 
historically. Rosenwein notes that ‘we cannot know how all people felt, but we 
                                                             
69  Ibid. p. 843 
70  Jan Plamper, ‘The History of Emotions: An Interview with William Reddy, Barbara 
Rosenwein, and Peter Stearns’, History and Theory, (2010), no. 49, p. 259 
100 
 
can begin to know how some members of ascendant elites thought they and 
others felt, or at least thought they should feel.’71 In the context of Matera and 
discourses of national shame this group is almost exclusively limited to a 
number of journalists and politicians. Broad generalizations about the feelings 
of all Italians need to be avoided.72 Instead examining the patriotic narratives 
that a number of politicians and journalists conveyed in the context of post-war 
Matera - as well as how they thought others should express national shame - 
can provide an insight into their ideas of Italian national identity and the norms 
of the emotional community they aimed to address. It is difficult to gauge the 
reception and impact that these expressions of national shame had at political, 
intellectual and popular levels. However the journalists and politicians that 
generated patriotic narratives in the context of post-war Matera had access to 
regional and national audiences and their public voices were potentially far-
reaching.   
Any study of national shame needs to engage with the large body of 
existing scholarship on nationalism. As noted above, a lacuna exists in the 
research carried out on post-war Matera in this regard. This chapter will 
attempt to fill that gap drawing on existing studies of the nation. John Dickie’s 
work on Italian nationalism is exemplary and provides a theoretical framework 
for examining nationalist discourse. Dickie defines the nation as ‘a social fiction, 
indeed a plurality of competing social fictions that are generated within modern 
societies as an integral moment of the struggle for power and consensus.’73 
Viewing the nation as a discursive construct, Dickie argues, enables historians 
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to investigate the ideas with which people imagine national identity at specific 
moments in time, their relationship with the historical context in which they 
were produced, and their subsequent impact on historical processes.74 
However, he contends that national identity needs to be studied on a micro- 
rather than a macro-historical level to avoid broad generalizations.75 Post-war 
Matera, therefore, provides an ideal laboratory for examining competing 
nationalist narratives at a local level in the rapidly changing political context of 
post-war Italy.      
Dickie’s work on nationalism builds upon Benedict Anderson’s highly-
influential thesis in Imagined Communities. Anderson famously defined the 
nation as ‘an imagined political community … imagined as both inherently 
limited and sovereign.’76 Nations, according to Anderson, are groups of people 
who will never get to know each other personally, but imagine themselves as a 
cohesive community moving forward through time simultaneously. Dickie, 
however, argues that Anderson’s work overlooks the numerous ways in which 
the nation can be imagined. Rather than the notion of a single harmonious 
imagined community that Anderson envisages, there are, in fact, a myriad of 
competing and contradictory narratives of what constitutes national identity. As 
Dickie contends: ‘Benedict Anderson’s famous slogan is right but does not go far 
enough: nations are ‘imagined communities’, but the process of imagining them 
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is a far more diverse and conflictual process than Anderson himself assumes.’77 
This contention is applicable to post-war expressions of Matera as a national 
shame. They reveal a loosely shared narrative that the Sassi constituted a 
national shame but conflicting ideas of the imagined Italian nation against 
which Matera’s cave dwellings were compared, and to whom blame needed to 
be attributed.  
Furthermore, Dickie notes a number of assumptions about nationalism 
that historians tackling this field need to keep in mind which have been 
overlooked in the existing literature on post-war Matera. First, it is implicit in 
theorizations of the nation that everyone knows and agrees on what exactly 
constitutes the nation. Second, it is assumed that the nation is a tangible entity, 
a thing, be it a specific culture or ‘race’. One of the primary ways in which 
patriotic narratives are established and maintained is through delineating the 
nation’s borders and the Others found beyond the pale. ‘We’ can be set against 
foreigners and internal enemies in the process of constructing the nation’s 
timeless characteristics. As Dickie notes: ‘the nation defines itself against 
impurities and weaknesses, traces of the foreign, which can be projected onto 
phenomena both inside and outside of the real boundaries of the state.’78 
Images of the South have provided an internal Other against which notions of 
the Italian nation have been imagined from unification onwards. The bulk of 
research carried out on stereotypical images of the Mezzogiorno and patriotic 
discourse focuses on the Liberal period. The post-war period has been relatively 
neglected in contrast. Matera provides an opportunity to examine the interface 
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between patriotic narratives and notions of the South after 1945. The Sassi 
became an important symbol of southern Italian otherness in the immediate 
post-war period. The city’s cave dwellings came to symbolize different concepts 
for different groups including an affront to the ideals of the Italian nation, Italy’s 
post-war housing crisis, the failure of the Italian state to modernize the 
Mezzogiorno, a remnant of a bygone age, and above all a national shame.  
Drawing together the different theoretical threads outlined above, this 
chapter contends that the ‘nation’ is a myriad of competing and conflicting 
imagined communities. Expressions of national shame, furthermore, illustrate 
this point. They involve imagining a set of ideals to which the nation has failed 
to live up. The patriotic ‘we’ implied in expressions of national shame is an 
imagined community. It follows, therefore, that expressions of national shame 
involve competing narratives. The articles and official documents examined 
below in the context of post-war Matera reveal that many different and 
conflicting patriotic voices were generated. Similar to patriotic narratives, 
emotional scripts also need to be thought of in the plural. Expressions of shame 
change across time and space. This chapter argues that people live and lived in 
emotional communities which shape the accepted norms of emotional 
expression in a given social, cultural and historical context. The different 
emotional communities that influenced references to the Sassi as a national 
shame will be identified, contextualized and examined in detail in an attempt to 
understand their motivations and workings. 
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2.3 An anatomy of national shame  
 
The first time that the term ‘national shame’ was mentioned in the context of 
Matera appears to have been in Vincenzo Corazza’s 1941 report on the Sassi. 
This account of housing conditions in Matera’s cave dwellings quotes Arcangelo 
Ilvento, the vice-director of the department of public health under Fascism, who 
had dubbed the Sassi a ‘vergogna nazionale’.79 This source, however, was not 
widely disseminated and does not appear to be the foundation for post-war 
patriotic narratives. Instead post-war references to Matera as a national shame 
in public debate seem to have first emerged in 1948. During a pre-election 
speech given in the city on 1 April 1948, Palmiro Togliatti branded the living 
conditions that he witnessed at Matera a disgrace.80 Similar sentiments were 
expressed in a number of newspapers and official documents from 1948 
onwards. The exact term vergogna nazionale does not appear to have been used 
in the Italian press until 1951. Notions of Matera as a national shame, however, 
intensified following the Italian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi’s visit to the 
city in June 1950 and the subsequent announcement that the Italian 
government would implement special legislation for the Sassi. The narratives of 
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successive governments had continually neglected the South. Matera’s cave homes, however, 
did not merely constitute a housing problem according to the PCI leader. They were also a 
national shame: ‘Non è possibile lasciare che il Paese sia governato da quei gruppi sociali, da 
quei partiti, da quegli uomini i quali in decenni e secoli, dacchè governano l’Italia, non sono 
stati capaci di far scomparire queste vergogne [the Sassi], queste miserie dei lavoratori, non 
sono stati capaci di dare a queste regioni la civilità di cui esse hanno bisogno che è un diritto 
per tutti gli uomini.’ Using the Sassi as a symbol of the entire South, Togliatti implied that 
southern Italy was backward compared to other parts of Italy. The Italian Communist Party’s 
post-war ideas of capitalist versus Bolshevik progress, as outlined below, arguably informed 
the notions of affluence and backwardness that Togliatti looked to communicate. For the 
above quotation see I comunisti e i Sassi di Matera, Festa dell’Unità, Matera, 1977, pp. 11-13. 
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national shame generated in the context of post-war Matera reached their apex 
in the period 1950-1952. This period was marked by increased political and 
media calls for state intervention to resolve the city’s housing problems. On 6 
March 1951 Michele Bianco, the PCI deputy for Potenza, presented a draft 
special law for Matera before parliament. The DC government quickly 
countered with its own provisional bill later the same year and a parliamentary 
committee was established to discuss the proposed special legislation for 
Matera. The first special law for the Sassi was passed on 17 May 1952. Political 
and media references to Matera as a national shame largely disappeared in an 
Italian context following the implementation of this legislation. The DC claimed 
to have finally tackled Matera’s housing problems and once again the PCI saw 
its main political rival usurp another post-war initiative that the Communist 
Party had originally proposed.  
Examining expressions of national shame in the context of the Sassi 
should shed light on the moral worlds and motivations of those individuals who 
called for government intervention at Matera. Descriptions of the Sassi as a 
national shame provide an opportunity to carry out a micro-study into notions 
of the Italian nation amongst a number of post-war politicians and journalists. 
The focus of this section, therefore, is to examine the different expressions of 
national shame generated during the scope of this study. Moreover, it will aim 
to identify and contextualize the emotional communities which shaped these 
patriotic narratives. A number of questions will be addressed: what do 
expressions of national shame tell us about notions of Italian national identity in 
the immediate post-war period? Furthermore, why was Matera seen as a 
national shame at that point in time; and what impact did discourses of national 
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shame have on the decision to implement a state intervention programme at 
Matera? 
 
The foreigner’s gaze 
 
The critical gaze of foreign nationals is a recurring narrative found in post-war 
accounts of Matera.81 As noted above, shame requires the gaze of an ‘other’, be 
they real or imagined, in order to be triggered. It involves losing face in front of 
someone else. Shame, therefore, can be the based on an individual’s projection 
of an external judgement and ultimately reveal their own self-perceptions. 
National shame also requires the presence of a witness who observes the 
nation’s apparent failure to live up to a set of putative ideals. This can be caused 
through envisaging the opinion of what Sara Ahmed has dubbed ‘international 
civil society’ as much as a reaction to concrete external criticism.82 Examining a 
selection of patriotic narratives produced in the context of post-war Matera and 
notions of the foreigner’s gaze will allow for these competing expressions of the 
nation to be studied in detail.  
 A recurring narrative found in Italian sources on post-war Matera is that 
the Sassi became world famous due to frequent visits from foreign journalists 
and intellectuals who later wrote about the city’s cave homes in the 
international press. These descriptions, it was claimed, displayed a morbid 
fascination with the Sassi and their picturesque quality while concurrently 
denouncing the living conditions as a stain upon Italy’s already damaged 
international reputation. In a letter addressed to both the Italian Prime Minister 
                                                             
81  Silvana Patriarca’s work on national shame and the Risorgimento was the main source of 
inspiration for this section. See Patriarca, ‘A Patriotic Emotion’, pp. 134-151. 
82  Ahmed, p. 111 
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and the Minister for the Interior, the Prefect of Matera, B.D. Iodice, conveyed the 
perceived level of national and international interest in the Sassi in the early 
1950s: 
La stampa di ogni corrente, politica e non politica, la cinematografica, la 
letteratura stessa, dall’argomento dei Sassi Materani ha tratto e trae 
continui spunti, non sempre felici né utili al paese, che vengono svolti per  
agitare il problema dal punto di vista sociale, economico, politico e 
storico, ed ormai è stata richiamata tutta l’attenzione non solo della 
Provincia o della Regione, ma anche della Nazione e del mondo, sul 
problema annoso, numerosi sono pure i turisti e forestieri, che 
s’interessano ormai allo storico problema della città materana, che ne ha 
il triste privilegio.83  
 
Iodice’s letter conveyed the belief that the eyes of the world were on Matera in 
the immediate post-war period and that the Sassi were a focal point for national 
and international journalists and writers interested in Italy’s southern question. 
The letter also implies that the media attention on Matera had been detrimental 
to Italy’s international reputation.  
Similar sentiments were expressed in a number of Italian press articles 
in the late 1940s and early 1950s.84 Writing in 1949 for Il Giornale d’Italia about 
the apparent widespread interest in Matera, for example, Marco Aontenelli 
claimed that ‘con quel che si è scritto intorno a questo miserabile alveare 
umano [the Sassi] … si potrebbe formare una biblioteca.’85 There was, to be 
sure, unprecedented international press interest in the Sassi during the late 
                                                             
83  ACS,  PCM 48-50, Risanamento Rioni Sassi, I.6.I, no. 77794 
84  See for example: ‘Intervista del nostro direttore col Ministro Zellerbach’, Il Giornale del 
Mezzogiorno , 3 October 1949 and Gino Spera, ‘Dalla regione più povera d’Italia. Problemi di 
Matera ancora da risolversi’, Il Tempo, 16 April 1950, p. 6. 
85  Marco Aontenelli, ‘Drammatiche cifre del Mezzogiorno. Duemila case per alloggiare gli 
inquilini delle caverne’, Il Giornale d’Italia, 27 October 1949, p. 2. Il Giornale d’Italia was a 
national daily newspaper founded in 1901 by the liberal monarchists Sidney Sonnino and 
Antonio Salandro. In the post-war period the paper was edited by Giovanni Santi Savarino 
and although not directly linked to the DC, it supported the party’s moderate policies. See 
Paolo Murialdi, La stampa italiana della liberazione alla crisi di fine secolo, Laterza, Bari, 
1995, pp. 54-55. 
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1940s and 1950s. Foreign curiosity about Matera appears to have been the 
direct result of Cristo si è fermato a Eboli’s success in English translation. 
Archival research for this thesis uncovered numerous examples of Anglophone 
newspaper articles on Matera and the Sassi from 1949 onwards. The majority of 
these press reports were produced in the context of promoting Marshall Plan 
funding in Italy, De Gasperi’s visits to Matera in 1950 and 1953 respectively, 
and the special law for the Sassi passed on 17 May 1952. Similar to Italian press 
sources, Matera was presented in the English-language media as a symbol of 
Italy’s southern question. The tone of these articles, however, was generally 
positive and hopeful. The narrative presented was that the Sassi were an age-
old problem which the Italian state, thanks to American investment, had finally 
taken measures to resolve.86 International press coverage, together with an 
English-language documentary film on the Sassi that the Marshall Plan’s 
propaganda office produced in 1951, appear to have further increased Matera’s 
international notoriety.87 Writing in the New York Times in 1954 Herbert L. 
Matthews contended that ‘Matera has world-wide fame because of its cave 
houses.’88 While it is impossible to ascertain the veracity of Matthews’s 
statement, it suggests that the Sassi were at least well-known in international 
media circles.  
                                                             
86  See Patrick McGauley, ‘Da Siberia fascista a stella della riforma agraria: l’immagine della 
Basilicata sulla stampa anglofona 1945-1970’, in Basilikos. Rivista di storia locale, Istituto di 
studi storici della Basilicata meridionale, Città del Sole, Naples, 2011, pp. 73-88. 
87  Romolo Marcellini, Life and Death of a Cave City (Italy, 1951). For further production 
information see http://www.sellingdemocracy.org/filmlist.html (accessed 22/07/2013) and 
Bonifazio, Narrating Modernization. 
88  See Herbert L. Matthews, ‘Cave-Homes Pose Problem in Italy: Government Trying to House 
Thousands Living in Misery in Poverty-Ridden South’, The New York Times, 20 May 1954, p. 
6. Similar sentiments were expressed in The Times of London in 1957. See From Our Special 
Correspondent, ‘Matera’s Cave Dwellers. Poverty and Ignorance in the Italian South’, The 
Times, 2 December 1957, p. 11. 
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 Italian claims that the international media branded Matera a national 
shame, however, do not reflect Anglophone press coverage of the Sassi in the 
early 1950s. A large number of English-language articles which cover post-war 
Matera were located for this research project. These texts describe the Sassi’s 
living conditions as backward and inadequate to varying degrees, e.g. an article 
in The Times of London from 1953 refers to the Sassi as ‘a colony which has for 
long been a blot on the life of the country.’89 The only clear-cut reference in the 
English-speaking press to Matera as a national shame, however, was found in an 
article dating from 1955.90 The piece was written to highlight the fact that 
numerous families were still living in cave homes a number of years after the 
DC government had implemented special legislation for Matera. In contrast, 
Italian claims that the foreign press had branded the Sassi a national shame 
date from the early 1950s. The Italian response, therefore, appears to have been 
based on internal perceptions and projections of the foreigner’s gaze rather 
than on actual claims that the Sassi constituted a national shame made in the 
foreign press.91  
                                                             
89  From our own correspondent, ‘New villages for cave dwellers. Signor De Gasperi in South 
Italy, The Times, 18 May 1953, p. 6 
90  Writing in The Guardian in 1955, Wayland Youngs argued that ‘The place [Matera] is 
beautiful and the people are friendly and strong and witty for all their savage history. But the 
place is also a disgrace to a civilized nation. Matera makes nonsense of communism and 
democracy, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Organisation for European 
Economic Cooperation.’ See Wayland Young, ‘The Caves of Matera. Still Dwellings To-day’, 
The Manchester Guardian, 7 January 1955, p. 4.  
91  Although Matera was briefly the focus of international media attention in the 1950s, the 
existing secondary sources appear to have overestimated the extent to which photographic 
images of the Sassi were published in the English-speaking press. Marida Talamona notes 
that the French photographer Henri Cartier-Bresson visited Matera in the early 1950s to 
photograph the Sassi. She claims that these photos were later published in LIFE magazine. A 
selection of these images was published in the report that the UNRRA-CASAS special 
commission for the Sassi produced in 1956. See Riccardo Musatti, Federico G. Friedmann 
and Giuseppe Isnardi, Commissione per lo studio della città e dell’agro di Matera: Saggi 
introduttivi, vol. I, UNRRA CASAS, Prima Giunta, Rome, 1956. However, no trace of these 
photos has been found in the archive of LIFE magazine which is now available online. 
Similarly Paolo Scrivano has claimed that images of the Sassi were published worldwide 
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The idea that the foreign press dubbed the Sassi a national shame, 
however, has been repeated in the secondary literature on post-war Matera. For 
example Anne Toxey has recently argued that following Cristo si è fermato a 
Eboli’s success in the English-speaking world Matera ‘came to be labeled [sic] 
“vergogna nazionale” … which the anglophone [sic] press reproduced as “the 
shame of Italy.”’92 No specific examples or further references are provided to 
back up this assertion. The salient point about international press coverage of 
the Sassi, judging from the sources located, is that it intensified following the 
implementation of the special law for the Sassi on 17 May 1952. Emphasis was 
placed on the role that foreign aid had played in tackling Matera’s housing 
crisis. Nonetheless, the perceived foreigner’s gaze is implicit in all of the post-
war articles published in the Italian press which refer to Matera’s cave homes as 
a national shame. The increased international interest in the Sassi appears to 
have enabled a number of journalists and politicians to create powerful and 
convincing emotional scenarios and use the concept of national shame for 
political ends. Examining a number of representative examples in which the 
implied gaze of the foreigner is addressed explicitly will help to reveal the 
workings of and motivations behind these patriotic narratives.   
 The Communist weekly magazine Vie Nuove published a two-page 
spread on the Sassi in 1948 complete with a series of five photos depicting the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
thus increasing the city’s international fame. He references a series of fifty-eight photos of 
the Sassi taken by the American photographer Marjory Collins in 1950, some of which were 
later published in Adriano Olivetti’s periodical Comunità but do not appear to have been 
published elsewhere. No further references are offered to back up Scrivano’s assertion. See 
Marida Talamona, ‘Dieci anni di politica dell’UNRRA Casas: dalle case ai senzatetto ai borghi 
rurali nel Mezzogiorno d’Italia (1945-1955), il ruolo di Adriano Olivetti’, in Carlo Olmo (ed.), 
Costruire la città dell’uomo, Einaudi, Turin, 2001, pp. 173-204; and Paolo Scrivano, ‘Signs of 
Americanization in Italian Domestic Life: Italy’s Postwar Conversion to Consumerism’, 
Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 40 (2005), no. 2, pp. 317-340.   
92  Toxey, ‘Reinventing the Cave’, p. 66. See also Toxey, Materan Contradictions, p. 52. 
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homes and lives of Matera’s rural poor. In this piece, the poet and writer Alfonso 
Gatto commented on the perceived behaviour of Italian and overseas visitors to 
Matera. Gatto was highly critical of what he viewed as the voyeuristic gaze of 
outsiders who, the article claimed, romanticized the lives of the Sassi’s 
estimated 15,000 inhabitants: ‘s’accumulano stupore e meraviglia sui Sassi di 
Matera come se fossero incastonati nella corona di un re barbaro e magnifico 
che caca seduto sul trono ed è ricco della sua splendida sporcizia.’93 Gatto 
argued that visitors to Matera had little understanding of the hardship that the 
city’s agricultural workers endured. Instead they had an idealised view of the 
Sassi and their focus on Matera’s rustic beauty merely prolonged a solution to 
the city’s acute housing problems. Gatto claimed that ‘i viaggiatori e i curiosi 
guardono meravigliati i monumenti di questa miseria e dicono “bello”. Matera 
resta per loro una città pittoresca e “folkloristica” da scoprire e da far conoscere 
perché rimanga gravata dalla nostra pietà.’94 Matera’s problems were further 
exacerbated, Gatto claimed, by the attitude of local officials who were reluctant 
to support a rehousing programme as they feared the city would lose its scenic 
quality.95  
Blame for the living conditions at Matera was attributed to the Christian 
Democrat government in particular and Italian society in general: ‘chi permette 
queste tane e queste grotte si chiamino case d’uomini – governo o società che 
sia – è colpevole e offre agli sguardi caritatevoli e avidi dei curiosi lo stesso 
                                                             
93  Alfonso Gatto, ‘Monumenti della miseria’, Vie Nuove , 19 December 1948, page number not 
available 
94  Ibid. 
95  Ibid. 
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spettacolo che si vuol proibire.’96 Gatto’s article implies, therefore, that Italian 
society and the Italian government were shameless. They had failed to 
acknowledge the gravity of Matera’s housing problems. Instead Italy welcomed 
patronizing outsiders to marvel at the Sassi’s apparent rustic charm. Matera’s 
problems would not be resolved, Gatto argued, ‘finchè non avremo vergogna di 
noi stessi.’97 The author, therefore, created an emotional scenario in which he 
accused Italians, and the Italian government, of lacking shame. The apparent 
morbid fascination of foreign visitors was used to add further weight to this 
politically charged narrative. The implication of Gatto’s article is that ‘we’, the 
good patriots, are ashamed of Matera, while the DC government, in contrast, is 
shameless and therefore unpatriotic and that foreigners are just hopeless 
romanticizers. The article, thus, illustrates how notions of Matera as a national 
shame were a means through which political identities and ideas of the nation 
were forged and contested in a Cold War context.  
Gatto’s reaction to foreign depictions of Matera needs to be understood 
in the context of Communist Party notions of affluence and progress that were 
prevalent in post-war Italy. The PCI believed that industrial development and 
prosperity were both positive and necessary as long as they were the products 
of communism and not the capitalist system. This viewpoint was partly a 
reaction to the widespread belief in Italy that the fruits of the ‘American Dream’ 
could be enjoyed in post-war Europe. Consumer goods, running water, and 
individual homes quickly became concrete aspirations for many Italians. In this 
context the communist press in Italy depicted the USSR as a terrestrial paradise 
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where the consumer goods limited to the wealthy in capitalist society were 
available to all citizens.98  
Capitalist affluence, in contrast, was viewed as inauthentic because it did 
not improve working people’s lives. Poverty and inequality were seen as 
evidence of capitalism’s dysfunction. Anything judged to be nostalgic, old-
fashioned or picturesque was rejected as decadent, reactionary and a potential 
barrier to communist progress.99 This viewpoint was exemplified in the 
rejection of intellectual interest in Italian folk culture - for example in PCI 
critiques of the work of Carlo Levi and Ernesto de Martino.100 As regards post-
war Matera, the accusation that outsiders were more interested in the Sassi’s 
picturesque qualities than the city’s rural poor is a recurring narrative found in 
PCI treatment of the city and its cave homes.101 Furthermore the Communist 
Party called for the destruction of the Sassi to make way for new popular 
housing.102 The PCI’s notion of affluence and rejection of anything seen as 
nostalgic helps to contextualize these viewpoints as well as the emotional 
scenario that Gatto presented to the reader in his article.  
Furthermore, in the context of PCI notions of progress, the Sassi were 
viewed as a prime example of the failure of capitalism. This point is exemplified 
                                                             
98  See Sandro Bellassai, La morale comunista. Pubblico e privato nella rappresentazione del PCI 
(1947-1956), Carocci Editore, Rome, 2000, pp. 166-173. For a broad overview of Italian 
depictions of Russia in the Cold War see Donald Sassoon, ‘Italian Images of Russia, 1945-
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102  See for example Michele Bianco’s intervention in Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, 26 
September 1951, p. 30585. 
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in an article published in the communist daily L’Unità on 3 January 1951. The 
author Nicola Nicoletti described the Sassi as ‘uno sconcio ed un disonore per 
l’Italia.’103 He also accused Alcide De Gasperi of being the latest in a long line of 
Italian public servants that had governed Italy in the interests of capitalism. The 
Sassi, Nicoletti claimed, were a monument to the degeneracy of capitalist 
society: ‘Quando avremo risolto questo problema il Sasso non si chiamerà più 
Inferno, ma gli metteremo il nome, e lo faremo diventare “Museo delle 
Meraviglie della società capitalista”.’104 Gatto and Nicoletti’s expressions of 
national shame in the context of the Sassi were linked to the perceived dangers 
of capitalist society and a rejection of the decadent. The implication in both 
articles, therefore, was that to be a good Italian patriot was to be a communist.  
A very different account of foreign interest in the Sassi can be found in 
Delio Mariotti’s article ‘La città delle grotte’. It was published in La Stampa on 
25 July 1950 to document Alcide De Gasperi’s first visit to the city two days 
previously. The report opened with the description of an impromptu and 
unauthorised expedition that a number of British Labour politicians had made 
to Matera during an official stay in Rome. ‘Una curiosità morbosa’, Mariotti 
claimed, ‘spingeva i deputati laburisti verso questi luoghi che da anni la 
letteratura internazionale si ostina a presentare come una macchia nella 
tavolozza del paesaggio italiano.’105 Although the journalist argued elsewhere in 
the article that the Sassi were a national disgrace, he expressed anger at the 
perceived criticism from foreign sources and mounted a patriotic defence of the 
fledgling Italian republic. First Mariotti claimed that the Labour deputies had 
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travelled to Matera surreptitiously without informing the Italian government. 
This behaviour, he contended, was unacceptable. ‘Gli ospiti’, Mariotti argued, 
‘devono osservare certe elementari regole di correttezza e non è affatto 
apprezzabile che un invitato vada per prima cosa a vedere semi-interrati di un 
palazzo allo scopo di muovere critiche al padrone di casa.’106 The implication is 
that the Labour MPs, and the foreign media too, had broken protocol and 
purposely travelled to the worst part of the country in order to criticize Italy 
and the Italian people.  
Furthermore, Mariotti questioned the foreign press’s motivation in 
publishing articles and photos depicting the Sassi. The inference from the text is 
that Italians had already understood that Matera’s cave homes constituted a 
national shame and thus did not need foreign visitors to remind them of this 
fact. In addition Mariotti put forward the idea that the international press had 
failed to understand the nuanced historical, social and economic factors which 
had resulted in the construction and continued inhabitation of Matera’s cave 
homes. For this reason, the journalist argued, it was unfair ‘attribuire alla 
giovane Repubblica italiana l’onta dei “Sassi”, se consideriamo che il governo De 
Gasperi ha affrontato la grossa questione del Mezzogiorno proprio nel momento 
più critico della storia italiana, all’indomani di una disfattta che ha lasciato 
rovine e debiti.’107 Instead the national shame associated with the Sassi, 
according to Mariotti, should have been blamed on previous governments and 
the Fascist regime in particular, which had tried to cover up Matera’s housing 
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problems through press censorship.108 The article implies that the foreign press 
had focused on the Sassi due to a sense of morbid curiosity. This had 
subsequently resulted in unjustified criticism of Italy and its people on the 
international stage. Mariotti’s article, however, offered no concrete reference to 
specific foreign press articles about Matera or the opinions of the British Labour 
MPs following their impromptu visit to the Sassi. Rather it appears to have been 
a projection of how ‘international civil society’ viewed Italy and Italians in the 
context of post-war Matera.109 The implication is that the Labour MPs had been 
emotionally insensitive towards an Italian national shame. They had failed to 
understand the gravity of the situation and thus got their emotions wrong. The 
apparent insensitivity that the Labour MPs displayed during their visit to 
Matera, therefore, augmented the ‘ought to’ force of the emotional scenario that 
Mariotti presented for the article’s implied Italian audience.  
It should be noted, moreover, that Mariotti wrote his article in the 
context of De Gasperi’s first visit to Matera in May 1950. This event was used to 
promote the DC’s twin programme for southern Italy: land reform and the Cassa 
per il Mezzogiorno. Furthermore, De Gasperi announced that the Christian 
Democrats would finally tackle the problem of the Sassi. In the context of ideas 
of national shame, Mariotti’s article implies that government intervention at 
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Matera would save face internationally and thus restore a sense of national 
pride.110 Emilio Colombo, the DC deputy for Potenza, made a similar point 
during his speech at Matera following De Gasperi’s first visit to the Sassi. He 
argued that: ‘in questo periodo così difficile [De Gasperi] ha saputo dimostrare 
all’Italia e al mondo che vi erano nel nostro popolo disgraziato ancora tante 
energie nascoste da poter compiere una opera di ricostruzione che ha 
meravigliato il mondo.’111 Colombo’s speech made it clear that, in his opinion, 
Italy was a disgraced nation both internationally and at home following twenty 
years of Fascist rule and the country’s disastrous involvement in the Second 
World War. The reconstruction process had shown the world that, in fact, 
Italians were capable of great things. Official sources and press articles 
sympathetic to the DC government presented the problem of the Sassi as the 
next step in rebuilding a new Italy and thus restoring a sense of national pride. 
Mariotti’s article and the emotional scenarios that it looked to communicate to 
the reader need to be viewed in this context. 
Writing about national shame and the Risorgimento, Silvana Patriarca 
argues that: 
The foreigner’s gaze had an important role in the very constitution of the 
patriotic Italians’ self-perceptions and sense of self as a people … Italian 
patriots were intimately aware of this external gaze and they somewhat 
internalized it. Feeling embarrassment and shame at the condition of 
their country, they saw themselves through the mirror provided by the 
foreigners’ eyes.112 
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In the case of post-war Matera, this external gaze appears to have been an 
Italian projection of what foreign visitors thought about the Sassi rather than a 
response to the city being dubbed a national shame in the international press. 
Nonetheless the patriotic narratives examined above reveal the images of the 
new Republic and of the Italian people that the two journalists in question 
wished to convey to their readers. These descriptions illustrate that the notions 
of national shame presented were politically charged, normative concepts that 
looked to define the values to which the Italian nation should aspire. Both Gatto 
and Mariotti presented themselves as defenders of Italy’s honour attempting to 
restore damaged national pride. The emotional scenarios they created, 
however, were very different. Gatto expressed anger and frustration at the 
apparent lack of shame towards the Sassi that he perceived amongst Italians 
and the Christian Democrat government in particular. Mariotti, in contrast, 
conveyed a sense of wounded national pride. His article can be read as an 
attempt to reaffirm a sense of belief in the Italian people and the new Republic 
through the perceived defamation of Italy in the foreign press. The political 
convictions of each writer and the newspapers that published their articles 
clearly influenced how they interacted with the perceived foreign opinions of 
the Sassi and the implied audience for both articles. Moreover, ideological 
considerations influenced the attribution of blame for the living conditions 
witnessed at Matera. Both sides of the Cold War political divide implicitly 
accused each other of failing to express the correct emotions in relation to 
Matera. The easiest way for each author to illustrate that they were ‘good’ 
patriots was to show how their political opponents were getting national shame 
wrong. Despite these differences Gatto and Mariotti conveyed one broadly 
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shared narrative: the Sassi constituted a national shame for Italians and swift 
action was needed in order to restore a sense of national pride.  
 
Housing, morality, and national shame 
 
Narratives of national shame in the context of the Sassi were also generated 
through links made between housing conditions and morality in a number of 
press articles and official documents. Not only were Matera’s cave homes 
depicted as an abomination to any self-respecting modern country because of 
their inadequate hygiene levels, it was widely argued that they fostered 
immorality and social degradation too. The implication was that impoverished 
families living in a single room would engage in incestuous sexual relations.113 
In addition to the perceived threat of incest there was the fact that people 
shared their homes with livestock. Disease was thought to be the main threat 
from people and animals living under the same roof.114 Post-war descriptions of 
the Sassi, therefore, echo discourses that were prevalent in the nineteenth 
century when so-called slum housing was equated with loose morals and social 
degradation, as outlined in detail below. Examining expressions of national 
shame and narratives linking housing conditions and social depravity will help 
                                                             
113 Speaking in an interview carried out in November 1952 the head of Matera’s carabiniere 
commented that ‘la promiscuità in cui vive la gente … qui si verificano molti reati portati 
dalla promiscuità delle famiglie e si è verificato il caso di qualche incesto o vizio 
omosessuale, questi sono in una certa frequenza, portati appunto dalla miseria che costringe 
questa gente a vivere nello stesso ambiente.’ See Atti della commissione parlamentare di 
inchiesta sulla miseria in Italia e sui mezzi per combatterla, Indagini delle delegazioni 
parlamentari. La miseria in alcune zone depresse, vol. VII, Camera dei Deputati, 1953, p. 208. 
114  Housing farm animals in the family home, however, was not uncommon for most Italian 
agricultural families in the first-half of the Twentieth Century and beyond. The death or theft 
of a mule could render a farming family destitute. Therefore, it was normal for agricultural 
families to keep their prize possessions inside their homes. See Ginsborg, p. 33. In addition, 
the UNRRA-CASAS team that carried out a study of the Sassi in the early 1950s believed that 
cohabitation between people and animals could spread disease, in particular malaria. 
Although these claims were unfounded, they arguably help to explain references to the 
perceived danger that farm animals posed to Sassi residents. See Friedrich G. Friedmann, 
Miseria e dignità, Il Mezzogiorno nei primi anni Cinquanta, Edizioni Cultura della Pace, San 
Domenico di Fiesole, 1996, p. 70. 
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to shed light on the moral worlds and motivations of a section of Italy’s post-
war public sphere - or those of the specific commentators in question at the 
very least. Moreover, contextualising these emotional scenarios should provide 
a greater understanding of why the Sassi generated such a large amount of 
patriotic narratives at that specific moment in time. 
Writing in the Neapolitan-based and centrist newspaper Il Mattino in 
May 1950, the journalist Gino Spera made reference to the moral and hygienic 
problems that the Sassi were perceived to embody. He wrote that 1,688 homes 
in Matera also served as stables. As a result people lived in ‘una sconcia 
promiscuità con le bestie oltre che all’immoralità della vita in comune di uomini 
e donne, sia pure della stessa famiglia, e non sempre, in un unico vano neanche 
sufficiente per una sola bestia.’115 Similar sentiments were expressed a year 
later in an article from the Giornale del Mezzogiorno written to mark the start of 
Matera’s risanamento programme. An interior photo of a cave home was 
accompanied by the caption: ‘Impressionante documentazione di una vergogna 
nazionale che sta per sparire.’116 The perceived link between housing 
conditions and morality was used to heighten the sense of national shame that 
the author looked to convey: ‘Ogni mattina la donna fa uscire dai “sassi” l’asino 
che normalmente vive con gli uomini. Selvaggia promiscuità che offende la 
dignità civile e morale dell’individuo e crea gravissimi problemi sociali, come la 
tubercolosi, la mortalità infantile, l’abbrutimento, la degradazione.’117 The link 
between housing, health, as well as social and moral wellbeing is explicitly 
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116  Cesare Marroni, ‘Cristo s’è mosso da Eboli. Lo stato “esattore e carabiniere” cambia volto in 
Lucania’, Il Giornale del Mezzogiorno, 17 September 1951, p. 1 
117  Ibid., p. 1 
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made in both texts. The implication is that the Sassi’s housing conditions were 
an affront to Italian moral values and thus constituted a national shame.   
The perceived connection between housing conditions, moral wellbeing 
and national shame appears to have originated in official circles. Following his 
visit to Matera in April 1950, Mario Cotellessa (Alto commissario per l’igiene e la 
sanità) wrote a letter to Achille Marazza (Ministro del Lavoro e della Previdenza 
Sociale) and Giulio Andreotti, then undersecretary for state, in which he 
detailed the housing conditions he had witnessed amongst the Sassi. Cotellessa 
urged Marazza to explore the possibility of constructing alternative housing at 
Matera to rehouse the families that were living in ‘primitive condizioni dei 
cavernicoli dell’età della pietra.’118 The Sassi, Cotellessa continued, ‘ci disonora 
sotto l’aspetto sociale, morale ed igienico .’119 The fact that different generations 
of the one family lived in a single room with their animals appears to have been 
the primary source of this shame: ‘la casa di abitazione della famiglia materana 
ed ivi sono contenuti, in un’ impressionante promiscuità: la cucina, i letti dei 
genitori e figli, i pochi miseri mobili e, separata da un basso muro di tufo, la 
stalla dell’asino e del mulo.’120 The implication from Cotellessa’s letter is that 
the Sassi embodied the Italian nation’s failure to live up to a set of perceived 
values. ‘Ci disonora’ implies that the eyes of the world were on Italy and Matera. 
The ‘us’ suggests that Cotellessa saw himself as part of an imagined community 
of well-meaning citizens that was able to recognise right from wrong in a 
national context, i.e. ‘good’ patriots. Acknowledging national shame, as Sara 
Ahmed has argued, means that a narrative of national recovery can begin. The 
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nation can move towards the putative values that define it and national pride 
can thus be restored.121 This process is arguably reflected in Cotellessa’s 
description of living conditions in the Sassi.   
Over two million Italians were unemployed in 1948. Moreover, the 
country was in the midst of a housing crisis. The Italian government identified 
the building sector as a means for resolving both problems and passed the legge 
n. 3, Provvedimenti per incrementare l’occupazione operaia. Case per lavoratori 
on the 28 February 1948. This legislation is better known as the Ina-Casa or 
Fanfani plan. Over 350,000 housing units were built from 1949-1963.122 
Writing about the Sassi in a letter to the Minister of Employment and Social 
Welfare dated 5 May 1950, Giulio Andreotti expressed similar sentiments to 
Cotellessa and called for new houses to be built at Matera under the Ina-Casa 
programme. Andreotti described the living conditions at Matera not only as 
deplorable but as immoral too.  
In quelle primitive dimore vivono famiglie di braccianti e di contadini 
molto miseri, spesso composte di numerosi elementi, conviventi in unico 
angusto spazio, dove la vita domestico-familiare si svolge in immorale 
promiscuità di sessi non solo, ma anche in antigienica coesistenza con il 
bestiame da lavoro e con gli arnesi del mestiere.123 
 
Like the texts cited above, the implication was that impoverished families living 
in a single room would engage in incestuous sexual relations. Andreotti copied 
the above phrase verbatim from a letter written on 27 April 1950 by F. De 
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122  For further information on the Ina-Casa programme see Paolo Di Biagi, ‘La “città pubblica” e 
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Giorgis, head of Matera’s carabinieri.124 In addition De Giorgis had warned of the 
perceived political dangers that Matera’s troglodyte homes had fostered. The 
letter claimed that the PCI had already begun using Matera’s inadequate 
housing situation in its political propaganda. Furthermore, De Giorgis implied 
that the Sassi’s living conditions were having concrete effects on residents’ 
political and spiritual wellbeing: ‘nei “Sassi” … vivono prevalentamente i 
comunisti più accesi e gli evangelici più fanatici ed è là che essi svolgono la loro 
opera con successi non indifferenti, speculando sullo stato di miseria e di 
indigenza morale e materiale di quella popolazione.’125 The immorality that 
inadequate housing conditions had produced, De Giorgis claimed, threatened to 
fuel social and religious deviancy. Swift government intervention was 
recommended in order to counteract the apparent moral, political and spiritual 
danger that Matera’s cave homes posed to the local population.126 These 
apparent fears over the links between housing and morality in official circles 
were communicated in the months leading up to Alcide De Gasperi’s visit to 
Matera in July 1950. The patriotic narratives created in the context of post-war 
Matera reached their apex in the period 1950-1952. The newspaper sources 
collected for this study suggest that the perceived links between housing and 
morality were one of the factors that provided momentum to the idea that 
Matera constituted a national shame and saw this concept become a 
commonplace in political debate in the period 1950-1952. 
 Expressions of shame over living conditions amongst Matera’s cave 
homes and concern over their impact on residents’ social wellbeing were not 
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limited to catholic commentators. On 6 March 1951 the PCI deputy for Potenza, 
Michele Bianco, presented a draft law for the Sassi to parliament. It made 
reference to the moral danger that he believed the city’s cave homes fostered. 
The text of the white paper noted that demanding special legislation for a 
specific town when Italy was experiencing an acute housing crisis could seem 
foolhardy and unjust. However, he argued that the Sassi’s housing problems 
urgently needed to be resolved ‘per ragioni di umanità e di dignità nazionale’.127 
Thus the Sassi were not merely a housing problem according to Bianco. They 
were a source of national shame which needed to be tackled. Bianco presented 
an emotionally charged description of living conditions at Matera to promote 
his draft law. Similar to the sources cited above, the text implied that there was 
a direct link between housing conditions and morality:  
Quando si parla dei “Sassi” di Matera bisogna pensare alle bolgie 
infernali e poi moltiplicarne l’orrore per dieci nella certezza tuttavia di 
rimanere sempre al di sotto della realtà. Bisogna pensare ad abitazioni 
che sono le stesse che esistevano cinque mila anni fa; bisogna pensare 
alle tane che i trogloditi di cinque mila anni fa scavarono con le unghie 
nella roccia, nella quale si insinuano, le une sotto le altre, in tutte le 
direzioni, in salita e in discesa, verso il centro della terra … una 
popolazione che si aggira intorno alle 18 mila anime, e con essa muli, 
asini, maiali, galline, in un’atmosfera che mozza il respiro ed in una 
promiscuità di sessi, di età, di uomini e di animali tale da suscitare orrore 
e ribellione! Onorevoli colleghi! I “Sassi” di Matera costituiscono una 
piaga che mortifica ed avvilisce ogni più elementare senso di umanità e 
rappresentano un marchio di infamia per la civiltà e la dignità del nostro 
Paese! Voi vorrete affrettarvi a cancellarlo facendo buona accoglienza 
alla presente proposta di legge.128 
 
Although less direct than Andreotti’s description cited above, the text of 
Bianco’s special law presents Matera as pre-modern in order to promote the 
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need for direct state intervention. The draft law infers that people of different 
sexes and generations living in a single room with their farm animals infringed 
upon the perceived values of the Italian nation. The Sassi constituted a moral 
issue and a source of ignominy for the fledgling Republic. Moving beyond the 
rhetorical skills that Bianco clearly employed to try and shame the reader into 
action, the text of the draft law suggests that the moral norms within which he 
was operating were remarkably similar to those of the journalists and DC 
politicians cited above. In order to understand Bianco’s description of the Sassi 
it is necessary to briefly examine the moral codes that the broad catholic 
movement and the Italian Communist Party looked to convey to their followers 
in the post-war period. 
 The family was a fundamental reference point in post-war Italian politics 
as Lesley Caldwell has cogently argued.129 The catholic movement claimed that 
the family was under threat from communism. They saw the family as one of 
Italy’s most important institutions and the Christian Democrats as the 
defenders of tradition. The family, however, was also a fundamental issue for 
the Italian left.130 Good communists were expected to defend traditional family 
values. The family unit was to be valued and protected. It was seen as the 
foundation of moral and social order.131 Sandro Bellassai has argued that this 
stance was in part an attempt to counteract accusations that communism 
fostered sexual immorality, but he contends that it also reflected the 
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importance that rank and file party members placed on ‘normal’ family life.132 
Eliminate capitalism, it was argued, and you would remove the main cause 
behind the breakup of families - as evidenced in the depiction of Soviet society 
in the communist press. Socialism was equated with healthy family life. 
Marriage rates had doubled in Russia, it was claimed, since the establishment of 
the USSR and the sanctity of the family had therefore been reinforced.133 
Furthermore, the PCI’s attitude towards sexual morality in the post-war 
period was conservative. Mixing of the sexes was viewed as dangerous and 
unseemly, sexual promiscuity was linked to a lack of character and 
homosexuality was seen both deviant and decadent. Loose sexual morals, it was 
claimed, marked an individual out as untrustworthy and, as a result, of no use to 
the Party. Restraint, it was argued, needed to be shown in the context of sexual 
desire. The Party was more important than physical impulses.134 The PCI’s 
stance towards sexual promiscuity reflected Lenin’s glass-of-water theory. 
Lenin rejected sexual promiscuity and instead recommended self-control and 
self-discipline amongst comrades. The concept of free love was viewed as a 
bourgeois invention and a threat to the moral wellbeing of Party members.135 
These points help to contextualize the apparent similarity between Bianco’s 
description of living conditions in the Sassi and those produced in official 
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sources cited above. There was, however, ideological divergence regarding the 
alleged causes of moral decay in post-war Italy.    
The DC argued that communism was the main threat to Western 
Christian values and the sanctity of the family. The accusation that Bolshevism 
fostered sexual deviancy was a recurring theme in catholic propaganda. The 
Catholic Church, moreover, adopted an aggressive stance towards communism. 
On 1 July 1949 Pope Pius XII issued a decree excommunicating any Catholics 
that collaborated with communist organizations. The PCI, however, 
acknowledged that the majority of Italians, including communist sympathisers, 
were catholic. Therefore the party hierarchy decided that it could not afford to 
attack the central tenets of Catholicism itself without risking the loss of 
potential voters. Stalin personally instructed Togliatti to refrain from targeting 
the catholic religion explicitly. Instead he advised the party to highlight how the 
structure and wealth of organized Christianity contradicted its spiritual 
message of peace and fraternity. The PCI, therefore, had to formulate a strategy 
for countering its main opponent without resorting to anti-Catholic rhetoric.136  
The Communist Party instead focused its moral outrage on capitalism 
and the supposed twin enemies of the working class: the Italian bourgeoisie and 
the United States of America.137 Capitalism was depicted not only as unjust and 
oppressive but as immoral too. The alleged decadent lifestyle and values of the 
Italian bourgeoisie as well as the moral degeneracy of capitalist society’s 
symbolic home, the USA, provided the ‘evidence’ for these claims. The 
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communist press routinely described the Italian bourgeoisie as sexually 
promiscuous while American society was depicted as being amongst the most 
morally repugnant on the planet. Mental health and social problems were 
reported to be rife in the USA and were in large part attributed to the 
acceptance of loose sexual morals.138 America, therefore, was depicted as a 
degenerate society which illustrated the moral dangers of capitalist civilization. 
Communist sources presented the Christian Democrats as internal allies of the 
USA and therefore of capitalism. Thus they were represented as a threat to 
Italy’s moral wellbeing.139 The different moral worlds of the DC and the Italian 
Communist Party help to explain the links made between housing and morality 
in the sources outlined above. Although the causes of alleged moral degeneracy 
were divided upon ideological lines, arguably the emphasis placed on the family 
unit in the wake of the Second World War, as well as attitudes towards sexual 
morality directly influenced the discourses of national shame, housing, and 
morality produced in the context of post-war Matera. 
Two supplemental factors need to be taken into consideration when 
examining the links made between housing and immorality in descriptions of 
post-war Matera. They are Europe’s post-war housing crisis, and discourses of 
housing, hygiene and morality that had developed in Europe from the 
eighteenth-century onwards. The issue of housing in post-war Italy is arguably 
crucial to understanding discourses of Matera produced during the scope of this 
study. Western Europe faced an acute housing shortage in the immediate post-
war period and the problem was keenly felt in Italy. Housing was one of the 
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primary social and economic problems that the Italian state faced in the 
immediate aftermath of World War Two.140 There had already been a housing 
shortage in Italy in the early part of the twentieth century. This shortfall, 
however, was further exacerbated by a number of factors in the post-war 
period. Over three million homes were believed to have been damaged or 
destroyed by bombing during the Second World War. Moreover, the Italian 
population grew by 11 per cent from 1937 to 1952.141 The return of demobbed 
soldiers and Italian citizens from former colonies placed further pressure on the 
existing housing stock. Istat estimated that in 1945 there were 1.38 people for 
every room in Italy and that by 1947 Italy faced a shortfall of 9 million rooms. 
Germany and Holland were the only western European countries which faced a 
greater housing shortage.142 Unsurprisingly, therefore, the concept of the home 
played an important role in post-war Italian society. This idea was linked both 
to perceptions of the country’s past and future. The home symbolized perceived 
notions of Italy’s traditional family values as well as the country’s move towards 
‘modernity’, be that viewed through a communist or catholic lens. Home 
ownership became an important aspiration for large sections of Italian society 
in the post-war period.143 In the context of Italy’s acute post-war housing crisis, 
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Matera’s cave homes were depicted in communist and catholic sources as one of 
Italian civilization’s lowest points.  
Official data from the post-war period, however, suggests that living 
conditions at Matera were ostensibly comparable with many other parts of 
post-war Italy. According to the 1951 census there were an estimated 218,642 
families living in 193,565 substandard dwellings which included baracche and 
cave homes. The majority of dwellings judged to be inadequate were located in 
southern Italy and the Islands, but there were also a large number of families 
living in substandard accommodation in northern and central Italy in rural 
areas but also in urban peripheries.144 The Inchiesta sulla miseria in Italia e sui 
mezzi per combatterla (an interparty parliamentary inquiry into poverty levels 
in Italy carried out between 1951-1953) calculated that a total of 802,000 
families in southern Italy and the Islands were living in poverty.145 This data 
suggests that apart from the dramatic setting of the Sassi and its large 
agglomeration of cave homes, the standard of living in post-war Matera was the 
norm in many parts of post-war Italy rather than the exception.146   
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Furthermore, the links between morality and housing found in post-war 
descriptions of the Sassi need to be examined in the context of discourses of 
hygiene and urban planning which first emerged in the eighteenth century.147 
Overcrowding in urban slums was believed to foster not just the spread of 
infectious disease, but also immorality, crime, incest, fornication and antisocial 
behaviour. Unsanitary housing was also considered a threat to the sanctity of 
the home and a potential breeding ground for revolutionary fervour amongst 
the poor. The concept that housing could shape morality was prevalent amongst 
philanthropic housing societies, e.g. the Peabody Trust and the East End 
Dwelling Company in Victorian London. It was argued that the moral character 
of the indigent could be improved through their organization into family units. 
The segregation of family members into different bedrooms and the segregation 
of the sexes were viewed as the solution to this problem. As a result concerns 
over morality directly influenced house design.148  
The emergence of links between housing, hygiene, morality and urban 
planning in an Italian context can be traced to the establishment of public health 
and sanitation legislation in 1888. This law stemmed from the introduction of 
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special legislation for Naples in response to the cholera epidemic of 1884 and 
1885. The Legge per la tutela della igiene e della sanità pubblica sought to 
quantify all urban centres with more than 20,000 inhabitants. This examination 
of the city marked a sea change in Italian urban planning. Street names became 
codified and maps of what had previously been terra incognita for civil 
authorities created dividing lines between affluent districts and so-called slums. 
Armed with detailed impressions of urban layouts, Italian town planners 
believed that their work could shape the hygiene and morality of a city for the 
better. Urban planning and improvement schemes aimed to eliminate economic 
and moral deprivation as well as provide new housing.149  
This had a direct effect on Italian urban planning. It took on an 
ideological and moral dimension through the emergence of the concept of 
sventramento. Adapted from the medical term for disembowelment, 
sventramento came to mean the demolition of slums and the widening of streets 
in urban planning and renewal. The term implies that the city is a body. Slums 
were seen as tumours that needed to be removed surgically. The health and 
hygiene measures undertaken by the Italian state at the end of the nineteenth 
century left an indelible mark on the country’s public administration. Public 
hygiene offices were established, hygiene regulations were introduced into 
building and the concept of moral hygiene permeated urban planning theories. 
The availability of light and fresh air became central to ‘hygienic’ urban 
planning designs from 1888 onwards. The norms of what constituted ‘healthy’ 
                                                             
149  Guido Zucconi, La città contesa. Dagli ingegneri sanitari agli urbanisti (1885-1942), Jaca Book, 
Milan, 1989, pp. 18-20 
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accommodation were defined scientifically and bureaucratically.150 Late 
nineteenth-century Italy also saw the invention of public health engineering 
with the publication of the magazine L’ingegneria sanitaria in 1891. The 
magazine defined public health engineers as doctors of the city whose ailments 
they should study and cure. Using the techniques of positivist science, public 
health engineers studied water supplies, housing conditions and compiled 
statistics on material conditions with the aim of improving hygiene standards. 
The model for this procedure was provided by the Piano di risanamento 
introduced in Naples in 1885. The city was studied in detail. A full population 
census was carried out and the housing conditions of tenements documented.  
Guido Zucconi notes that there was an ideological change in Italian urban 
planning in 1929 under Fascism. Town planners became more concerned with 
blending the modern and the classical than debates over public health and 
hygiene. There were also technological changes with the introduction of plans, 
elevations, and end views rather than the overhead maps previously used. 
However, the concept of diradamento edilizio (literally meaning thinning or 
pruning) used in the 1930s was simply sventramento by another name. Urban 
planners still believed that their work could a priori modify moral and social 
conditions.151 In the context of post-war Matera it is notable that the term 
risanamento was used to describe the rehousing programme for the city’s cave 
dwellers. Although in the context of urban planning this term can be translated 
as ‘slum clearances’, it derives from a medical term meaning to cure. The 
implication is that slum clearances were a means of curing the city from its 
                                                             
150  Ibid., pp. 30-33 
151  Ibid., pp. 35-153. This concept was still current in the post-war period, as will be seen in the 
next chapter which examines the implementation of the special law for the Sassi. 
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social ills through redevelopment. Based on the sources examined above it 
seems apparent that discourses linking housing conditions to morality persisted 
in Italy during the immediate post-war period, albeit refracted through the lens 
of two ideologies bitterly divided along Cold War lines. Fears over housing 
conditions and the family were arguably exacerbated by the destruction 
inflicted during the Second World War and the subsequent housing crisis. 
Matera’s Sassi provided a canvass upon which these uncertainties could be 
projected and intertwined with narratives of national shame and divergent 
political identities. Moreover, the city provided a testing ground for theories of 
social progress through architecture and urban planning which were 
implemented through the first special law for Matera in the 1950s. 
It is difficult to ascertain the impact that narratives of housing, morality, 
and national shame had on popular attitudes towards the Sassi at a local level in 
the 1950s. However, recent interviews carried out with residents that were 
moved from the Sassi to new housing as part of Matera’s risanamento 
programme suggest that notions of national shame created in the immediate 
post-war period have had a lasting impact on local attitudes towards the Sassi. 
Three different studies found that former Sassi residents were often reluctant 
and embarrassed to speak about their past lives and in a number of cases 
denied that their families had ever lived amongst Matera’s cave homes. The 
implication is that the emotional scenarios created in the 1950s have had a 
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residual impact on the collective memory of life in the Sassi amongst former 
residents.152 
It is evident that post-war Italy’s broad catholic and communist 
movements constituted two distinct emotional communities. Their moral 
worlds were ostensibly opposed, but there was a shared belief in the 
importance of the family and a rejection of loose sexual morals. The causes of 
Matera’s apparent moral degeneracy, however, were attributed to opposing 
sources. For communists the blame lay with capitalism and the Christian 
Democrats who were regarded as the political bedfellows of the USA. In 
contrast, Catholics viewed international communism as the greatest threat to 
their moral world and references to the dangers of Bolshevism were frequent in 
official accounts of the Sassi. There was clearly competition amongst the 
catholic and communist politicians and journalists cited above to appropriate 
ideas of national shame and use them against their political opponents. By 
claiming that their political rivals had got their patriotism wrong, each camp 
could look to legitimate their own reading of Italian nationalism. However, fears 
over the link between housing and morality shared by the communist and 
catholic commentators examined suggest that they were also part of a larger 
supra-political Italian emotional community. Arguably Italy’s post-war housing 
crisis, the emotional and material damage of the Second World War, and 
discourses of housing and hygiene had a direct impact on reaffirming the value 
placed on the home and the sanctity of the family for the Italian population. 
There was a broadly shared narrative about the impact that housing conditions 
                                                             
152  See Toxey, ‘Via Media’, pp. 73-76; Zuccari, pp. 446-460; and Del Parigi and Demetrio, pp. 26-
27. 
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could have on people’s moral wellbeing. In the context of Matera, writers and 
politicians from different political backgrounds constructed a similar discourse 
in which the Sassi symbolized post-war Italy’s housing crisis. This narrative was 
given further weight through the links made between housing and moral 
wellbeing.   
 
De Gasperi’s tears 
 
Matera, con i suoi ‘Sassi lasciò una traccia profonda nell’animo sensibile 
del Presidente. Tornato a Roma non mancò di esternare la sua 
commozione e si adoperò in ogni modo per il risanamento edilizio della 
città lucana. ‘Quei tuguri – disse – quelle tane stringono il cuore’. E ci 
raccontò in dettaglio il caso emblematico della famiglia del reduce 
Francesco Contino, da lui visitata ai ‘Sassi’ ascoltandone la storia 
quotidiana desolante di lavoro durissimo e di sacrifice, affrontata però 
con una tenacia e una speranza che non dovevano essere deluse.153 
 
This description of Alcide De Gasperi’s first visit to Matera on 23 July 1950 
appeared in Giulio Andreotti’s book De Gasperi e la ricostruzione published in 
1974. The short work is essentially a hagiography of De Gasperi’s post-war 
political career, but it is noteworthy that the Italian prime minister’s two visits 
to Matera were used to bookend a section on southern Italy. After years of 
rhetoric from previous governments, the book argued, De Gasperi had finally 
managed to tackle the age-old problem of the Sassi.154 Andreotti paid particular 
attention to De Gasperi’s emotional reaction during his first visit to Matera 
which, the book claimed, was central to the decision to formulate the special 
law for the Sassi. References to the Italian prime minister’s emotions, during 
and after his visit to a number of cave homes in July 1950, are also found in the 
                                                             
153  Giulio Andreotti, De Gasperi e la ricostruzione, Edizioni cinque lune, Rome, 1974, p. 101 
154  Ibid., p. 101 
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contemporary press coverage. The shared narrative of these articles is that De 
Gasperi’s deep sense of empathy prompted him to draw up special legislation 
for Matera’s cave dwellers. These reports were framed within the context of 
national shame and ideas of emotional norms in post-war Italy. Official media 
coverage of the Italian Prime Minister’s visit to Matera in 1950 was used to 
promote the Christian Democrats’ twin programme for southern Italy.155 In the 
context of notions that Matera constituted a national shame, 1950 was also the 
year in which this concept appeared more frequently in Italian press sources. 
De Gasperi’s visit appears to have been one of the factors that increased the 
circulation and regularity of this idea in press sources. This section will examine 
why the journalists covering the story deemed the Italian Prime Minister’s 
apparent tears to be significant at that moment in time and the historical 
context which shaped how and why they communicated this story in the 
national and regional press.  
Writing in 1950 about De Gasperi’s first visit to Matera for La Gazzetta 
del Mezzogiorno, Oronzo Valentini described the Italian Prime Minister’s visible 
                                                             
155  The concept of Matera as a symbol of the southern question became one of the key images 
used in DC propaganda in the early 1950s to promote the need for agrarian reform and the 
Cassa del Mezzogiorno. These points are exemplified in the official coverage of De Gasperi’s 
visit to Matera on 23 July 1950. The living conditions of Sassi residents were used to justify 
government reforms in southern Italy. See Giorgio Ceccherini, ‘La visita di De Gasperi in 
Lucania’, Il Popolo, 25 July 1950, pp. 1 & 4 and La Settimana INCOM, Viaggio nel Mezzogiorno. 
De Gasperi in Lucania (Italy, 1950). Roberto Rossellini also dramatized De Gasperi’s first visit 
to Matera in Anno Uno, his hagiography of the DC leader. See Roberto Rossellini, Anno uno 
(Italy, 1950). The PCI press presented a very different account of De Gasperi’s first visit to 
Matera. An article published in L’Unità on 25 July 1950 claimed that there had been protests 
against the Italian Prime Minister and that local police had resorted to confiscating a 
caricature of De Gasperi from the local offices of the Socialist Party. Subsequently a number 
of prominent Socialist and Communist activists had been arrested. See ‘Violenze della polizia 
a Matera per festeggiare la visita di De Gasperi’, L’Unità, 25 July, 1950, p. 5. The archival 
sources reveal that there was an altercation between the local police and local Communist 
and Socialist Party members. Seven policemen and four civilians suffered slight injuries and 
eight people were charged in relation to the incident. The archival sources also reveal that 
2,015 members of Coldiretti were bussed to Matera to listen to De Gasperi’s speech. This 
suggests that the visit was closely stagemanaged. See the material on De Gasperi’s first visit 
to Matera in ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 178, fascicolo 1642, sottofascicolo II.  
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distress during a visit to the cave home of Vito Andrisano and his family: ‘De 
Gasperi chiedeva notizie della loro vita, del loro lavoro, chiedeva 
insistentemente con un senso di angoscia, quasi volesse imprimersi nella mente 
e negli occhi il ricordo indelebile di uno spettacolo che ha avuto profonda eco 
nel suo animo.’156 A photo of De Gasperi visiting one of Matera’s cave homes 
accompanied the article. The Italian Prime Minister appears visibly 
uncomfortable in the shot which depicts the interior of a cave home with the 
silhouette of a mule in the background. The article noted that during the speech 
given in Matera’s main square later the same day, De Gasperi referred to the 
Sassi as ‘un deplorevole avanzo della nostra triste storia di secoli.’157 The 
implication from the article is that Matera’s cave homes were a national 
disgrace and that a mixture of empathy and shame had caused the Italian Prime 
Minister’s emotional reaction. 
Delio Mariotti also made direct reference to the Italian Prime Minister’s 
emotional state upon witnessing living conditions in the Sassi in an article for 
La Stampa. Mariotti claimed that ‘ci diceva De Gasperi alcune ore dopo la sua 
visita alla cupa e fantastica città che il problema dei “sassi” afferra alla gola e 
l’impeto di risolverlo sommuove il sangue in uno slancio generoso. (Il 
presidente all’uscita da alcuni tuguri aveva le pupille umide.)’158 The article 
frames De Gasperi’s apparent tears of compassion in the context of national 
shame. Mariotti contends elsewhere in the article that the Sassi constitute a 
national disgrace. The report ends, however, claiming that, with their twin 
reform programme for the Mezzogiorno, the Christian Democrats have taken 
                                                             
156  Valentini, p. 1 
157  Ibid., p. 2 
158  Mariotti, p. 5 
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the first steps in tackling southern Italy’s social and economic problems. 
Resolving Matera’s housing problems is presented as a key step in this 
process.159  
Reference to De Gasperi’s emotional response during his first visit to 
Matera was also made in Giovanni Acquaviva’s article published in the Corriere 
del Giorno on 24 July 1951. This piece was written to mark the news that the 
Christian Democrats had decided to put special legislation for Matera before 
parliament. The report claims that De Gasperi was moved to tears during his 
visit to the Sassi. 
Lo ricordiamo perfettamente De Gasperi durante le sue pereginazioni al 
Sud, scendere fin giù nelle grotte dei ‘Sassi’ e toccare con mano la miseria 
orripilante dei tuguri ove dieci persone con un asino e sette galline 
alloggiavano nella stessa unica camera il cui tetto faceva da pavimento 
ad un analogo tugurio sovrastante; lo ricordiamo pallido e quasi 
scostante per quella sua natura di montanaro, commuoversi fino alle 
lacrime al cospetto di così abominevole spettacolo.160  
 
The article directly linked De Gasperi’s apparent emotional reaction to Matera’s 
cave homes to his decision ‘coinvolgere massici interventi statali per eliminare 
la inqualificabile vergogna dei “Sassi”, nel quadro della rinascita del 
Mezzogiorno d’Italia proprio negli anni più duri e travagliati del dopoguerra.’161 
Acquaviva therefore links De Gasperi’s tears to notions of national shame. 
Moreover state intervention at Matera is framed in the context of the Christian 
Democrats efforts to resolve southern Italy’s perceived social and economic 
backwardness in comparison to northern Italy. The Sassi, it is implied, are a 
symbol of the southern question which De Gasperi’s government have finally 
                                                             
159  Ibid., p. 5 
160  Giovanni Acquaviva, ‘De Gasperi e Colombo per la redenzione di Matera’, Il Corriere del 
Giorno, 24 July 1951, p. 1 
161  Ibid., p. 1 
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resolved. It is clear, therefore, that the Italian Prime Minister’s apparent 
emotional reaction to living conditions at Matera was incorporated into official 
propaganda in the context of promoting the DC’s reform programme for 
southern Italy.  
It is impossible to know how genuine De Gasperi’s tears were during his 
first visit to Matera. A more fruitful avenue of enquiry, therefore, is to discern 
the reasons why De Gasperi’s apparent emotional reaction was considered 
newsworthy in contemporary press sources. In order to do this it is necessary 
to consider the articles cited above in the historical context of emotional norms 
and ideas of masculinity in post-war Italy. Tom Lutz has argued that while 
crying is a universal amongst humans, as with all emotional displays, the 
meaning assigned to tears changes across time and space.162 Crying therefore 
needs to be contextualized in order to be understood. In particular the age and 
sex of the person crying are crucial to understanding the meanings assigned to 
their tears. The types of emotional performance expected from men and women 
in the given context needs to be examined. In the first half of the twentieth 
century, rational emotional control was fostered in Western culture, 
particularly in men.163 In an Italian context Mussolini actively looked to rid 
Italians of what he deemed the defect of sentimentalism. In the lead up to the 
Second World War Italian soldiers were instructed to keep their emotions in 
check. The model of masculinity that Fascism looked to foster was of a virile, 
intense, and emotionally disciplined individual who was willing to use violence 
                                                             
162  Tom Lutz, Crying: The Natural and Cultural History of Tears, W.W. Norton, London, 1999, p. 
25 
163  Ibid., p. 151-153 
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when necessary and ready to die for his country.164 Ruth Ben Ghiat has argued 
that following the humiliation of military surrender and foreign occupation in 
the mid-1940s there was a crisis of Italian masculinity. The male identities of a 
generation that had been raised under Fascism needed to be redefined in the 
context of a new democratic republic.165 
In this context, following twenty years of Fascist rule, Italy’s post-war 
political leaders had to formulate a new way to communicate to the mass public 
which distanced themselves from the methods of Mussolini’s regime. The 
Fascist rhetoric of the superman was rejected and instead political leaders 
could show signs of physical weakness and tiredness as well as use calm and 
understanding tones to communicate their political message.166 De Gasperi was 
depicted in party sources and politically sympathetic publications as a modest, 
pious, patient and meditative individual.167 The fact that he hailed from 
Trentino, formerly part of Austria, meant that De Gasperi was often viewed as 
having a more ‘northern European’ temperament: he was depicted as being 
stoic, direct, serious, and economical with his words. Furthermore, the DC 
leader was presented in party sources as a pious family man: his wife was 
depicted as a woman of great strength and his daughter Lucia was a nun.168  
Italian emotional norms and notions of masculinity prevalent in the 
post-war period arguably help to explain the significance that sections of the 
Italian press placed on De Gasperi’s apparent tears of empathy during his first 
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war Italy’, Modern Italy, vol. 3 (1998), no. 2, pp. 249-250 
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visit to Matera. It was acceptable, perhaps even welcomed, that a post-war 
Italian Prime Minister should display public emotion - albeit discreetely. As 
noted above, however, De Gasperi was depicted in partisan sources as having a 
stoic character often attributed to the fact that he was a montanaro. The claim 
that he was moved to cry in public during his visit to Matera, therefore, suggests 
that this event was viewed as having added significance. Furthermore, the press 
coverage examined above implies that De Gasperi’s tears were motivated by 
empathy for the living conditions of fellow Italian citizens and the state’s 
inability to tackle the ‘problem’ of Matera’s Sassi. In the context of ideas of 
Italian nationalism, therefore, the Prime Minister’s tears were used to show 
readers that he was a ‘good’ patriot.  
De Gasperi’s visit to Matera on 23 July 1950 had a concrete effect on the 
city’s history. On his return to Rome the DC leader called for a parliamentary 
committee to draft special legislation for Matera’s cave homes to be established. 
Although, as seen above, the mass media and the PCI had placed pressure on the 
Christian Democrat government to tackle Matera’s housing problems, the 
Servizio Informazioni’s official report on De Gasperi’s visit makes direct 
reference to the fact that ‘il Presidente del Consiglio è stato evidentemente 
impressionato dal problema dei “sassi di Matera”.’169 Moreover, the report 
notes that ‘l’on. De Gasperi si è fatto interprete, quindi, della necessità ed 
urgenza di una soluzione integrale per sanare una situazione che si presenta 
assai complessa nei suoi vari aspetti igienici, sociali e morali.’170 The Italian 
cabinet duly agreed that a committee should be established to draw up special 
                                                             
169  ACS, PCM 48-50, Matera, Risanamento dei Rioni dei Sassi: I.6.I, no. 77794. Presidenza del 
consiglio dei ministri. Servizio Informazioni – Div. Comunitari e Rassegne. 28 July 1950. 
170  Ibid. 
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legislation for Matera’s troglodyte homes. Notably, however, the Servizio 
Informazioni’s communiqué appears to have been drafted to provide a 
summary of De Gasperi’s visit to Matera for press outlets. The exact same text 
was cited in La Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno just days after the Italian Prime 
Minister’s visit.171 This suggests that the Christian Democrats were keen to 
convey the message that their party leader was not only moved during his visit 
to the Sassi, but he was willing to act on these apparent feelings and thus make 
a contribution to restoring a sense of national dignity in a country still coming 
to terms with its apparent crisis of national identity in the aftermath of the 
Second World War. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Expressions of national shame produced in the context of post-war Matera 
appear to have emerged in April 1948 following Palmiro Togliatti’s pre-election 
speech in the city. The idea gained momentum in 1950 following Alcide De 
Gasperi’s visit to Matera and the announcement that the Italian government 
planned special legislation for the Sassi. The concept of Matera as a national 
shame reached its height in the early 1950s when political and media calls for 
government intervention increased. References to Matera as a national shame, 
however, largely disappeared from political and media sources when the Italian 
parliament and senate passed the legge n.619: Rinsanamento dei rioni dei Sassi 
nell’abitato del comune di Matera on 17 May 1952. This legislation instigated a 
large-scale rehousing programme for the city’s estimated 15,000 cave dwellers. 
In the post-war context of the late 1940s and early 1950s, it is clear that the 
                                                             
171  See ‘La pace è la suprema aspirazione del Governo e del popolo italiani’, La Gazzetta del 
Mezzogiorno, 29 July 1950, p. 1. 
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different journalists, politicians and public officials cited above had different 
notions of what constituted Italian national identity. Although the terminology 
used to express patriotic shame was often strikingly similar, these narratives 
were at the same time a means through which political identities were formed 
in the context of the Cold War. Ideas of national shame and pride became part of 
the wider political battleground in which opposing sides of the ideological 
divide attempted to appropriate the national ‘we’ and accuse each other of 
being bad patriots. The moral sensibilities of distinct catholic and communist 
emotional communities also clearly shaped the different expressions of national 
shame examined above. Notions of progress, sexual morality, and the sanctity of 
the family impacted the reasons why and the ways in which national shame was 
expressed. There were, however, additional historical factors in the immediate 
post-war period which arguably impacted these emotional norms and produced 
some shared concerns between catholic and communist emotional 
communities: the trauma and destruction of the Second World War, the 
resultant Europe-wide housing crisis, the legacy of Fascism, and the increased 
emphasis on the sanctity of the family.  
Furthermore, the patriotic expressions generated in the context of post-
war Matera show that there were different and competing notions of what 
constituted the nation. It is clear, therefore, that broad generalizations about the 
feelings of all Italians in this context should be avoided. Instead historians need 
to examine individual expressions of national shame at a micro-level as well as 
the parameters of the specific emotional communities which shaped these 
narratives. This chapter has attempted to uncover the interface between the 
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competing national identities and the different emotional communities that 
were generated by and influenced expressions of national shame in the context 
of post-war Matera. These patriotic narratives created the very thing to which 
they claimed to belong - the Italian nation – as well as a set of national ideals 
which the Sassi were judged to have affronted.  
The narratives of patriotic shame generated in the context of post-war 
Matera had a direct impact on the city’s social and urban development. This was 
exemplified in De Gasperi’s decision to create a commission to draw up draft 
legislation for Matera following his first visit to the city in April 1950. The 
government presented a provisional law to parliament on 30 May 1951 which 
outlined a programme for the construction of 2,000 new homes for the 
residents of the Sassi over a four-year period. The project was given an initial 
budget of 5.2 billion lire which would be used to construct apartments and 
purpose-built agricultural villages in Matera’s hinterland. Notions of national 
shame appear to have influenced the subsequent parliamentary and senate 
commissions which debated the DC government’s draft legislation for Matera in 
spring 1952. During the parliamentary-commission discussions Giulio Spallone, 
the PCI deputy for Acquila, noted that despite reservations over a number of the 
draft law’s articles, the Communist Party would vote in favour of the 
legislation.172 This decision, Spallone explained, was taken ‘perchè ci interessa il 
                                                             
172  The communist delegates that took part in the parliamentary commission to discuss the 
draft law for Matera were opposed to the creation of rural villages for the Sassi’s estimated 
16,000 inhabitants. Moreover, they queried the budget of four billion lire that the 
government draft law had allocated for the rehousing programme. In addition, the PCI and 
the PSI were against the draft law’s provision to repair and reuse a number of homes located 
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Democrat government’s draft law planned to ‘conservare i “Sassi” così come sono oggi, 
utilizzando il patrimonio utilizzabile.’ Bianco was against this approach because in his 
opinion the Sassi were ‘una cosa che dovrebbe sparire!’ Therefore he contended that 
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problema dei “Sassi di Matera”, perchè vogliamo cancellare questa vergogna che 
affligge da secoli l’Italia meridionale.’173 The Socialist senator Giacomo Mancini 
expressed similar sentiments during the discussion of the special law in Italy’s 
second chamber. He argued that none of the Sassi’s cave homes should be 
retained because they were an affront to southern Italy’s sense of pride: ‘avrei 
desiderato che nel disegno di legge in esame non fosse stata prospettata la 
possibilità di recuperare un certo numero di caverne, per l’onore e la dignità del 
Mezzogiorno.’174 But ultimately Mancini voted in favour of the special law for 
the Sassi because in his opinion ‘le caverne rappresentano il disdoro del 
Mezzogiorno e a tale disdoro si deve porre finalmente termine.’175 The 
interventions made during the parliamentary commission and senate debates 
cited above suggest that ideas of national shame directly influenced the decision 
to pass the special law for the Sassi. Arguably no party wanted to oppose the 
proposed special legislation for fear of being seen as unpatriotic despite a 
number of reservations about it provisions. The first special law marked a 
defining moment in Matera’s history and transformed the city’s urban and 
social fabric forever. The next chapter will examine the implementation of the 
first special law in detail.
                                                                                                                                                                            
‘bisognerebbe, insomma, provvedere ad eliminare completamente queste zone di abitazione, 
e l’eliminazione di queste zone andrebbe fatta in modo integrale.’ See Camera dei Deputati, 
Commissione in sede legislativa, Commissione VII, Lavori Pubblici, LXIX, 6 February 1952, p. 
574. Narratives of national shame appear to have directly influenced this position. In his 
own draft law for Matera Bianco had called on Italian deputies to approve the legislation ‘per 
ragioni di umanità e di dignità nazionale’ as the Sassi were ‘un marchio di infamia per la 
civiltà e dignità del nostro Paese.’ See Bianco, pp. 1-4. 
173  Camera dei Deputati, Commissione in sede legislativa, Commissione VII, Lavori Pubblici, LXIX, 
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174  Senato della Repubblica, Risanamento dei “Sassi” di Matera. Discussione del disegno di legge 
n. 2262, VII commissione, 8 May 1952. Reproduced in Mario Cresci (ed.), Matera: immagini e 
documenti, Edizioni Meta, Matera, 1975, p. 347. 
175  Ibid., p. 349 
147 
 
Chapter 3: The first special law for the Sassi 
 
Dopo secoli di attesa, il ricordo si perde nella storia dei tempi, dopo che 
intere generazioni si sono succedute nell’ansia di vedere risolto il 
problema dei ‘Sassi’ che racchiudono, imprigionando, nella loro aspra e 
paurosa struttura, gli alloggi di migliaia nostri lavoratori, ecco una 
luminosa e radiosa volontà di Governo democratico e Cristiano, 
cancellare quello che indubbiamente costituiva una vergogna per una 
Nazione civile.1 
 
The above quote comes from a document that Matera’s provincial 
administration produced to announce draft legislation for the Sassi. The 
subsequent enactment of the first special law on 17 May 1952 marked a turning 
point in the city’s history. No previous legislation had implemented a 
comprehensive plan to rehouse Matera’s troglodyte population. The so-called 
Legge Colombo would result in the transformation of Matera’s urban and social 
fabric. Following the success of Carlo Levi’s Cristo si è fermato a Eboli and the 
subsequent press and political interest in the Sassi, Matera had attracted the 
attention of Italy’s public sphere. The Sassi’s cave dwellings had been dubbed a 
national shame and were commonly presented as a symbol of Italy’s southern 
question in political and media circles. Resolving Matera’s widely-publicized 
housing problems thus became an issue of national importance for the Christian 
Democrat government. At the same time the implementation of the first special 
law provided the ruling party with an opportunity to showcase its twin reform 
programme for southern Italy. Matera’s cave dwellers would be rehoused in 
purpose-built accommodation designed by the leading lights of Italian post-war 
architecture and town planning. These new housing projects would aim to meet 
the perceived social, cultural and employment needs of their new inhabitants 
                                                             
1  See the report dated 18 April 1951 in ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 82, fascicolo 661, 
sottofascicolo A. 
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and dovetail with land reform legislation passed in 1950. Agricultural workers 
would be moved closer to the land that they worked, day labourers would be 
transformed into small landowners, and artisans would be rehoused in 
purpose-built urban neighbourhoods. The special law for the Sassi, therefore, 
was an attempt to deliver on the promises that Alcide De Gasperi had made 
during his visit to Matera in July 1950. Narratives of national shame were 
combined with state paternalism and ultimately political opportunism in what 
was a significant experiment in post-war urban planning. 
  That experiment involved a major building and rehousing programme 
which transformed Matera’s urban and social topography. The first special law 
legislated for the transfer of residents deemed to be living in uninhabitable 
housing to new accommodation and ultimately resulted in the gradual 
abandonment of Matera’s distinctive cave homes. This process was projected to 
take four years, but had not been fully completed over twenty years later. The 
original rehousing plans proposed the construction of five rural villages for self-
sufficient small landowners, tenant farmers and artisans; two semi-rural 
suburbs for fixed-wage and day labourers; three urban quarters for artisans and 
city-based workers; and the renovation of those cave homes deemed fit for 
habitation. These proposals, however, would be modified when the provisions 
of the first special law were translated into concrete building projects. Notably 
the estimated 15,000 Sassi residents whose lives the first special law directly 
impacted were not consulted throughout the risanamento process. Instead the 
rehousing programme was applied from above. The lack of local representation 
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would result in a number of social and economic problems during the special 
law’s implementation.  
The existing secondary literature on post-war Matera tends to view the 
risanamento programme as a deliberate manipulation of housing data in order 
to empty the Sassi rather than renovate the existing cave homes. This policy, it 
is argued, was carried out in order to gain social and political control over a 
potentially revolutionary urban population. Moreover, the first special law for 
Matera is viewed as being emblematic of a wider government strategy which 
aimed to transform small landowners, tenant farmers, and landless agricultural 
workers into cheap labour for northern Italian industry. Post-war land reform 
legislation is judged to have been a deliberate attempt to move agricultural 
workers from farming into construction and the factory. There has been, 
however, a surprising neglect of primary source documents pertaining to the 
risanamento programme’s implementation in much of the secondary material. 
The construction work undertaken at Matera following the implementation of 
the special law needs to be viewed in the context of broader historical processes 
at a national and international level. Italy faced a major housing crisis in the 
wake of the Second World War and implemented a major rebuilding 
programme. Furthermore the country then witnessed the rapid expansion of 
urban centres due to internal migration and rural exodus in the 1960s. Hitherto 
there has been a tendency to study post-war Matera at a micro-level without 
taking wider historical changes in post-war Italy and Europe into consideration. 
A number of existing secondary sources have cast long shadows over 
subsequent research and arguably stifled analysis of the risanamento 
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programme.2 This chapter will endeavour to be a corrective. It will draw on 
previously neglected archival material to reassess the first special law and 
critique the arguments put forward in the existing literature on post-war 
Matera. As a result at times this part of the thesis will be empirical in its aims 
and descriptive in its presentation of material, but no less historical for that. It 
will look to trace the links between the caso Levi, narratives of national shame 
and the southern question, and the political decisions which shaped the special 
law’s implementation during the course of the 1950s. It will also examine the 
many problems that the risanamento programme encountered.  
This chapter is divided into four separate sections which explore the first 
special law’s drafting and subsequent application. The first section examines 
the residential-village model proposed in a report on Matera produced in 1950. 
The concept of transferring the Sassi’s rural workers closer to the land that they 
worked would dominate the risanamento programme and therefore needs to be 
studied in detail. The second part focuses on the comprehensive study of the 
Sassi carried out in the early 1950s by an interdisciplinary research team. This 
project’s findings produced a large amount of housing data on the Sassi which 
supplemented the regional office of public works’ findings. Moreover, it brought 
the potential links between the Sassi’s urban layout and the local community’s 
social bonds to the attention of the architects and urban planners that worked 
on the risanamento programme. Thirdly this chapter analyses the terms of the 
special law. It looks at the parliamentary debates which shaped the legislation, 
the provisions of the law itself, and local reaction to the proposed risanamento 
                                                             
2  See for example Restucci and Tafuri, Raguso, Matera dai Sassi ai borghi and Toxey, Materan 
Contradictions. This point is developed in detail in section 3.4 below.  
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programme. The fourth section examines the special law’s implementation. It 
outlines the teething problems that the first special law experienced and the 
different housing projects that were built. Finally this section re-evaluates the 
first special law through a critique of the existing secondary literature on the 
subject.  
 
3.1 The residential village model 
 
The concept of rehousing the Sassi’s agricultural workers in purpose-built rural 
villages was central to the official intervention programme undertaken at 
Matera. This urban-planning model stemmed from a European Cooperation 
Administration (ECA) financed report published in January 1950 by the Basento 
Valley land-reclamation syndicate. The study, entitled Il problema dei Sassi di 
Matera, was compiled by the rural economist Nallo Mazzocchi Alemanni in 
collaboration with the ECA official Enzo Calia.3 This report is significant in the 
context of Matera’s post-war urban development as the concepts that it put 
forward directly influenced the first special law for the Sassi and the 
subsequent Piano Regionale Generale for Matera. The ECA report situated the 
caso Matera in the wider context of restructuring agriculture at a regional level. 
It argued that the stagnation of southern Italian agriculture was due to the fact 
that rural workers lived in urban centres and had to travel long distances on a 
                                                             
3 Nallo Mazzocchi Alemanni (1889-1967) graduated in agricultural economics. As part of his 
studies he carried out research in Italy’s then colonial territories in Somalia and Eritrea. He 
subsequently worked for the Italian Colonial Ministry and was part of the Commissione per lo 
studio agrologico della Tripolitania in 1913-1914 and travelled extensively in Africa. From 
1920-1923 he was the director of the Istituto agricolo coloniale italiano di Firenze and then 
in the 1930s worked as the inspector general of the Opera nazionale comabattenti (a 
veterans association which employed demobilized soldiers in public works programmes). 
Mazzocchi Alemanni worked as the technical director of the bonifica intergrale scheme in the 
Pontine Marshes in the 1930s and then in the 1940s oversaw a project to settle the Sicilian 
great estates. For further biographical information see: ARCHIVIO NALLO MAZZOCCHI 
ALEMANNI (1889-1967), http://www.animi.it/archivio_mazzocchi-alemanni.htm, (accessed 
21/06/2013).   
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daily basis to reach the land that they farmed. Therefore, it was argued, time 
and energy that could have been used working the land was wasted.4 The report 
contended that the long distances between farmland and urban centres meant 
that the possibility of including other family members (women, children and the 
elderly) in agricultural work was greatly reduced. For Mazzocchi Alemanni and 
Calia these factors resulted in reduced levels of agricultural productivity in 
southern Italy. Their report presented Matera as a typical example of this 
economic model.5    
A three-pronged solution for resolving the Sassi’s housing problems was 
proposed. The details of this model need to be briefly summarized as they 
would influence subsequent rehousing plans implemented at Matera. First, the 
report put forward the construction of three agricultural villages located 10-12 
kilometres outside of Matera at Timmari-Picciano-Rifeccia, Venusio, and Torre 
Spagnola. They would rehouse 1,460 small farmers and artisans.6 These 
locations were chosen because, according to the report, they reflected where 
the majority of Matera’s small landowning farmers and landless workers 
owned, rented or worked agricultural land. The urban planning proposals 
                                                             
4 Writing in 1950 about the need to populate the southern great estates, Mazzocchi Alemanni 
estimated that southern agricultural workers spent 400-500 hours per annum travelling to 
and from their farmland. As a result he claimed that 200 million hours of potential working 
hours were being lost each year. See Nallo Mazzocchi Alemanni, ‘Insediamento umano nei 
territori latifondistici’, in Eugenio Zagari (ed.), Mezzogiorno e agricoltura, Giuffrè Editore, 
Varese, 1977, pp. 137-150. 
5
 ‘Il caso di Matera offre un tipico esempio della necessità di risolvere il problema di quel 
deteriore accentramento contadino.’ The details of Mazzocchi Alemanni and Calia’s report on 
the Sassi are reproduced in the former’s article ‘Il problema dei “Sassi” di Matera avviato 
verso una definitiva soluzione’, Agricoltura italiana, (1951), no. 7, pp. 171-177. 
6 The report contends that ‘una razionale e realistica soluzione del problema dei Sassi deve 
basarsi su di una visione organica del problema, che è contemporaneamente urbano e rurale, 
igienico e economico, intimamente connesso con quello della trasformazione agraria di tutto 
il territorio materano. E poiché ha fondamento della trasformazione fondiaria della regione è 
ormai riconosciuto che sta la costituzione di “Borghi residenziali” come lo strumento più 
adatto a determinare l’indespensabile popolamento stabile delle campagne.’ This quote is 
reproduced in Restucci and Tafuri, p. 40. 
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suggested for resolving the Sassi’s housing problems, therefore, were meant to 
improve the town’s agricultural economy. Moreover, all three agricultural zones 
were connected to Matera via pre-existing roads. Thus, in theory, the 
agricultural workers transferred to the new villages would have more time to 
concentrate on farming and additional family members could also carry out 
farm work.7 These villages would also provide the essential services needed to 
create a self-sufficient urban centre, such as schools, medical facilities, food 
supplies and a church, which would convince rural workers that the new 
housing projects were viable.8 Second, the report outlined the construction of 
two suburban residential quarters at Piccianello and Cappuccini to rehouse the 
estimated 685 Sassi artisans and braccianti whose employment was directly 
linked to Matera’s historic urban centre. These two sites were selected because 
of a pre-existing bus service to the town centre. This would mean that new 
residents would not be isolated from their workplace. Finally, Mazzocchi 
Alemanni and Calia proposed the renovation of the estimated 501 cave homes 
judged to have met the required hygienic and structural standards and the 
permanent closure of the 1,641 homes that the report deemed to be 
uninhabitable.9 Renovations would, it was recommended, be carried out by 
homeowners themselves with financial incentives from the state. The report, 
however, aimed to transcend the agricultural and housing context of Matera. It 
hoped that the rehousing model proposed for the Sassi could be part of ‘la 
soluzione del più generale problema di un logico e razionale insediamento 
                                                             
7 The 1,460 families to be rehoused in rural villages would be divided accordingly: Timmari-
Picciano-Rifeccia (350 small farmers, 150 landless workers, 50 artisans: 550 families in 
total); Borgo Venusio (200 small farmers, 150 landless workers, 60 artisans: 410 families in 
total); and Borgo Torre Spagnola (300 small farmers, 150 braccianti, and 160 artisans). 
8
 Mazzocchi Alemanni, ‘Insediamento umano’, p. 143 
9 Mazzocchi Alemanni, ‘Il problema dei “Sassi”’, pp. 171-177 
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umano per entro i depressi territori latifondistici.’10 The use of Matera as the 
testing ground for innovative and experimental urban planning designs and 
theories, which it was hoped could be implemented in other parts of rural Italy, 
is a recurring feature in the various post-war studies of the city. Matera’s 
perceived national importance seemed to provide urban planners and 
architects with an opportunity to test their ideas on instigating social and 
economic development through architecture and town planning strategies. 
The borghi rurali model was the most innovative aspect of Mazzocchi 
Alemanni and Calia’s report in terms of urban planning. Anne Toxey has argued 
that the study’s plans to rehouse the majority of Sassi residents in rural villages 
were loosely based on the bonifica integrale model employed under Fascism, 
most notably in the drainage and repopulation of the Pontine Marshes in the 
1930s.11 Mazzocchi Alemanni had worked on this vast project in his role as the 
inspector general of the Opera Nazionale Combattenti. His urban-planning 
model for Matera, however, contrasted with the Agro Pontino project in one 
crucial aspect.12 Instead of proposing separate farmhouses, service villages 
(which provided warehouses, grain silos, administrative offices, a church and a 
police station) and the civic and administrative centres constructed under 
                                                             
10 Ibid., p. 176 
11 This project saw a vast malarial plain drained and farms created for assignees moved from 
the Emilia-Romagna and Veneto regions. The implication of Toxey’s argument is that post-
war government intervention at Matera was residually Fascist in tone. This point is not 
developed any further, however, and feels somewhat forced. See Toxey, Materan 
Contradictions, p. 89.     
12 Mazzocchi Alemanni was not the first person to suggest rehousing Matera’s cave dwellers in 
rural accommodation. Following his visit to the city in 1902 Giuseppe Zanardelli had 
recommended relocating the Sassi’s residents to the countryside where they worked. 
Moreover, Alfredo Angeloni’s 1927 public works programme, ‘Per la più grande Matera’, and 
Vincenzo Corazza’s 1941 report on Matera’s cave homes had both outlined plans for 
rehousing the Sassi’s agricultural workers in rural housing. However, these three unrealized 
initiatives had planned to build individual farmhouses rather than the rural villages that 
Mazzocchi Alemanni and Calia proposed. See Pontrandolfi, pp. 17-31. 
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Fascism in the 1930s, which were later adopted by the Puglia-Lucania-Molise 
land reform board, the plans for Matera put forward the concept of residential 
villages. Mazzocchi Alemanni argued that town planning needed to take local 
conditions into consideration. The model used in the Pontine Marshes project, it 
was claimed, would not be suitable for southern Italy as rural workers were 
used to living together in urban centres. Residential villages were proposed 
instead with the belief that they would foster social bonds and increase 
agricultural productivity.13 
There were, however, a number of problems with Mazzocchi Alemanni 
and Calia’s report which would be carried into the first special law for the Sassi 
and emerge when subsequent studies of Matera had been carried out. First the 
report had failed to examine the complex and idiosyncratic character of land 
ownership and tenancy at Matera in detail. Land holdings tended to be small in 
size and fragmented across the complex patchwork of farmland close to the 
provincial capital. Many small proprietors and tenant farmers owned or rented 
property in different zones close to the provincial capital. Consequently a lot of 
agricultural workers needed to travel between the various plots of land that 
they farmed. In addition, not all of the small farms and plots of land near Matera 
were owned or rented by families living in the Sassi. Property was also farmed 
by agricultural workers from nearby villages and towns. This point would 
become clear following more detailed studies of land holdings at Matera carried 
                                                             
13
 Mazzocchi Alemanni gives a detailed explanation for his preference of the residential village 
model instead of separate farmhouses and service villages in Mazzocchi Alemanni, 
‘Insediamento umano’, pp. 137-150. 
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out in the early 1950s.14 As a result the locations chosen for the proposed rural 
villages did not always correspond to areas that Sassi residents farmed.  
Mazzocchi Alemanni and Calia’s report, in addition, failed to provide a 
detailed plan for the transformation of agricultural land into the farms and 
supplemental plots needed to create self-sufficient families for the proposed 
rural villages.15 Landless workers would have no motivation to move to isolated 
towns unless they received land to farm or were assured that there would be 
consistent employment as fixed-wage labourers. A subsequent study of local 
agriculture carried out in the mid-1950s revealed that seventy-seven per cent of 
Matera’s 38,000 hectares of arable land was divided between small landowners, 
tenant farmers, and sharecroppers in modestly-sized farms and rented 
properties. Thus it was unclear where the additional land needed to create 
larger self-sufficient farms and provide land for casual day labourers would be 
found.16 These points were not addressed in the ECA report despite the fact that 
the Christian Democrat government was drawing up land reform legislation in 
1950. 
How can these apparent oversights be explained? A closer examination 
of the data that Mazzocchi Alemanni and Calia provided on the Sassi’s housing 
                                                             
14 A report on Matera’s agricultural economy produced in November 1952 for the land reform 
board suggests that land holdings were divided between numerous small-holding and tenant 
families, many of whom were from neighbouring towns such as Altamura. See ASM, 
Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 82, fascicolo 662, sottofascicolo B.  
15 Pontrandolfi, pp. 59-62  
16 Fedele Aiello’s study of land holdings at Matera carried out in the mid-1950s found that 
seventy-seven per cent of the city’s 38,000 hectares of available agricultural land was 
divided between small landowners (16,900 hectares), tenant farmers (10,500 hectares) and 
sharecroppers (1,800 hectares). Agriculture at Matera appeared to correspond to the 
latifondo contadino model theorized by Manlio Rossi-Doria in which large land holdings had 
been divided into small units. See Fedele Aiello, ‘Dai Sassi alle borgate’, Nord-Sud, (1955), no. 
5, pp. 62-88; and Manlio Rossi-Doria, Riforma agraria e azione meridionalista, Edizioni 
Agricole, Bologna, 1948, pp 1-51. 
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conditions reveals that these statistics were taken directly from Luca Crispino’s 
1938 report on Matera.17 This suggests that the ECA-sponsored study was 
based on pre-existing data rather than a close examination of the city’s social 
and economic conditions during the period 1949-1950. A report produced by 
the head of the local carabinieri in April 1950 provides alternative statistics on 
Matera’s demographics and employment which appears to reinforce this point. 
The report suggests that Matera’s population had increased between 1938, 
when Crispino’s report was carried out, and 1950 when Mazzocchi Alemanni 
and Calia produced their study.18 Thus, Mazzocchi Alemanni appears to have 
applied his model for developing southern agriculture onto Matera without 
carrying out a detailed study of local economic and social factors. Furthermore, 
there is no evidence to suggest that Mazzocchi Alemanni and Calia consulted 
Sassi residents in the drafting of their report. This offers a supplemental 
explanation for their failure to understand the complex nature of land holdings 
at Matera. The implication from Mazzocchi Alemanni and Calia’s report is that 
local residents did not have the required understanding of agricultural 
economics and were incapable of contributing to the restructuring of the local 
economy. Rather this process would need to be carried out from above by 
experts. This paternalistic attitude towards local residents would characterize 
the majority of reports that were produced on the Sassi in the post-war period 
as well as the risanamento programme.  
                                                             
17  Crispino, pp. 3-32. 
18
 See Giovanni Stingone’s report entitled Matera – Risanamento dei rioni  dei “Sassi”. Servizio 
informazione speciale dated 17 April 1950. ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 82, fascicolo 
661, sottofascicolo A. 
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Notably in 1950 Mazzocchi Alemanni had presented a paper at the 
Italian economic, demographic, and statistical society’s conference. In this study 
he argued that relocating agricultural workers to borghi rurali situated closer to 
the land that they farmed was essential for increasing agricultural productivity 
in southern Italy. The report on Matera arguably provided an opportunity to 
map out these theoretical ideas in the context of what, in the early 1950s, was 
considered the archetypal southern Italian rural city.19 Writing in 1951 about 
the first special law for Matera, Mazzocchi Alemanni argued that ‘sarà quanto 
mai fecondo per la soluzione del più generale problema di un logico e razionale 
insediamento umano per entro i depressi territori latifondistici.’20 As a result a 
generic model for increasing agricultural productivity in southern Italy was 
applied to a distinctive local case which, through media and political attention, 
had become emblematic of a putative concept of southern Italian agriculture. 
This illustrates the impact that notions of Matera as a symbol of the southern 
question had on the city’s post-war history. The city was seen as a laboratory 
for resolving the social and economic problems of the entire Mezzogiorno. 
Despite their report’s limitations, the urban-planning model that Mazzocchi 
Alemanni and Calia put forward for rehousing the Sassi’s agricultural workers 
in borghi rurali would shape the provisions of the first special law for Matera. 
The study’s oversights, however, would prove to be problematic when the 
special law was implemented in the mid-1950s as will be examined below in 
detail.  
 
                                                             
19 See Mazzocchi Alemanni, ‘Insediamento umano’, pp. 137-150. 
20 Mazzocchi Alemanni, ‘Il problema dei “Sassi”’, p. 176 
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3.2 The Study Commission 
 
In 1951 the Istituto Nazionale di Urbanistica (INU) commissioned a 
comprehensive study of the Sassi. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration-Comitato Amministrativo Soccorso ai Senzatetto (UNRRA-
CASAS) financed the project.21 Over the next two years the Commissione di 
Studio della città e dell’agro di Matera examined the economic, geographic and 
demographic conditions as well as the historical development of Matera’s cave 
dwellings. The study was incorporated into a wider UNRRA-CASAS project to 
build the purpose-built village La Martella in Matera’s agricultural hinterland. 
This scheme was projected to rehouse 200 families from the Sassi closer to the 
land that they worked. The Study Commission’s findings served as a blueprint 
for the urban planners and architects that designed La Martella’s urban layout 
and house design.22 Friedrich G. Friedmann, a lecturer in Philosophy at the 
University of Arkansas, led the project.23 He was joined by a team of seventeen 
researchers and consultants who contributed to the study.24 A vast amount of 
                                                             
21  For a history of UNRRA-CASAS activities in post-war Italy see Talamona, pp. 175-204. 
22  La Martella’s troubled history and development are examined in detail in the next chapter. 
23  Friedrich G. Friedmann studied Literature and Philosophy in Rome in the 1930s before 
fleeing to London and later North America in 1940 to escape racial persecution. He returned 
to Italy in 1950 having been awarded a Fulbright scholarship to study the philosophy of 
Italy’s peasantry and carried out field work in Basilicata and Calabria. At the end of 1950 
Friedmann received additional funding from the Rockefeller Foundation which allowed him 
to prolong his research into southern Italy’s rural poor for another nine months. Following 
this period of study he published the article ‘The World of “La Miseria”’ in which he 
examines the worldview of southern Italy’s rural culture which drew heavily on Carlo Levi’s 
portrayal of the peasantry in Cristo. For a full biography of Friedmann’s early life see 
Friedmann, Miseria e dignità, pp. 13-33; and Friedrich G. Friedmann, ‘The Origins of “La 
Miseria”’, in David A. Rees (ed.), The Ethnographic Moment: correspondence of Robert Redfield 
and F.G. Friedmann, Transaction Publishers, New Jersey, 2006, pp. 1-9.  
24  In addition to Friedmann, the Commissione’s research team consisted of Giuseppe Isnardi: 
Geography; Francesco Nitti: Medieval and Modern History; Federico Gorio and Ludovico 
Quaroni: town planning; Rocco Mazzarone: demographics and hygiene conditions; Lidia De 
Rita: Psychology; Giuseppe Orlando: Economics; Gilberto Marselli: Economics and Rural 
Sociology; Alberto Giordano: Criminology; Tullio Tentori: Cultural Anthropology; Eleonora 
Bracco: Prehistory and Paleonthology. Moreover, Rigo Innocenti, Riccardo Musatti, 
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data on the Sassi was gathered which UNRRA-CASAS planned to publish in full, 
however, only a preliminary report and three official volumes were ever 
officially issued.25  
Friedmann and his team hoped that their work could contribute to 
improving the living conditions of Sassi residents while concurrently 
safeguarding local rural culture.26 It was argued that a development programme 
from above risked destroying the community’s pre-existing cultural and social 
bonds.27 Instead the Study Commission directly consulted Sassi residents 
during its field work. The local population was surveyed in an attempt to 
understand the economic and psychological needs of the families that would be 
transferred to La Martella. Moreover, Friedmann and his team contended that 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Venerando Correnti, Tommaso Ventura and Giovanni Vitrani worked as consultants on the 
project and Giovanni Martoglio acted as the group’s secretary. 
25  See Musatti, Friedmann and Isnardi; Francesco Nitti, Una città del Sud, vol. II, UNRRA-Casas 
Prima Giunta, Rome, 1956; and Tullio Tentori, Il sistema di vita della comunità materana. 
Riassunto di un’inchiesta etnologica, UNRRA-Casas Prima Giunta, Rome, 1956. Albino Sacco, 
who worked as an assistant for the Study Commission, claims that the DC dominated 
management of UNRRA-CASAS decided not to publish the remaining six studies because the 
researchers involved were linked to Adriano Olivetti’s Comunità movement. Instead, Sacco 
contends, the material was transferred to Bari and subsequently mislaid. See Bilò and Vadini, 
pp. 50-51. 
26  Speaking in 1985 about the Study Commission’s aims Friedmann argued that ‘il nostro 
problema principale era come costruire un insediamento nuovo in modo tale da migliorare 
le condizioni di vita degli abitanti, e in specie le condizioni igieniche, senza distruggere 
quelle forme di cultura che erano diffuse da secoli nei Sassi.’ See Friedmann, Miseria e 
dignità, p. 70. The philosophy behind the Study Commission’s research appears to have 
drawn directly from Friedmann’s work on southern rural culture. He argued that any 
development programme for southern Italy needed to protect the positive aspects of 
southern peasant culture. See Friedrich G. Friedmann, ‘The World of “La Miseria”’, Partisan 
Review, (1953), no. 20, pp. 218-231. The article was later translated into Italian and 
published as Friedrich G. Friedmann, ‘Osservazioni sul mondo contadino dell’Italia 
meridionale’, Quaderni di Sociologia, (1957), no. 3, pp. 148-161. 
27 While acknowledging the need for an official reform programme for the Mezzogiorno, 
Riccardo Musatti argued that peasant culture needed to be preserved in this process: ‘Ora di 
fronte a una società tradizionalmente costretta a una condizione subalterna … il potere 
politico non può ritardare più oltre l’intervento rinnovatore. Ma nel grande passo dall’inerzia 
all’azione il rischio mortale è quello di tutto travolgere: di sgetolare sotto un impulso 
materiale e ideologico senza precedenti strutture preformate da secoli e giungere, così, 
piuttosto che alla costruzione di altri scompensi, di nuove e crude dissonanze: di portare alla 
campagna piuttosto che quanto la “città” rappresenta di organizzazione, squilibrio, caotico 
cozzo d’interessi in lotta.’ See Riccardo Musatti, ‘Monti e vicende dello studio’, Commissione 
per lo studio della città e dell'agro di Matera: Saggi introduttivi, vol. I, UNRRA CASAS, Prima 
Giunta, Rome, 1956, p. 6. 
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local residents should be allowed to choose the new community’s political, 
social and economic structures rather than these elements being imposed from 
above.28 The Study Commission’s work was the only instance in which Sassi 
residents were directly consulted about their transfer to new housing. The 
risanamento programme, in contrast, would be carried out without the input of 
the 15,000 that it directly impacted. There was, however, a paternalistic 
undertone to the work that Friedmann and his team carried out. The Study 
Commission contended that not only could La Martella’s architectural and 
urban planning design preserve the pre-existing social ties they had located in 
the Sassi, but it could actually improve them.29  
INU and UNRRA-CASAS published the Commissione’s preliminary 
findings in 1953. The report provided data on the Sassi’s housing conditions 
and demographics as well as an employment profile of residents. According to 
Friedmann and his team there were 15,052 people living in the Sassi in 1951. Of 
the 6,276 people in employment 3,254 worked in agriculture, 2,417 in industry, 
171 in commercial activities, and 434 in services. The report concluded that 
there were a total of 3,329 dwellings in the Sassi. A total of 158 cave homes 
were deemed inhabitable, 1,676 in need of redevelopment work, 509 dwellings 
could be converted into storerooms or stables, and 986 homes were judged to 
                                                             
28 This point is made explicitly by Friedmann in his description of his research team’s primary 
aims: ‘quale tipo di organizzazione potrebbero scegliere le nuove comunità, quale forma e 
direzione potrebbero assumere le loro attività culturali, sociali, politiche, non stava a noi 
naturalmente di decidere; a questi interrogativi dovevano rispondere i membri di queste 
comunità.’ See Federico G. Friedmann, ‘Un Incontro: Matera’, in Musatti, Friedmann and 
Isnardi, p. 13. 
29  Writing about La Martella Friedmann contended that ‘in contrasto drammatico con il 
carattere chiuso e difensivo dei villaggi e delle città tradizionali, queste case suggerivano 
l’idea del volontario associarsi, dell’aprirsi al mondo circostante.’ See Friedmann, ‘Un 
Incontro’, p. 14. 
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be uninhabitable.30 Therefore, the Study Commission contended that, in terms 
of hygienic and infrastructural considerations, less than half of the Sassi’s 
homes would need to be abandoned permanently. Although Matera: uno studio 
claimed that the Commissione’s findings informed the first special law’s 
provisions and its subsequent implementation, in fact the risanamento 
programme drew on supplemental housing data that Matera’s Office of Public 
Works produced. The decision to apparently overlook the housing statistics that 
Friedmann and his team had generated would become a major topic of debate 
in secondary sources that examined the first special law’s implementation.31  
Another salient aspect of the Study Commission’s findings was 
psychologist Lidia De Rita’s research into the Sassi’s vicinato system. Vicinato 
was the name given to the numerous shared courtyards found amongst the 
Sassi. The single entrance into many of Matera’s cave homes opened out onto an 
enclosed piazza that was shared between different residents. But the term 
meant more than just a communal outdoor space where domestic chores were 
carried out and children played; it also referred to the social ties and norms that 
existed between the different families which lived side by side in different parts 
of the Sassi. The vicinato system was significant in terms of the first special law 
because the numerous architects and town planners that worked on the 
risanamento programme idealized this social and urban system. Moreover, they 
attempted to recreate the perceived symbiosis between social bonds and urban 
layout in the new housing projects that they designed. The vicinati were viewed 
as an organic example of how architecture and urban planning could stitch 
                                                             
30  This data is taken from Matera: uno studio, pp. 26-31. 
31  This point is discussed in further detail in section 3.4 of this chapter. 
163 
 
together a community’s social fabric. This social and urban system was viewed 
as a blueprint for fostering the type of community ties which had been lost in 
modern cities, but had survived amongst the Sassi.32 The romanticized view of 
Matera’s vicinati amongst town planners and architects reflected broader urban 
planning trends in post-war Italy. Anti-urban sentiments and theories of 
decentralization were prevalent in Italian town planning circles. Urban planning 
was seen as a means for recovering the social ties that had been lost in large 
urban sprawls. These ideas were based on Italian interpretations of Lewis 
Mumford and Ebenezer Howard, whose work on regional planning was first 
published in Italian in the immediate post-war period.33 Erwin A. Gutkind’s 
concept of the ideal community being a homogenous entity founded on social 
cohesion was also prevalent amongst Italian architects and urban planners in 
the 1950s.34 This helps to explain the interest that town planners and architects 
working on the risanamento programme had in Matera’s vicinati. The Study 
Commission’s research into the vicinato system and its ability to foster strong 
social ties, however, produced ambiguous results. Lidia De Rita carried out a 
                                                             
32  The idealization of the vincinato system is exemplified by Federico Gorio who worked on the 
La Martella project: ‘Quanti urbanisti e quanti sociologi cercano invano la pietra filosofale 
dell’unità di vicinato, cioè di quell’ideale nucleo di più famiglie che l’affiatamento sociale, 
oltre che il destino della convivenza, tiene in sesto; e questo fanno con lo scopo finale di 
riscostruire nei nuclei urbani quel tessuto connettivo che la nostra civiltà con un grave 
processo di autonecrosi ha inesorabilmente distrutto. Allora ci si accorge che la vita nei Sassi 
di Matera, esempio raro, è organizzata secondo una fitta struttura di legami primari, 
socialmente e topograficamente individuati e circoscritti, che la suddividono in tante unità di 
vicinato, esattamente come tessuto organico è diviso e al tempo stesso costruito in cellule e 
precisamente come gli urbanisti e sociologi vorrebbero cementate le loro città.’ Federico 
Gorio, ‘Il villaggio La Martella. Autocritica’, Casabella, (1954), no. 200, pp. 31-38. See also 
Luigi Piccinato’s description of Matera’s vicinati in his article ‘Matera’, Urbanistica, (1955), 
no. 15-16, pp. 142-151. 
33  For a discussion of Italian interpretations of Mumford’s and Howard’s work in the 
immediate post-war period see Chiara Mazzoleni, ‘The Concept of Community in Italian 
Town Planning in the 1950s’, Planning Perspectives, vol. 18, (2003), no. 3, pp. 325-342. For a 
brief summary of Howard’s Garden City concept see Peter Hall, Urban and Regional Planning, 
Routledge, London, 2002 pp. 28-33; for Mumford’s planning philosophy see Lewis Mumford, 
The City in History, Penguin, London, 1961. 
34  Mazzoleni, p. 332 
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psychosocial and sociometric study of four different vicinati in the early 1950s. 
She aimed to ascertain the impact that the built environment had on social 
bonds between different family units living in a vicinato.35 
Her preliminary findings suggested that the social cohesion which the 
vicinato system was believed to foster had been all but eroded due to economic 
hardship. Instead she concluded that the Sassi’s social ties had been replaced 
with petty jealousies, gossip, and intrusiveness. Moreover, there were class, 
gender and generational tensions amongst the sample of families studied.36 De 
Rita argued, however, that intervention from above could be enough to 
redevelop the community spirit that had once been apparent amongst Sassi 
residents.37 The implication was that the new rural villages and urban quarters 
planned for development under the auspices of the first special could not only 
recreate but strengthen the social bonds that the vicinato system had previously 
fostered. The numerous town planners and architects that worked on the 
risanamento programme shared this philosophy. The belief was that urban 
                                                             
35  De Rita based her research methods on the work of the psychotherapist Jacob L. Moreno 
who, in the 1930s, had formulated a qualitative framework for examining social bonds 
amongst New Yorkers. De Rita’s fieldwork at Matera was published as Lidia De Rita, 
‘Controllo sociometrico di vicinati di una comunità lucana’, Bollettino di Psicologia applicata, 
(1954), no. 4-5, pp. 149-186; Lidia De Rita, ‘Il vicinato come gruppo’, Centro sociale, vol. 2 
(1955), no. 1, pp. 3-10; and Lidia De Rita, ‘I Sassi sotto inchiesta’, Civiltà delle macchine, 
(1956), no. 2, pp. 26-32. 
36  See De Rita, ‘Controllo sociometrico’, pp. 149-186. 
37  She argued that: ‘il vicinato come gruppo ha avuto una sua funzione precisa ed 
indubbiamente positiva per molti aspetti; oggi sembra averla persa nel disorganizzarsi 
generale del vecchio mondo, ma forse uno dei mezzi per ricostituire più solidamente e in 
un’atmosfera rinnovata e democratica la vecchia trama sociale del mondo contadino è quello 
di non lasciar naufragare il vicinato, di valorizzarlo e potenziarlo invece come gruppo sociale 
per meglio agire attraverso di esso. Sarà più facile in tal modo assecondare la spinta al 
rinnovamento delle nuove generazioni senza lasciare che diventi un motivo di rottura le cui 
conseguenze morali possono essere molto dannose; solo così si aiuterà meglio e più 
naturalmente il mondo contadino a risolvere con le sue stesse forze i suoi grandi problemi.’ 
De Rita, ‘Il vicinato come gruppo’, p 10. 
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planning and architecture provided the means to create an ideal community 
and promote social improvement.38 
  
3.3 The first special law  
 
Five days after De Gasperi’s first visit to Matera on 23 July 1950 the DC leader 
announced that the Italian government would take measures to resolve the 
housing situation he had witnessed in the city. Emilio Colombo was asked to 
establish a parliamentary commission that would draw up plans for the 
risanamento of Matera’s cave homes. On 2 April 1951 Colombo presented a 
draft law to the Italian Prime Minister. It closely resembled Mazzocchi Alemanni 
and Calia’s 1950 report. The draft law recommended the same three-plank 
strategy for resolving Matera’s housing problems. Thus it made provision for 
rural villages to rehouse the Sassi’s agricultural workers closer to the land that 
they farmed, suburban residential quarters for artisans and urban workers, and 
the renovation of cave homes considered fit for habitation. A budget of four-
billion lire would be allocated to implement the project. The data that Colombo 
provided on housing conditions and employment, however, was directly copied 
from the ECA-sponsored report on the Sassi.39 As a result the housing statistics 
that Colombo’s bill presented were taken from a study carried out in 1938 and 
not from contemporary data. This exemplified one of the risanamento 
                                                             
38  Spencer and Wollman argue that an idealized concept of pre-industrial communities is often 
the product of nostalgia for a Tonnies-esque Gemeinschaft characterized by social cohesion, 
mutual cooperation, and close interpersonal ties. This view they argue, however, elides the 
potential negative aspects of community such as insularity, intolerance of outsiders, and the 
close scrutiny of community members. In addition, this romantic view of social bonds tends 
to ignore potential class, gender, religious and generational divisions. See Spencer and 
Wollman, p. 38.  
39 Ministero dei Lavori Pubblici, Risanamento dei “Sassi” di Matera, Camera dei Deputati, 
Disegno di legge n. 2141, 9 August 1951, pp. 1-3 
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programme’s continued problems: draft rehousing plans based on information 
that was out of date leading to practical problems when later implemented.  
The submission of Colombo’s draft law prompted a local propaganda 
campaign in Matera itself. The proposed bill was hailed as the first step in 
tackling what Italian politicians and the public sphere had considered to be a 
national shame.40 The PCI, however, had put its own provisional law for the 
risanamento of the Sassi before parliament on 6 March 1951. This draft bill had 
been penned by Michele Bianco, Communist deputy for Potenza and a native of 
Miglionico near Matera. Anne Toxey has recently claimed that both draft laws 
offered similar solutions for resolving the widely-publicized housing problem at 
Matera.41 In fact, Bianco’s draft law contrasted with the government bill on a 
number of key points. Instead of building rural villages Bianco had suggested 
transferring the estimated 2,142 troglodyte families living in substandard 
accommodation to purpose-built council houses in Matera itself. Furthermore, 
no explicit provision for renovating existing houses in the Sassi was given. 
Rather, the PCI’s draft law implied that existing dwellings declared 
uninhabitable should be demolished. In addition, while the government draft 
law had a budget of four-billion lire, Bianco in contrast had projected an 
expenditure of eight billion lire to complete his urban rehousing project.42 
Despite these discrepancies the introductory texts of both draft laws were 
                                                             
40 The DC produced posters to celebrate the provisional drafting of the special law for Matera. 
See ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 82, fascicolo 661, sottofascicolo A. 
41 Toxey, Materan Contradictions, pp. 90-91 
42 Bianco claimed that it would be more cost effective to demolish the 501 homes which, 
according to Crispino’s 1938 report, would need renovation work to render them fit for 
habitation. See Bianco, pp. 1-4. 
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similar in tone and content and concurred on one point: the Sassi constituted a 
national shame which required prompt and comprehensive state intervention.  
A cross-party parliamentary legislative committee was established in the 
early months of 1952 to discuss the draft law’s terms and conditions. It met 
between February and March of the same year. The proceedings reveal that 
Matera’s cave dwellings were considered an issue of national importance in the 
early 1950s. It was agreed by all interlocutors that the Sassi were a national 
disgrace and that Matera’s housing problems needed to be tackled as soon as 
possible. That was the only issue, however, on which there was cross-party 
consensus. There were divergent opinions on how the risanamento programme 
should best be carried out. But these different viewpoints were not divided 
evenly along party or ideological lines. Instead the debate revealed a number of 
underlying practical concerns regarding the proposed urban renewal 
programme at Matera.  
The main issue that divided committee members was the construction of 
purpose-built rural villages.43 The PCI representatives argued against the 
transfer of Matera’s rural workers to outlying agricultural settlements. Michele 
                                                             
43 Anne Toxey has argued that two urban renewal models were discussed in the context of the 
special law for Matera: a systematic rehousing programme versus the renovation of existing 
homes. In fact the second issue was only briefly mentioned during the parliamentary 
committee’s discussions on the special law. Emilio Colombo outlined that the renovation of 
homes in the Sassi deemed fit for habitation would be based on the cost of supplying them 
with essential services: water supply, sewage system and electricity. Isolated homes would 
not be renovated if providing the services listed above cost more than building new homes 
for residents. Moreover, Michele Bianco frequently called for the whole-scale destruction of 
the Sassi during his parliamentary interventions on the subject which suggests that a 
potential renovation programme was not his main priority regarding special legislation for 
Matera. See Toxey, Materan Contradictions, pp. 90-91. For the parliamentary committee 
discussions cited see Camera dei Deputati, Commissione in sede legislativa, Commissione VII, 
Lavori Pubblici, LXIX, 6 February 1952, p. 574; Camera dei Deputati, Commissione in sede 
legislativa, Commissione VII, Lavori Pubblici, LXX, 8 February 1952, p. 578; and Atti 
Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, 26 September 1951, p. 30585. 
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Bianco, who had drafted the PCI’s special law, was the most vocal opponent of 
the borghi-rurali model. Although not opposed to this concept in principle, he 
argued that the decision to rehouse the majority of the Sassi’s cave dwellers in 
rural villages had been made without a close examination of the city’s social and 
economic characteristics. Moreover, local residents had not been directly 
consulted and would have no representatives on the proposed committee that 
would implement the special law. Transferring Matera’s estimated 2,000 
agricultural families to rural accommodation, Bianco contended, would only be 
successful if they were allocated adequately-sized plots of farmland and were 
consulted about their housing needs. According to his calculations, however, the 
land reform board would have just 1,000 hectares of expropriated land to 
distribute at Matera amongst the estimated 1,500 families set to be re-housed in 
the three agricultural settlements. This would leave a large number of residents 
landless and dependent on securing temporary farm labour at the closest urban 
centre, i.e. Matera. Thus, Bianco argued, the planned rural villages would not be 
a viable option at Matera. Instead he proposed building 1,500 urban homes and 
685 rural dwellings.44  
Giulio Spallone, PCI deputy for Abruzzo, also argued against the 
construction of rural villages for the Sassi’s agricultural families. He maintained 
that there were few unified farms close to Matera. Rather the city’s agricultural 
land was divided into small landholdings and rented properties. These plots 
                                                             
44 See Camera dei Deputati, Commissione in sede legislativa, Commissione VII, Lavori Pubblici, 
LXIX, 6 February 1952, p. 573; Camera dei Deputati, Commissione in sede legislativa, 
Commissione VII, Lavori Pubblici, LXX, 8 February 1952, p. 580; Camera dei Deputati, 
Commissione in sede legislativa, Commissione VII, Lavori Pubblici, LXXIII, 14 March 1952, pp. 
601-602; and Camera dei Deputati, Commissione in sede legislativa, Commissione VII, Lavori 
Pubblici, LXXIV, 21 March 1952, p. 614. 
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were scattered in various locations across the city’s agricultural hinterland. 
Spallone added the point that braccianti had no fixed workplace. Therefore, he 
argued that transferring small landowners, tenant farmers and day labourers to 
rural villages would not reduce the amount of time they spent travelling to and 
from their workplace and thus increase agricultural productivity as the 
government’s draft law claimed. Land allocation was again deemed to be the 
key issue regarding the viability of the rural-village model. Spallone argued that 
if the land reform board could not guarantee agricultural land for Matera’s 
small farmers and landless workers, then the planned rural settlements should 
be scrapped.45  
Concerns over the suitability and viability of rural villages to rehouse the 
Sassi’s agricultural workers, however, were not limited to opposition benches. 
Giovanni Perlingieri, DC deputy for Benevento, and Francesco Moro, Christian 
Democrat representative for Verona, were equally opposed to implementing 
this urban-planning model at Matera. Pierlingieri argued that Matera’s fixed-
wage labourers, day labourers and tenant farmers had no fixed relationship 
with the land they worked and preferred the convenience of urban living to life 
in the countryside. Both DC deputies argued that rural workers would need to 
be guaranteed an adequate plot of farmland before being transferred to the 
proposed new settlements.46  
                                                             
45 See Camera dei Deputati, Commissione in sede legislativa, Commissione VII, Lavori Pubblici, 
LXX, 8 February 1952, p. 581; and Camera dei Deputati, Commissione in sede legislativa, 
Commissione VII, Lavori Pubblici, LXXIV, 21 March 1952, p. 620. 
46 Camera dei Deputati, Commissione in sede legislativa, Commissione VII, Lavori Pubblici, LXX, 8 
February 1952, pp. 580-581 
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Furthermore, the Communist Party was concerned with the proposed 
rental charges set out in the government’s draft law. Under these provisions the 
Istituto Case Popolari di Matera would set rents based on the price of 
construction and maintenance of new properties. Citing examples in the 
provincial towns of Miglianico and Stigliano, Michele Bianco feared that many 
families would struggle to pay the rents imposed. Instead he suggested that 
housing management should be controlled by Matera’s municipal council. A 
guarantee would be needed to assure that rents on new homes were fixed at an 
affordable rate.47 Pierlingieri and Moro echoed Bianco’s concern over potential 
rental prices in the urban and rural housing projects as set out in the DC’s draft 
law.48 There appears, however, to have been no consultation with Sassi 
residents on this or any of the special law’s provisions. The issue of rental prices 
for new residents would become a problem once the first special law was 
implemented in the mid-1950s. 
Emilio Colombo defended the terms of his draft law. He argued that the 
construction of urban dwellings would only resolve the local housing problem. 
Instead the transfer of rural workers to purpose-built villages within a 10 
kilometre radius of Matera would allow the government to concurrently tackle 
an economic problem. Citing Mazzocchi Alemanni and Calia’s report, Colombo 
maintained that moving Matera’s rural workers closer to their land would 
increase the city’s agricultural productivity. The author of the government’s 
                                                             
47 See Camera dei Deputati, Commissione in sede legislativa, Commissione VII, Lavori Pubblici, 
LXIX, 6 February 1952, pp. 572-576; Camera dei Deputati, Commissione in sede legislativa, 
Commissione VII, Lavori Pubblici, LXX, 8 February 1952, pp. 577-582; Camera dei Deputati, 
Commissione in sede legislativa, Commissione VII, Lavori Pubblici, LXXIII, 14 March 1952, pp. 
601-602; and Camera dei Deputati, Commissione in sede legislativa, Commissione VII, Lavori 
Pubblici, LXXIV, 21 March 1952, p. 614. 
48 Camera dei Deputati, Commissione in sede legislativa, Commissione VII, Lavori Pubblici, LXX, 8 
February 1952, p. 581 
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draft law argued that the agricultural reform board would have 3,500 hectares 
of land to distribute at Matera. Colombo made it clear that it would not be 
possible to transform all of the Sassi’s landless agricultural workers into small 
farmers. They could instead be employed by the small farming businesses 
created in the context of the projected rural villages.49  
Despite reservations about aspects of the draft law for the Sassi, the 
Communist Party ultimately voted in favour of the bill. Following discussions in 
the Italian Senate the first special law was passed on 17 May 1952. Similar to 
the land reform issue, the PCI found itself in the difficult position of potentially 
opposing legislation that it had originally proposed. In the case of Matera, 
however, the Communist Party chose to support the DC government’s 
intervention, albeit with some caveats. It seems likely that a more nuanced 
understanding of the issues in Matera was overridden by the city’s symbolic 
importance. PCI deputies had frequently referred to the Sassi as a national 
shame in parliamentary discussions and the concept was central to Michele 
Bianco’s own draft special law for Matera.50 Opposing the first special law 
would arguably have left the Communist Party vulnerable to accusations from 
their political opponents of being unpatriotic. The decision, therefore, was made 
to reluctantly support the Legge Colombo.  
                                                             
49 See Camera dei Deputati, Commissione in sede legislativa, Commissione VII, Lavori Pubblici, 
LXX, 8 February 1952, pp. 578-579; and Camera dei Deputati, Commissione in sede legislativa, 
Commissione VII, Lavori Pubblici, LXXIII, 14 March 1952, pp. 602-603. 
50  Speaking in parliament on 20 February 1950, the PCI deputy Mario Alicata referred to the 
Sassi as a ‘vergogna di una nazione civile, vergogna di uno Stato moderno.’ See Atti 
Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, 20 February 1951, pp. 26316-26330. See also Michele 
Bianco’s parliamentary intervention on 27 February 1951. Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei 
Deputati, 27 February 1951, pp. 26560-26564. 
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The first special law had three main criteria. First, the transfer of families 
living in homes deemed uninhabitable to new accommodation; second, the 
renovation of those houses considered fit for habitation and the provision of 
essential public services; and third, the creation of rural villages to rehouse 
agricultural workers.51 A programme for implementing the risanamento 
programme was to be drawn up within a period of two months by the Prefect of 
Matera, the local mayor, the head of the regional council, the president of the 
Puglia-Lucania-Molise land reform board, and the head of the regional 
agricultural authority. This plan was meant to outline in detail the number of 
families that would have to be transferred to new housing as well as those 
homes which needed to be renovated. The provisional outline would then have 
to be approved by the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
the Ministry of Finance. Furthermore, only those families living in houses 
deemed uninhabitable on 1 January 1951 would be eligible to be rehoused in 
new accommodation. The decision over which families to relocate would be 
made by a commission headed by the local mayor and which included 
representatives of the local prefect’s office, the land reform board, the local 
office for public works, the agricultural authority, and the local INA-CASA 
office.52 Michele Bianco’s draft law had included a provision to have two Sassi 
residents as part of the housing commission. This initiative, however, was 
rejected by the parliamentary legislative committee that drew up the special 
                                                             
51  Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, 18 June 1952, pp. 2206-2208. 
52 Ibid., pp. 2206-2208 
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law.53 As a result the risanamento programme was carried out without the 
consultation of the 15,000 people whose lives it directly impacted.  
Local political reaction to the first special law was predictably divided 
along ideological lines. A press release from the local administration (the 
council, mayor and chamber of commerce) thanked De Gasperi and Colombo for 
the draft bill claiming that ‘così sarà un triste ricordo il problema dei Sassi, che 
per secoli ha mortificato moralmente e socialmente questa città.’54 
Furthermore, on 4 April 1951 the DC’s provincial office affixed a number of 
posters to publicize the presentation of the draft law for the Sassi to the Italian 
Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi. The text claimed that ‘Il secolare problema 
della redenzione dei Sassi nei suoi complessi aspetti morali e sociali è affrontato 
con decisione e con alta visione umanitaria dal Governo, e si pone fra le 
realizzazioni piu imponenti della Democrazia Cristiana.’55 The PCI, in contrast, 
countered noting that Michele Bianco had first put forward draft legislation for 
Matera. Writing in L’Unità Michele Guanti claimed that the DC had simply 
appropriated Bianco’s legislation for political ends and would fail to keep its 
promise to implement the bill.56 Similar to the DC government’s land reform 
bill, therefore, the Communist Party once again found itself in the difficult 
position of criticizing a state intervention programme that it had originally 
proposed.  
                                                             
53  Raguso, p. 35 
54  ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 82, fascicolo 661, sottofascicolo A 
55 ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 82, fascicolo 661, sottofascicolo A 
56  Writing in L’Unità in 1952, PCI deputy Michele Guanti claimed that ‘il problema dei Sassi si è 
sentito direttamente dagli abitanti dei Sassi che vogliano uscire dale grotte e dicono basta a 
questa vergogna di inciviltà e umanità.’ See Michele Guanti, ‘I cittadini del Materano non 
credono più alle promesse D.C.’, L’Unità, 7 April 1952, p. 2.  
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It is difficult to gauge popular reaction to the first special law amongst 
Sassi residents, but police reports, official documents and newspaper accounts 
provide some fragments of local opinion, albeit filtered through official and 
political channels. Official reports suggest that Sassi residents greeted the first 
special law with a sense of cautious optimism. In a letter to the Prefect of 
Matera dated 5 April 1951 the local police commissioner, Dr. L. Russo, claimed 
that the announcement of special legislation for Matera’s cave dwellings ‘è stato 
favorevolmente commentato ed apprezzato da tutta la cittadinanza.’57 Writing 
later the same month, however, the local prefect contended that the local 
population were sceptical about the government’s promise to implement the 
special law.58 Official documents, moreover, reveal that a number of local 
residents took part in popular protests in the early 1950s calling on the Italian 
government to provide them with new housing. For example, during Mario 
Cotellessa’s visit to Matera in his role as Alto Commissario per l’Igiene e la Sanità 
in April 1950, an estimated 100 women blocked the official’s car in an attempt 
to make him visit their homes.59 Furthermore, in March 1952 a small group of 
women from the neighbourhoods of Casalnuovo and Madonna della Virtù 
presented a petition to the local mayor calling for the construction of 2,000 
homes and the risanamento of the Sassi.60 These protests suggest that there was 
popular pressure from a number of local residents to provide alternative 
accommodation for Matera’s cave dwellers. A similar viewpoint was expressed 
                                                             
57  See ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 82, fascicolo 661, sottofascicolo A. 
58  He claimed that the ‘progetto di legge presentato, appasiona l’opinone pubblica in modo 
particolare pur rimanendo alla superficie un attegiamento di diffidente attesa verso il 
Governo.’ See ACS, MI, Gabinetto, Fascicoli permanenti, Atti, busta 210, relazioni mensili 50-
52. 
59  See ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 80. 
60  See ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 82, fascicolo 661, sottofascicolo A. 
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by a local Sassi resident during an interview published in L’Unità in 1952. The 
unnamed woman told Aniello Coppola that ‘vogliamo i diritti umani e una casa 
igienica come la Costituzione parla e vogliamo vivere in pace … vogliamo fuggire 
da questo “sasso”’.61 Tullio Tentori found similar sentiments amongst Sassi 
residents during his research for the Study Commission in the early 1950s. The 
people interviewed called for improved housing to replace the humid and 
overcrowded living conditions of their cave homes. One resident described his 
house as ‘veramente un’abitazione da cani e non da persone civili’ while 
another declared that ‘come vedete dormiamo nell’acqua ed anche le bestie 
vivono come la mia famiglia. Di fronte a un popolo civile. Vergognatevi 
autorità.’62 These reactions suggest that narratives of national shame and 
modernity generated in the context of post-war Matera may have influenced 
popular attitudes towards the Sassi amongst a number of residents. Anne Toxey 
has argued that notions of national shame were a means through which the 
local population was persuaded to move to new housing. She contends that as a 
result Sassi residents shunned their former homes in favour of the promise of 
modern housing.63 Tentori, in contrast, argued that there was a new sense of 
social justice amongst Matera’s poorest inhabitants in the post-war period. Sassi 
residents, he contended, believed that they were entitled to better housing 
conditions and had begun to voice their opinions openly. Ideas of national 
shame and modernity generated in the context of post-war Matera may have 
impacted notions of what constituted acceptable housing for the Sassi residents 
that Tentori questioned in the early 1950s. At the same time, however, it is 
                                                             
61  Aniello Coppola, ‘La vita delle donne nei Sassi di Matera’, L’Unità, 24 April 1952, p. 6 
62  Tentori, pp. 25-27 
63  Toxey, ‘Via Media’, p. 73 
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important to acknowledge the agency of those people interviewed who called 
for improved living standards for themselves and their families. Speaking in 
1985 Friedrich Friedmann claimed that the work of the Study Commission in 
the early 1950s clearly showed that the majority of Sassi residents were 
enthusiastic about the idea of moving to and owning their own homes and farm 
land. In contrast, he argued, it was middle-class landlords who rented out cave 
dwellings as well as local shop keepers who were opposed to the transfer of 
Sassi residents to new accommodation. They feared that the risanamento 
programme would result in a loss of income.64 This suggests that there were 
class divisions over the implementation of special legislation for the Sassi with 
local residents pushing for new housing and landlords opposed to development 
plans for financial reasons. It would, however, be mistaken to make sweeping 
claims about the amount of popular support for the state rehousing programme 
at Matera and the subsequent special law amongst Sassi residents. The evidence 
is fragmentary and in many cases has been filtered through official documents 
and the party press. It does seem clear, however, that a section of the estimated 
15,000 people living in Matera’s cave homes had called for the state to provide 
them with new housing. There was, however, little or no consultation with the 
families that the special law would directly affect once legislation was 
implemented. Apart from the Study Commission’s work and the PCI deputy 
Michele Bianco’s call for two Sassi residents to be included on the special law’s 
housing commission, there appears to have been no political will to consult the 
local population. Instead the risanamento programme was implemented from 
                                                             
64  Friedmann, Miseria e dignità, p. 70 
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above.65 This oversight reflects the paternalistic nature of state intervention at 
Matera. The implication of this approach is that government officials and 
national politicians assumed that the local population would be unable to make 
any noteworthy contribution to the risanamento programme. Rather the 
modernisation of Matera was the responsibility of the Italian state. This 
arguably reflected the widely-held notion in post-war Italian politics that the 
South was incapable of reforming itself. Images of Matera as a symbol of the 
southern question and a national shame contributed to shaping this narrative 
post-1945. This idea appears to have directly influenced the city’s post-war 
history. In practical terms the lack of consultation with Sassi residents would 
result in a number of infrastructural and social problems for the new housing 
projects when the first special law was implemented in the 1950s. These 
difficulties will be examined in the next section. 
 
3.4 Implementing the risanamento programme   
 
Following the approval of the first special law for Matera on 17 May 1952 the 
city’s Office of Public Works (OPW) produced a provisional report on how the 
legislation would be implemented.66 The data on housing conditions that the 
                                                             
65  During interviews carried out with three former Sassi residents in 1987, Angelo Del Parigi 
and Rosalba Demetrio noted that: ‘quando nella conversazione con le fonti si tocca il tasto 
del risanamento dei Sassi, del grande programma di costruzione di rioni e borghi rurali 
volute dalla legge 619 del ‘52, le risposte si fanno evasive, gli sguardi più schivi del solito, gli 
atteggiamenti tradiscono un certo imbarazzo. Stati d’animo autentici, manifestati della 
volontà altrui, quasi non si avesse il diritto o non ci si ritenesse degni di pensare e di dire la 
‘propria’ sulla questione.’ See Del Parigi and Demetrio, p. 27. The implication is that local 
residents did not feel that they could voice their opinion on the risanamento programme. 
This arguably reflects the fact that Sassi residents were not consulted during the 
implementation of the special law and felt excluded from the decision making process. 
66  See Riccardo Lubrano, Risanamento dei rioni “Sassi” nell’abitato del comune di Matera (legge 
17-5-1972 n. 619). Programma delle opere e degli interventi, Repubblica italiana, Ministero 
dei Lavori Pubblici, Provveditorato regionale alle opere pubbliche per la Basilicata, 1952. 
Located in ASM, Prefettura, Atti Amministrativi di Gabinetto (Ricovero 1990), busta 82, 
fascicolo 662, sottofascicolo B. 
178 
 
report laid out shaped early plans for the amount of rural and urban housing 
that would need to be built to rehouse families living in substandard housing. 
The OPW compiled its report collating data from the local prefect’s office, the 
local mayor, the president of the regional council, the local land reform office, 
the agricultural inspection authority and the UNRRA-CASAS sponsored Study 
Commission. The report concluded that there were 3,374 homes located in the 
Sassi. Of these just 43 were deemed to be inhabitable, 859 were judged to be in 
need of renovation and 2,472 were considered uninhabitable. In addition, the 
OPW draft programme included data on the employment profile of the 2,581 
families living in Matera’s cave homes. An estimated 1,653 of this total carried 
out work connected to Matera’s urban centre: artisans, small business owners, 
and construction workers. The report, therefore, recommended that these 
families should be rehoused in three urban neighbourhoods. The remaining 928 
families, in contrast, worked primarily in agriculture. Data on the subdivision of 
these agricultural workers into small landowners, tenant farmers, fixed-wage 
labourers and casual labourers was not provided in the OPW plan. However, the 
report made provision for the transfer of these 928 agricultural families to 
purpose-built rural villages in Matera’s hinterland: 36 families would be 
transferred to the village of Venusio, 55 to Santa Lucia, 200 families to La 
Martella, 139 families to Timmari-Picciano, 118 to Murge and Torre Spagnola, 
and 380 landless families to semi-rural villages close to Matera.67  
The OPW claimed to have taken the availability of agricultural land into 
consideration when drawing up plans for the location and size of rural villages. 
                                                             
67  Of these projects only the villages of La Martella and Venusio would be completed during the 
scope of this study. For the data reported above see Lubrano, p. 4. 
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It claimed that 900 hectares of demesne land at Lucinano-Picciano outside 
Matera would be expropriated and then be made available for distribution to 
landless workers. The OPW report made it clear that many of the families to be 
rehoused in rural villages already owned or rented land in Matera’s agricultural 
hinterland. The size of the proposed rural villages, however, was not set in 
stone. The report made it clear that its results would be subject to the 
availability of appropriate agricultural land. It is clear from the OPW report that 
its findings were provisional. There was a clear acknowledgement that the 
rehousing programme would need to be flexible and that a more accurate study 
would have to be carried out before a final decision on the number of cave 
homes to be permanently closed could be made.68  
In 1952 the Ministry of Public Works entrusted the architect Luigi 
Piccinato with overseeing Matera’s rehousing programme. Piccinato was asked 
to draft a comprehensive town planning programme for the city, i.e. the Piano 
Regionale Generale (PRG).69 UNRRA-CASAS had started constructing the village 
of La Martella prior to the special law’s enactment and Alcide De Gasperi 
inaugurated the project on 17 May 1953.70 In October of the same year the 
Ministry of Public Works launched an architectural design competition to 
tender submissions for the remaining rural villages and urban quarters to be 
built under the terms of the special law. The winning designs were announced 
                                                             
68  See Lubrano’s 1952 report. 
69  See the series of letters between the Prefect of Matera, the Ministry of Public Works and the 
Regional Office for Public Works found in ASM, Prefettura, Atti Amministrativi di Gabinetto 
(Ricovero 1990), busta 82, fascicolo 662, sottofascicolo B. For an outline and discussion of 
Piccinato’s PRG for Matera see Piccinato, pp. 142-151; Raguso, pp. 51-63; Restucci and 
Tafuri, pp. 67-70; and Leonardo Sacco, ‘Matera ‘61’, in Giorgio Baglieri, Marcello Fabbri and 
Leonardo Sacco (eds.), Cronache dei tempi lunghi: Basilicata e mezzogiorno verso gli anni 60, 
Lacaita, Manduria, 1965, pp. 406-412.  
70  Chapter 4 examines the construction of La Martella in detail. 
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in November 1954. However, only three urban neighbourhoods and one rural 
village were completed under the auspices of the first special law. The 
construction process and early lives of these housing schemes proved to be 
problematic. Examining these projects individually will help to shed light on the 
first special law’s implementation and its limitations which will then be re-
evaluated in detail. 
 
Serra Venerdì 
 
Serra Venerdì was the largest urban neighbourhood built under the umbrella of 
the first special law. The residential quarter was designed to provide 828 new 
homes and 62 additional buildings for essential services, including 37 shops. It 
was built on a hill overlooking the UNRRA-CASAS village La Martella. In 1954 a 
national competition was held to tender designs for Serra Venerdì. Luigi 
Piccinato and Luisa Anversa Ferretti were entrusted with drawing up the 
blueprint for the project’s urban layout. Housing design and the construction 
contract were awarded to a team of architects and engineers which included 
Leonardo Favini, Luigi Aversa, Roberto Pontecorvo, Renzo Giorgetti and Aldo 
Pinto. There was an attempt to reflect some of the distinguishing features of 
regional design in Serra Venerdì’s housing. The shape of windows and loggia 
and the type of blinds and fireplaces chosen were loosely modelled on local 
architecture.71  
Building work on the residential neighbourhood started in May 1955 
and there were 430 families living there one year later. Emilio Colombo, the DC 
                                                             
71  See ‘Il quartiere “B” Serra Venerdì, Casabella continuità, (1959), no. 231, pp. 25-28 and ASM, 
Genio Civile, Versamento VII, busta 94. For an appraisal of the project’s architectural merits 
see Raguso, pp. 113-120. 
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deputy for Potenza and the region’s most influential politician, oversaw the 
official opening ceremony in May 1956. This formal inauguration was covered 
in the national press and featured in an official newsreel. Serra Venerdì’s second 
lot of 260 new houses was officially inaugurated on 22 December 1957.72 
Despite the government fanfare which accompanied Serra Venerdì’s 
inauguration, however, the project was beset by a number of problems from the 
outset. Archival sources from 1956-1958 reveal that residents complained to 
the local prefect and the local Genio Civile office about faulty fixtures and 
fittings in their homes, leaking rainwater during bad weather, blocked sewage 
systems, inadequate storage space and a lack of public amenities. The 
neighbourhood’s road and footpath infrastructure was incomplete and there 
was no street lighting. There were reports of ground-floor flooding and the 
degradation of the existing road network.73 Furthermore, residents complained 
about the amount of rent that they were expected to pay for their new homes 
and the separate rate for nearby allotments.74 Many families relocated to Serra 
Venerdì had owned their former cave homes in the Sassi or had paid lower 
rents compared to their new accommodation. The transfer to more expensive 
housing created financial hardship for the majority of residents who were 
                                                             
72  ‘Altri seicento alloggi popolari a Matera nuova tappa per il risanamento dei Sassi’, Corriere 
del Giorno, 22 December 1957, p. 5. An official newsreel was dedicated to the inauguration 
ceremony held at Serra Venerdì and Lanera on 22 December 1957. See La Settimana INCOM, 
Scompaiono i “Sassi”, (Italy, 1958). 
73  A letter from the Associazione Autonoma degli Inquilini del Rione Serra Venerdì dated 28 
September 1956, just four months after the project’s official inauguration, outlined the 
housing problems listed above. Moreover, a letter from Dr. Salvatore Masciandro, president 
of the Istituto autonomo per le case popolari Matera, to the local council, prefect and genio 
civile office documented the problems with Serra Venerdì’s road infrastructure and revealed 
that many of the earlier housing problems had persisted into 1958. See ASM, Genio Civile, 
Versamento VII, busta 21. For further documentation on Serra Venerdì’s infrastructural 
problems see ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 82, fascicolo, 668, sottofascicolo 6. 
74  Article 13 of the first special law had fixed rental prices on new homes built to rehouse Sassi 
residents at 0.5 per cent of the building cost. See Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, 
18 June 1952, pp. 2206-2208. 
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employed in manual labour or were pensioners with modest incomes.75 Official 
documents show that 137 of the 536 families at Serra Venerdì were in arrears 
with their rent in June 1957. Eviction notices were served to the indebted 
parties later the same month. Over the next year a number of residents only 
managed to avoid eviction thanks to last-minute financial assistance from 
family members and local public figures.76 Local officials were faced with the 
prospect of evicting people that had been transferred from the Sassi less than a 
year earlier. In addition there was growing civil unrest amongst residents 
coupled as well as political agitation from the PCI.77 In February 1958 rents at 
Serra Venerdì were reduced by 30 lire per month following direct intervention 
from the Minister for Public Works.78 The Sassi commission’s failure to 
recognise that increased rental prices would be an issue for families transferred 
to new housing at Serra Venerdì reflects the fact that there was no consultation 
                                                             
75  A petition dated 20 July 1957 from approximately 50 local residents calling for lower rental 
prices argued that ‘i sottoscritti abitavano le note case del Sasso e per tali case pagavano un 
irrisorio affitto di poche migliaia di lire all’anno. Invece ora devono pagare dale 3 alle 6 mila 
lire al mese, e per causa di disoccupazione, di malattie, di invalidità, di pensioni minime … si 
vedono costretti a non pagare la pigione.’ See ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 82, 
fascicolo 671, sottofascicolo 3. For detailed information on rental payments at Serra Venerdì 
see ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 82, fascicolo 671, sottofascicolo 1; and ASM, 
Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 82, fascicolo 671, sottofascicolo 3.   
76  See, for example, a report from Matera’s police commissioner entitled ‘Serra Venerdì 
(Matera) – Sfratto di assegnatari di alloggi’ about the attempted eviction of four families on 
31 July 1957. ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 82, fascicolo 671, sottofascicolo 3. This 
incident was also covered in the local newspaper Basilicata. See the article ‘Intimati a Matera 
150 sfratti agli abitanti di Serra Venerdì’, Basilicata, 2 August 1957, p. 4. Additional 
documentation on threatened evictions from Serra Venerdì is contained in ASM, Prefettura 
(Ricovero 90), busta 82, fascicolo 671, sottofascicolo 2. 
77  Local members of the PCI organized a public meeting at Serra Venerdì on 22 July 1957 in 
opposition to the threatened evictions. See report from the local police in ASM, Prefettura 
(Ricovero 90), busta 82, fascicolo 671, sottofascicolo 3. Moreover, a number of articles on 
the issue were published in L’Unità. See ‘Lo sfratto incombe su 50 famiglie del rione Serra 
Venerdì di Matera’, L’Unità, 26 June 1957, page number not available; Giuseppe Palmieri, 
‘Hanno ricevuto le intimazioni di pagamento 44 assegnatari delle case popolari di Matera’, 
L’Unità, 30 June 1957, page number not available. 
78  See letter dated 20 February 1958 from the Minister of Public Works to the Prefect of Matera 
and local genio civile in ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 82, fascicolo 671, sottofascicolo 
3. 
183 
 
with Sassi residents. Instead state intervention at Matera ignored the social and 
economic exigencies of the local population.   
 
Lanera 
 
Lanera was the smallest of the three urban neighbourhoods built under the 
terms of the first special law for the Sassi. It was planned to provide 353 
residential homes, 30 public buildings and 19 shops on a site close to the city’s 
sixteenth-century castle overlooking the Piano.79 The quarter’s design was 
awarded to the architect Mario Coppi and the engineer Marcello Fabbri. In 
contrast to the reinforced concrete used at Serra Venerdì and Spine Bianche, 
Lanera’s designers incorporated the use of local building materials and 
techniques, such as tufa rock and adobe bricks, into the design of their three-
storey apartment blocks.80 Construction work on Lanera started in 1956 and on 
22 December 1957 Emilio Colombo, the then Minister for Agriculture, and 
Giacomo Sedati, undersecretary at the Ministry of Public Works, visited Matera 
to officially inaugurate the project. This event was covered in the national press 
and was the subject of an official newsreel.81 In a letter to Adone Zoli, the then 
Italian Prime Minister, the Prefect of Matera argued that Lanera’s upcoming 
inauguration was of national significance ‘in quanto essa rappresenta la 
concreta attuazione di un impegno del Governo.’82 The media coverage of this 
                                                             
79  See Doria, pp. 47-52; and ‘Altri seicento alloggi popolari a Matera nuova tappa per il 
risanamento dei Sassi’, Corriere del Giorno, 22 December 1957, p. 5.   
80  For an in-depth discussion of Lanera’s urban layout and design see Raguso, pp. 140-143.  
81  See ‘Altri seicento alloggi popolari a Matera nuova tappa per il risanamento dei Sassi’, 
Corriere del Giorno, 22 December 1957, p. 5 and ‘Sorgono moderni villaggi di villette intorno 
all’inferno di pietra. Presto i “sassi” di Matera saranno abbandonati dagli uomini’, Il Giornale 
del Mezzogiorno, 2-9 January 1958, p. 3. An official newsreel was dedicated to the 
inauguration ceremony held at Serra Venerdì and Lanera on 22 December 1957. See La 
Settimana INCOM, Scompaiono i “Sassi” (Italy, 1958). 
82  In addition, Matera’s prefect argued that visits from erstwhile Italian Prime Minister’s (De 
Gasperi and Antonio Segni) had ‘determinato tali favorevoli ripercussioni di carattere 
184 
 
event showed that Matera was still deemed to be of national importance in 
terms of government propaganda and promoting the intervento straordinario. 
In contrast to the infrastructural issues and resulting social tensions 
experienced at Serra Venerdì in the late 1950s, the primary source material on 
Lanera suggests that the project experienced fewer teething problems. In 
October 1959, however, local residents sent a petition to Emilio Colombo 
complaining about the lack of a public oven and the fact that the proposed green 
space had been left unplanted leading to sand blowing into their homes during 
bad weather.83 Despite the fact that Lanera had featured in government 
propaganda to promote the DC’s development programme for southern Italy, 
the neighbourhood fell into a state of neglect in the late 1950s. 
 
Spine Bianche 
 
Spine Bianche was the last of the three urban quarters built under the auspices 
of the special law to be completed. The project, located to the north west of 
Matera, was designed to provide 687 houses for 3,500 people as well as 24 
shops, 24 artisan workshops, municipal buildings a church, a market and a 
crèche. The project’s urban layout was awarded to a team of architects headed 
by Carlo Aymonino. Moreover, Giancarlo De Carlo, Mario Fiorentino, Felice 
Gorio, Hilda Selam and Vito Sangirardi were entrusted with the building 
design.84 An attempt was made in Spine Bianche’s overall plans to recreate and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
politico e psicologico.’ See the letter dated 11 December 1957 in ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 
90), busta 82, fascicolo 668. 
83  See ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 82, fascicolo 668, sottofasciolo 4. 
84  The other architects involved in drawing up Spine Bianche’s urban layout were C. Chiarini, 
M. Girelli, S. Lenci and M. Ottolenghi. See Sergio Lenci, ‘Esperienza nella progettazione del 
quartiere Spine Bianche a Matera’, Casabella Continuità, (1959), no. 231, pp. 21-22. For 
information on Spine Bianche’s housing design see the Ufficio del Genio Civile’s report dated 
25 August 1959 in ASM, Genio Civile, Versamento 0, busta 62. 
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foster the social ties of Matera’s vicinati.85 Construction was started in 1955 and 
the first lot of houses were handed over to new residents in 1959. The public 
buildings and the neighbourhood’s road network, however, were still 
unfinished when the village was inaugurated.86 A second lot of houses and the 
remaining amenities were finally completed in 1964 but Spine Bianche quickly 
fell into a state of disrepair due to the lack of public services that the local 
council provided to the new neighbourhood.87 
It is significant that no national politicians took part in Spine Bianche’s 
inauguration and there was no national press coverage of this event in contrast 
to the fanfare that had greeted the official opening of Matera’s other new urban 
neighbourhoods. By 1959 Matera had lost its symbolic importance in terms of 
promoting government intervention in southern Italy. Land reform and the 
southern question had decreased in political importance with the onset of 
Italy’s economic boom and a period of rural exodus as millions of Italians 
swapped agriculture for life and work in one of Italy’s rapidly growing urban 
centres.88 This process resulted in a change in political focus and meant that, in 
the context of official propaganda, the risanamento programme’s political 
currency had all but disappeared and by 1959 Spine Bianche, like the 
risanamento programme, had become an anachronism. 
  
                                                             
85  Writing in Casabella Continuità Sergio Lenci, one of the architects that worked on Spine 
Bianche, revealed that the Sassi’s vicinati had captivated his team of architects and that they 
had proposed building a series of houses with closed courtyards in an attempt to preserve 
the traditional social bonds of Matera’s cave dwellers. See Lenci, p. 21. 
86  See the interview with Oronzo Vincenzo Manicone, one of Spine Bianche’s original residents, 
in Doria, p. 57. 
87  For an account of Spine Bianche’s degradation see Doria, pp. 55-59 
88  This point is developed in detail below. See pp. 208-211. 
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Venusio  
 
Borgo Venusio was the second rural village built to house agricultural workers 
from the Sassi under the terms of the special law for Matera (the first village, La 
Martella, is the subject of the next chapter). Luigi Piccinato was awarded the 
design contract for the project. Venusio was to be built 7.5 kilometres from 
Matera next to a partially abandoned village that the Opera Nazionale 
Combattenti had constructed in 1927 to house demobbed soldiers. The new 
project at Venusio planned to rehouse 66 agricultural families living in the Sassi 
closer to the agricultural land that they worked. In addition the village would 
provide municipal buildings, a post office, a police station, a doctor’s surgery, 
seven shops, a crèche, a social centre, a primary school and a Catholic church.89  
Alcide De Gasperi laid the first stone at Venusio in an official ceremony 
on 17 May 1953 following the inauguration of the UNRRA-CASAS sponsored-
village La Martella. UNRRA-CASAS was entrusted with overseeing the 
construction work at Venusio which started in 1954. The 66 houses were 
completed in 1956 but the project was beset by a number of problems. There 
were delays in completing Venusio’s public buildings, road network, water and 
sewage systems, and in the provision of electricity.90 Moreover, there were 
problems securing the estimated 350 hectares of land to be allocated to families 
relocated from the Sassi.91 As a result Venusio was still uninhabited in the early 
                                                             
89  See the report ‘Per la costruzione degli Edifici Pubblici del Borgo “Venusio” a Matera’ in ASM, 
Genio Civile, VII Versamento, busta 117. 
90  In a letter dated 17 July 1955 to Emilio Colombo, Matera’s prefect wrote that ‘l’esecuzione di 
dette opere [public buildings and essential services] è indispensabile per poter procedere 
all’assegnazione delle case coloniche, altrimenti le case stesse costruite e completate 
rimarranno chiuse per parecchio tempo.’ See ASM, Prefeturra (Ricovero 90), busta 82, 
fascicolo 663.   
91  See the letter to Emilio Colombo from the Prefect of Matera dated 30 January 1956. The 
prefect wrote that the ‘trasferimento delle famiglie in quella zona [Venusio] si presenta 
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1960s and a number of buildings were subsequently illegally occupied. The 
project was fully completed in the 1970s, but its houses were instead allocated 
to non-agricultural workers.92 In the 1960s an additional 62 houses were built 
at the rural village Picciano and 121 new homes at the semi-rural quarter Agna 
as part of the risanamento project, but the projected rural villages at Santa Lucia 
and Torre Spagnola would never be constructed following the land reform 
board’s failure to secure the agricultural land needed to render the projects 
viable.93 As a result the borghi rurali model that Mazzocchi Alemanni and Calia 
had put forward was abandoned and instead the risanamento programme 
became an urban housing project. The decision to discard the rural-village 
model reflects the failure to understand the complex pattern of landholding at 
Matera. This oversight stemmed from the lack of consultation with local 
residents who worked in agriculture. Instead a broad model for restructuring 
southern Italian agriculture was applied to a specific local context. This point 
arguably reflects the impact that notions of Matera as a symbol of the southern 
question prevalent in post-war Italy had on the risanamento programme for the 
Sassi. The city was seen as emblematic of a generic idea of southern Italian 
agriculture and therefore provided a testing ground for theories on how to 
reorganize and modernize the Mezzogiorno’s agricultural economy.   
                                                                                                                                                                            
quanto mai difficile per mancanza di terre disponibili da assegnare alle famiglie stesse.’ ASM, 
Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 82, fascicolo 669, sottofascicolo 2. For further information on 
problems with Venusio see the Ufficio del Genio Civile di Matera’s 1956 report ‘La prima fase 
del risanamento dei “Sassi” di Matera. Orientamenti per il completamento dell’opera sulla 
base dell’esperienza acquisita’ in ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 82, fascicolo 674, 
sottofascicolo. 3. 
92  Sacco, Matera contemporanea, p. 53 
93  Notably the houses built at Picciano A and B were never officially allocated to families from 
the Sassi but a number of buildings were and continue to be illegally occupied. See Doria, pp. 
67-69. 
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Re-evaluating the first special law 
 
The implementation of the first special law for Matera was beset by a series of 
problems as outlined above. There had been a failure to secure the agricultural 
land needed to create the five viable rural villages that the special law had 
provisionally planned to build. There were also delays in completing the three 
urban neighbourhoods built under the terms of the risanamento programme 
and then problems with the housing and essential services provided to new 
residents. Why were there so many problems with such a high-profile 
development project? The explanations offered in the existing secondary 
literature on the risanamento programme fail to adequately explain the 
project’s shortcomings. Manfredo Tafuri’s writing on post-war Matera has been 
highly influential on recent secondary literature.94 He attributes the first special 
law’s limitations to deliberate ideological decisions that the DC government 
made. However, Tafuri’s work is ideologically driven and neglects to examine a 
number of important primary source documents on the first special law’s 
implementation. This oversight has been compounded in a number of 
subsequent secondary sources on the risanamento programme which have 
accepted Tafuri’s arguments a priori without consulting the relevant archival 
material to test his contentious claims. It is apposite, therefore, to reassess the 
                                                             
94  Manfredo Tafuri is considered to be one of Italy’s most important post-war architectural 
historians. In 1974, in conjunction with the architect and academic Amerigo Restucci, Tafuri 
produced a short book on the history of the Sassi in the context of the OPW’s public 
competition for restoring the Sassi. The book provides a detailed and comprehensive 
account of the Matera’s post-war history despite its relative brevity. However, the work’s 
ideological position and the arguments that it puts forward have arguably cast too long a 
shadow over subsequent research. Tafuri was a member of the Italian Communist Party. 
This point has not been taken into consideration in recent secondary literature. Instead 
Tafuri’s arguments have too often been accepted a priori when supplemental analysis of 
relevant primary source material was needed to test some of his more contentious 
conclusions. For an intellectual biography of Tafuri see Andrew Leach, Manfredo Tafuri: 
Choosing History, A&S Books, Ghent, 2007. 
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first special law’s implementation in the context of Tafuri’s work on Matera. 
This will shed light on the reasons behind the project’s many limitations.  
First, Tafuri argues that the wholesale transfer of Sassi residents to new 
housing and the closure of their cave homes were avoidable. He claims that 
these decisions were made for political reasons. Local and national bureaucrats, 
it is argued, deliberately overlooked the data that Friedmann and his team 
produced on the Sassi. The Study Commission had concluded that there were 
3,329 dwellings amongst the Sassi. Of these 158 were deemed inhabitable, 
1,676 could be renovated and reused, 986 were uninhabitable and 509 could be 
adapted for other purposes (such as stables or warehouses). In contrast, the 
OPW report upon which the implementation of the special law was based had 
decided that there were 3,374 homes amongst the Sassi. Just 43 houses were 
deemed fit for habitation, 859 were suitable for renovation and 2,472 were 
considered uninhabitable. Tafuri contends that the OPW’s decision to declare 
the majority of Sassi homes unfit for living was taken for political reasons. He 
argues that by ‘spostando la massima parte dei fondi di stanziamento verso la 
creazione di borgate esterne, si punta alla dispersione e alla frantumazione di 
un nucleo sociale politicamente combattivo.’95 This argument has been repeated 
in two recent books on post-war Matera which draw heavily on Tafuri’s work.96  
There are, however, a number of problems with this contention. First, 
there is no evidence in the primary source material on the special law’s 
implementation that the Study Commission’s data was deliberately discarded. 
Rather archival sources suggest that the provisional decision to rehouse Sassi 
                                                             
95 Restucci and Tafuri, p. 60 
96  See in particular Raguso, p. 38 and Toxey, Materan Contradictions, pp. 88-90. 
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residents living in homes deemed fit for habitation was the result of urban 
planning and economic factors rather than ideological concerns. It was 
considered too expensive to provide essential services to isolated homes in 
parts of the Sassi that would need to be largely abandoned. This point explains 
the difference in housing data that the OPW and Study Commission produced.97 
Tafuri brands the OPW’s argument specious and claims that the special law 
acted merely as a pretext for the ‘cosciente distruzione del Sasso.’98 However, 
primary sources illustrate that the debate on the renovation of the Sassi’s cave 
homes, and how best this process should be carried out, continued throughout 
the 1950s. The OPW’s 1952 report on how to implement the risanamento 
programme was provisional and subject to change. This point is exemplified in 
the OPW’s 1956 study of the Sassi. It found errors in its 1952 study and 
provided alternative data on the number of cave homes that would need to be 
abandoned and those that could be renovated.99 This suggests that the decision 
to empty the Sassi was not firmly established from the approval of the special 
law onwards as Tafuri contends. Rather the risanamento programme was a 
reactive process characterized by revisions and on-going discussion amongst 
the civil servants tasked with implementing its provisions.  
                                                             
97  See Lubrano’s 1952 report. 
98  Restucci and Tafuri, p. 60 
99  Writing in 1956, the chief engineer of Basilicata’s OPW underlined the fundamental need to 
reassess living conditions in the Sassi based solely on hygienic criteria and not on the urban 
planning considerations put forward in the OPW’s original 1952 report. Only at that point, 
he argued, could a final decision on how many existing caves homes would need to be 
permanently closed be made. This point illustrates that the risanamento programme was not 
unilateral or guided by a single ideological thrust. Rather it appears that the first special law 
was a complicated process in which civil servants reacted to on-going demographic and 
urban developments. See G. Travaglini, ‘La prima fase del risanamento dei “Sassi” di Matera. 
Orientamenti per il completamento dell’opera sulla base dell’esperienza acquisita’, Ufficio 
del Genio Civile di Matera, Provveditore regionale alle OO.PP. per la Basilicata, 5 November 
1956, in ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 82, fascicolo 674, sottofascicolo 3. 
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Furthermore, the claim that the DC deliberately emptied the Sassi in 
order to transfer a politically engaged and combative community across the 
surrounding countryside is problematic. It presumes that the estimated 15,000 
inhabitants of Matera’s cave homes were a socially and politically cohesive 
group. This viewpoint elides the generational, gender and class tensions which 
appear to have existed amongst Sassi residents in the early 1950s.100 Moreover, 
Tafuri seems to ignore the fact that the reports of sporadic protest at Matera in 
the immediate post-war period were directly linked to calls for new housing. 
His argument overlooks the political agency of those local residents who wished 
to leave the Sassi and move to new accommodation. Tafuri’s claim that the 
Sassi’s agricultural and rural workers were part of a socially and politically 
integrated community appears to be based on an idealized concept of a pre-
industrial Gemeinschaft rather than the fragments of evidence on life amongst 
the Sassi found in primary source material.101 Tafuri also ignores the political 
pressure from the PCI to transfer residents to new accommodation. Speaking 
about the Sassi in parliament in 1951 the PCI deputy Michele Bianco, who had 
presented the first draft law for the Sassi to parliament, had declared that ‘vi è 
qualcosa da distruggere nella mia terra, e cioè i “Sassi”.’102 Similar sentiments 
are found in additional parliamentary interventions on the topic from 
                                                             
100  See for example the reference to new attitudes amongst younger Sassi residents and the 
resultant intergenerational conflict that it created in Tullio Tentori, Il sistema di vita della 
comunità materana. Riassunto di un’inchiesta etnologica, vol. III, UNRRA-Casas Prima Giunta, 
Rome, 1956, pp. 24-25. 
101  This point is all the more surprising given that Restucci and Tafuri chastise the different 
urban planners and architects involved in the risanamento programme for romanticizing the 
Sassi’s vicinati, but then appear to have made similar claims themselves regarding the 
apparent sense of political solidarity amongst Matera’s cave dwellers prior to the special 
law’s implementation. See Restucci and Tafuri, p. 48. 
102  Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, 26 September 1951, p. 30585 
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Communist deputies.103 No call for the renovation of the Sassi has been found 
amongst contemporary politicians that discussed the special law’s provisions. 
Instead the political will on both sides of the Cold War divide was that Matera’s 
cave homes constituted a national shame and should be permanently 
abandoned. This viewpoint was not limited to the Christian Democrats as Tafuri 
implies.   
Second, Tafuri claims that the failure to locate agricultural land for the 
projected five rural villages outside Matera, and the subsequent decision to 
abandon this concept in favour of building urban dwellings, were part of a 
broader government strategy. He argues that the risanamento programme at 
Matera reflected the DC’s attempts to force agricultural workers off the land and 
into the building trade with the final aim of creating a cheap labour force for 
northern Italy’s expanding industrial sector.104 Tafuri provides no additional 
sources to back up this contention. Again this analysis of the special law’s 
implementation has been repeated a priori in a number of recent secondary 
sources.105 The argument that Matera was part of a larger economic plan to 
create a cheap labour force for northern industry, however, is debatable for a 
number of reasons. Primary sources pertaining to the risanamento programme 
reveal no trace of a broader conspiracy to derail the allocation of agricultural 
                                                             
103  See for example Mario Alicata’s intervention on the Sassi: Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei 
Deputati, 20 February 1951, pp. 26316-26330. 
104  Tafuri argues that the special law’s implementation ‘exemplified the role that the great 
industrial capital had assigned to underdevelopment: the underdeveloped area was 
managed as a pool of reserve labour for industrialized areas. To achieve this the agricultural 
vocation of the south was stressed, the service sector was artificially expanded, and a policy 
of public works instigated to stimulate consumerism in the south … public works and 
building functioned as a means of containing unemployment and providing training for 
agricultural groups that would later on be encouraged to migrate to developed areas. There 
they would form a reserve force, enabling producers to keep wages low.’ Manfredo Tafuri, 
History of Italian Architecture, 1944-1985, The MIT Press, London, 1989, pp. 24-25. These 
points are also made in Restucci and Tafuri, p. 67 and p. 70. 
105  See Toxey, Materan Contradictions, p. 146 and Raguso, pp. 39-40. 
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land to Matera’s landless workers. Rather they suggest that the implementation 
of the first special law was uncoordinated and reactive. The decision to plan 
rural villages for Matera’s cave dwellers was based on flawed research that 
Mazzocchi Alemanni had produced. This generic model for rejuvenating 
southern agriculture was applied to a territory which had come to symbolise 
the southern question but which had a complex land-holding structure. It is 
clear from the existing primary sources that the land reform board attempted to 
expropriate and purchase the necessary land needed for the projected five rural 
villages, but the holdings close to Matera were a patchwork of plots and not the 
great estates found in other parts of southern Italy, e.g. the Berlingieri estate in 
the Metapontino.106 When it became clear that the land needed to create viable 
rural villages in Matera’s hinterland was unavailable, the concept of borghi 
rurali was abandoned in favour of urban dwellings.107 The reform board’s 
failure to understand the nature of land holding at Matera, however, reflects the 
fact that local residents were not consulted during the implementation of the 
first special law. The complex nature of land holding at Matera was 
misunderstood or ignored completely. Instead development models for the 
entire Mezzogiorno were applied from above to a specific economy without 
taking local factors into account. This reflects the impact that notions of Matera 
                                                             
106  The Metapontino is located on the Ionian littoral. This coastal region stretches for 60 
kilometres between the provinces of Taranto and Matera covering an area of 80,000 
hectares. Before land reform, the Metapontino had been divided into eight different estates, 
the largest of which, at Policoro, covered 6,500 hectares. The remaining land had been 
owned or rented by rural workers who lived in one of the nearby inland villages. Until the 
eradication of Malaria in 1950, however, the Metapontino had been largely uninhabited with 
approximately 93 per cent of land used for pasture and cereal cultivation and large tracts of 
woodland retained for hunting. See King, Land Reform, pp. 141-142. 
107  See the report from the Sassi Commission meeting held on 16 October 1955 and the report 
from Matera’s prefect to the Ministry of the Interior: ‘Relazione in merito all’attuazione della 
Legge 17-5-1952, nr.619 per il risanamento dei rioni “Sassi” di Matera’ dated 27 February 
1955. ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 82, fascicolo 662, sottofascicolo B. 
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as a symbol of the southern question generated in the immediate post-war 
period had on the city’s subsequent urban and social history. A generic 
economic model for the entire imagined Mezzogiorno was applied to an 
individual regional case.      
Furthermore, it is clear that the DC implemented a limited land reform 
programme in an attempt to quell civil unrest amongst landless agricultural 
workers and halt PCI gains in rural Italy. The claim that Matera’s risanamento 
programme was part of a wider strategy to provide cheap labour for northern 
Italian industry, however, reflects the PCI’s critique of post-war land reform and 
appears to be ideologically driven.108 It implies that the DC government 
engineered post-war Italy’s vast rural-to-urban migration through a limited 
land reform programme. This viewpoint fails to consider the broader historical 
context of Italy’s post-war economic boom and ignores the agency of those 
people who chose to move to urban centres. Many Italians elected to abandon 
agriculture for the lure of higher wages, the consumer world of the city, and the 
idea of a better life in northern Europe and Italy’s industrial triangle. Italy’s 
entry into the EEC in 1957 and the policies of the Common Market agricultural 
policy, established in 1962, were additional factors behind the decline in 
agricultural cultivation in southern Italy. While Dutch farmers were subsidized 
by up to $700 by the European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund, 
                                                             
108  See for example Gerardo Chiaromonte, Agricoltura, sviluppo economico, democrazia, De 
Donato, Bari, 1973. Writing in 1953 about communist propaganda regarding land reform, 
the social democrat Andrea Rapisarda claimed that the PCI was spreading the idea that ‘il 
governo intende trasferire i braccianti dai malsani agglomerati urbani ai villaggi rurali 
soltanto per distruggerne la solidarietà di classe e trasformarli in contadini egoisti’ adding 
that ‘il giudizio implica una condanna dello sfollamento dei Sassi.’ This point is notable as the 
same argument would later be echoed in Tafuri’s assessment of the first special law. See 
Andrea Rapisarda, ‘La riforma agraria in Lucania. Burocratici e pioneri’, Il Mondo, 14 March 
1953, p. 5. 
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Italian farmers in contrast received just $70.109 As a result there was little 
incentive to continue working the land for many Italians of the boom 
generation. As Paul Ginsborg notes: ‘even if a proper agrarian reform had been 
carried out, with widespread land redistribution on a more rational basis, with 
improvement of agrarian contracts and with extensive state aid to the new 
landowners, the “bone” of the rural South would still have had to shed a 
significant proportion of its population.’110 Tafuri, therefore, arguably overlooks 
the broader social, historical and cultural context in which Matera’s 
risanamento programme was carried out when drawing up his conclusions.    
The fundamental problem with Tafuri’s reading of the risanamento 
programme is that he appears to have decided on his main arguments before 
examining the relevant primary documents. His claim that the first special law 
was a deliberate strategy to empty the Sassi, and was part of a broader DC 
strategy to push agricultural workers off the land and into cities and factories, 
has substituted the analysis of archival material. This oversight has been 
repeated in a number of subsequent secondary sources which have uncritically 
cited Tafuri’s claims. As a result the existing literature on post-war Matera has 
created a narrative in which the risanamento programme’s shortcomings are 
explained as the result of deliberate and methodical decisions which the DC 
government made. The Manichean reading of Matera’s post-war history, in 
which the PCI are the heroes and the DC the villains of the piece, is reductive 
and borders on the ahistorical. This approach is deeply flawed yet surprisingly 
                                                             
109  See Ginsborg, pp. 232-233. 
110  Ibid., p. 231 
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prevalent in the historiography of post-war Matera. In contrast, this chapter has 
attempted to provide a corrective to this reductive methodology and instead 
reassess Matera’s first special law through a critique of the existing secondary 
material and the relevant archival sources. Primary source material suggests 
that the special law’s implementation was anything but systematic. Rather it 
was reactive, beset by a lack of coordination, official disagreements, the failure 
to consult the local population, and ultimately waning political interest at a 
national level once the Sassi’s value in terms of political propaganda had 
diminished in importance. This suggests that in official circles the first special 
law for Matera was more important in symbolic terms as an image of progress 
for official propaganda than as an actual reform programme. 
 
Conclusion  
 
By the time the second special law for the Sassi was passed on 21 March 1958, 
allocating a further two billion lire to the risanamento programme, an estimated 
1,300 cave homes had been closed and their residents moved to new 
accommodation. A brief report from October 1958 showed that 828 homes had 
been built at Serra Venerdì, a further 333 at La Nera, and 257 houses at Spine 
Bianche were ready to be allocated with a further 66 under construction. In 
addition a total of 66 houses had been completed in the rural village Venusio 
and 167 new homes had been built and allocated at La Martella.111 However, La 
Martella would experience numerous problems, the Venusio project would 
prove to be a failure, and the residential-village model would be abandoned in 
favour of constructing additional urban quarters. As a result the risanamento 
                                                             
111  ASM, Prefettura, Atti Amministrativi di Gabinetto (Ricovero 1990), busta 82, fascicolo 674, 
sottofascicolo 1. For more information on the construction of La Martella see Chapter 4. 
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programme would become an urban resettlement scheme. At a micro-level this 
decision can be attributed to the land reform board’s failure to acquire the 
necessary plots needed to create functioning agricultural villages. The rural 
village model that Mazzocchi Alemanni had put forward had failed to 
understand the complex nature of land holdings at Matera. This oversight 
stemmed from the fact that the local population that worked the land had not 
been directly consulted. As a result the initial provisions of the first special law 
were based on a flawed understanding of local agriculture and were modified 
accordingly once this became apparent. At a macro-level the years of Italy’s 
economic miracle saw the rapid growth of urban centres and industry, social 
transformation, and rural exodus. Millions of Italians chose to leave agriculture 
for economic and social reasons and the issue of land reform diminished in 
political importance.112 In the context of Matera this point is exemplified by the 
fact that there was no official inauguration of Spine Bianche. The Sassi’s 
symbolic and political currency began to fade in the years of the economic 
miracle.113  
 Despite the numerous problems recounted above, the Christian 
Democrats had used Matera’s risanamento programme to promote its post-war 
reform programme in southern Italy. In the early 1950s the Sassi were 
perceived in political and intellectual circles as a symbol of the southern 
question which had once again become an important political issue. Tackling 
Matera’s housing problems, therefore, allowed the DC to claim that it had 
implemented concrete measures to resolve southern Italy’s social and economic 
                                                             
112  Between 1955 and 1971 an estimated 9 million Italians moved from one region to another 
as rural-urban migration grew rapidly. See Foot, Modern Italy, p. 138 and Ginsborg, p. 219. 
113  Pontrandolfi, p. 154 
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problems. The purpose-built rural village of La Martella was central to 
government propaganda promoting the DC’s initiatives in the South. It aimed to 
provide modern housing for 200 families living in the Sassi and move them 
closer to the agricultural land that they worked. In official sources the project 
became a symbol of the Mezzogiorno’s rebirth in the early 1950s in contrast to 
the Sassi’s cave dwellings. The La Martella project, however, was beset by 
numerous problems and shortcomings. The next chapter will examine La 
Martella’s complex history in detail. 
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Chapter 4: La Martella: a model for southern 
Italian development 
 
Dai sassi orridi come caverne, grigi come la miseria, tristi di una angustia 
angosciosa, il chiaro villaggio ‘La Martella’ – sorgente sulle pendici 
collinose aperte su di una valle ricca di luce, di verde e di sole – e  un 
contrapporsi di fattori positivi. Tra questi due estremi di vita e  quasi 
simbolicamente riassunto e raffigurato il problema del Mezzogiorno.1 
 
The village of La Martella in Basilicata became a model for southern Italian 
development in the early 1950s. This purpose-built agricultural village, situated 
7 kilometres from Matera, was constructed between 1951 and 1954 by the 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration-Comitato 
Amministrativo Soccorso ai Senzatetto (UNRRA-CASAS) and the Sezione speciale 
per la riforma fondiaria di Puglia, Lucania, Molise.2 La Martella was originally 
planned to re-house two hundred families from the Sassi. Inaugurated exactly 
one year later by the Christian Democrat Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi, his 
party used the project as an example of the impact that the intervento 
straordinario and Marshall Plan aid had made in southern Italy. Owing to the 
intellectual and media focus on the Sassi’s squalid living conditions in the late 
1940s and early 1950s, Matera had been dubbed a national shame and come to 
symbolize the inadequate housing conditions in post-war Italy and in particular 
the Mezzogiorno. In contrast, La Martella, with its Neorealist architecture and 
social-town planning designed by a team of innovative architects under the 
auspices of the industrialist Adriano Olivetti, was presented as a model for 
southern Italy’s socio-economic development. Images of the village were 
                                                             
1 Marroni, p. 1 (emphasis in original) 
2 For the sake of brevity, and to avoid repetition, the Ente di riforma fondiaria Puglia e Lucania 
will be referred to as the Ente di riforma, land reform board or agricultural reform board. 
200 
 
juxtaposed with those of Matera in official sources to illustrate the progress that 
the DC had made in resolving the Sassi’s substandard housing conditions and by 
implication the southern question. Despite the image of La Martella portrayed in 
the mass media, the project failed to live up to its billing and had fallen into a 
state of disrepair by the early 1960s.  
There is, undoubtedly, a large body of literature on La Martella owing to 
the project’s historical importance. The existing body of research on the village, 
however, has primarily focused on the project in the context of political, urban 
and architectural history.3 Hitherto the village’s role in promoting government 
reform in the Mezzogiorno has been ignored. In particular, the depiction of La 
Martella in official documentary films has been completely overlooked in the 
existing literature on post-war Matera. As one of the first post-war development 
projects for southern Italy to be inaugurated, La Martella was a historically 
significant enterprise which played a salient role in the promotion of the Cassa 
per il Mezzogiorno and agrarian reform in the mid-1950s. The village was 
meant to serve as a pilot project for the rehousing of Matera’s estimated 15,000 
cave dwellers which would then be replicated in other ‘depressed areas’ 
throughout Italy. As a result it provides an insight into the normative social 
values that the DC looked to promote through its post-war southern reform 
programme in the 1950s, specifically the sanctity of the family which was linked 
to housing conditions. Furthermore, the existing literature on La Martella’s 
                                                             
3 See for example Maristella Casciato, ‘Neorealism in Italian architecture’, in Sarah Williams 
Goldhagen and Réjean Legault (eds.), Anxious Modernisms. Experimentation in Postwar 
Architectural Culture, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 25-53; Mauro Sàito, ‘Quaroni e la 
Martella,’ in Pino Scaglione (ed.), Matera: città di architetti e architetture, Rome, 1999, pp. 
17-18; Paolo Francesco Francione, La Martella. Il più bel borgo rurale d’Italia, Antezza, 
Matera, 2009; Raguso, pp. 69-98; Restucci, pp. 266-272; Restucci and Tafuri, pp. 43-46; 
Sacco, Matera contemporanea; Talamona, pp. 173-204; Chisena, pp. 183-190. 
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history has tended to view the DC’s southern reform programme, and in 
particular land reform, as part of a systematic strategy of social control which 
aimed to transform landless rural workers into small farmers dependent on the 
state. La Martella is viewed as a high-profile example of this strategy in action. 
This chapter will look to reassess these points drawing on previously neglected 
archival sources. 
In the overall context of this thesis, examining La Martella’s depiction in 
official sources will shed further light on how and why Matera became a symbol 
of the southern question in post-war Italy and how this concept was 
appropriated for political ends. If, as the opening quotation suggests, Matera 
was perceived to be emblematic of southern Italy’s economic and social 
problems and La Martella as a potential antidote, analysis of the post-war 
housing project should help to illuminate stereotypical perceptions of the 
Mezzogiorno in political and media circles in 1950s Italy. Owing to its high-
profile role in promoting the intervento straordinario, the history of the La 
Martella project offers historians the opportunity to examine the concrete 
effects that notions of Matera as a symbol of the southern question had on the 
city’s urban and social development. For these reasons the decision was made to 
include a case study of the village as a separate chapter in this research project. 
The chapter will endeavour to investigate how and why representations of La 
Martella were used to promote the DC’s programme of state investment and 
land reform in southern Italy in the 1950s. Moreover, it will look to examine the 
impact that this political and media focus had on the project’s development. 
This will be carried out through the analysis of previously neglected archival 
sources including official newsreels and documentaries, newspaper articles as 
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well as police and prefect reports. Notably La Martella’s residents are largely 
absent from existing studies of the village. Using letters of protest and petitions 
from residents found in the state archive at Matera, this chapter hopes to make a 
modest contribution to including their perspectives in the village’s historical 
narrative. The chapter starts with a concise history of La Martella’s planning and 
construction. Second, it focuses on how the village’s inauguration was depicted 
in the mass media. The third section examines images of Matera and La Martella 
in documentary films produced by the Centro Documentazione in the 1950s to 
promote government reform southern Italy. The fourth and final section 
outlines the various problems encountered during the early years of the La 
Martella project and their impact on the nascent community’s development. 
 
4.1 A brief history of Il Borgo La Martella 
 
La Martella was originally conceived as an UNRRA-CASAS pilot project to 
rehouse 200 of the Sassi’s poorest families. In November 1950, UNRRA-CASAS 
established the Commissione per l’incremento economico e sociale headed by 
Guido Nadzo and Adriano Olivetti.4 The committee’s aim was to examine the 
                                                             
4  Guido Nadzo was an official in UNRRA-CASAS and the European Cooperation 
Administration’s Housing and Public Works Italian division. For additional information on 
Nadzo’s activity in Italy see Talamona, pp. 173-204. Adriano Olivetti (1901-1960) was an 
industrialist, entrepreneur, urban planner, publisher and writer. He was born into a wealthy 
Piedmontese family. His father’s company Olivetti manufactured electrical instruments and 
later specialised in the production of typewriters. Adriano Olivetti became interested in 
politics at a young age and was a contemporary of Piero Gobetti and Carlo Rosselli. In 1924 
his father sent him to the US to observe the industrial methods used in the country’s leading 
factories. In 1933 Olivetti became managing director of the family business and later 
president of the Olivetti Company in 1938. Drawing on his interest in urban planning, 
Olivetti launched a number of social housing and urban planning schemes for his company’s 
employees at its plant in Ivrea. In the post-war period Olivetti combined his interest in 
politics and urban planning. He founded the magazine Comunità in 1946 and re-launched the 
town planning periodical Urbanistica in 1949. Moreover his publishing house Edizioni 
Comunità published a number of influential works on architecture and town planning. 
Olivetti became a member of the Istituto Nazionale di Urbanistica in 1938 and its president 
in 1950. Morever, he became a member of UNRRA-CASAS’s housing committee in 1951 and 
later became the organization’s vice president in 1959. These activities were a springboard 
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socio-economic and urban conditions of a select number of ‘depressed areas’ in 
detail. The results would then be used to plan building and social-assistance 
programmes tailored to the socio-economic needs of each study area. UNRRA-
CASAS received five billion lire from the European Recovery Programme (ERP) 
to carry out this work. Three pilot studies were to be undertaken: an 
agricultural village at La Martella; a fishing village called Porto Conte at Nurra in 
Sardinia (which was never completed); and Orto Nuovo - a residential village for 
artisan families at Cutro in Calabria.5 The overall aim of these projects, which 
Riccardo Musatti profiled in the pages of Olivetti’s quarterly cultural and 
political periodical Comunità, was to plan and construct a number of ‘borghi 
residenziali dotati di tutti i servizi essenziali alla vita di una nuova comunita  
autonoma ... in base a un approfondito studio delle condizioni ambientali e con 
criteri informati alla piu  aggiornata tecnica urbanistica e architettonica.’6 
Rehousing 200 of the Sassi’s poorest residents at La Martella would be the first 
UNRRA-CASAS project planned and carried out according to these guidelines.  
Following De Gasperi’s first visit to Matera in July 1950, however, the 
UNRRA-CASAS project was co-opted into the wider reform programme for the 
Sassi.7 During a meeting held on 26 January 1951 between UNRRA-CASAS and 
Emilio Colombo it was suggested that La Martella become part of the broader 
                                                                                                                                                                            
for the political group Movimento Comunità that Olivetti founded in 1947, whose call for 
federalism and opposition to centralism echoed the programme of the by then defunct 
Action Party. For further information on Olivetti see Davide Cadeddu, Adriano Olivetti 
politico, Edizioni di storia e letteratura, Rome, 2009; Valerio Ochetto, Adriano Olivetti, 
Mondadori, Milan, 1985; and the essays collected in Carlo Olmo (ed.), Costruire la città 
dell’uomo, Einaudi, Turin, 2001. 
5 For a history of the UNRRA-CASAS projects at Nurra and Cutro see Talamona, pp. 187-190.  
6 Riccardo Musatti, ‘I borghi residenziali Unrra Casas’, Comunità, (1952), no. 13, p. 44 
7 The relationship between the Christian Democrats and UNRRA-CASAS is outlined in 
Bernardi, pp. 161-201. 
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state initiative to resolve Matera’s social and economic problems.8 Negotiations 
during April and May of the same year saw the Ente di riforma agree to 
collaborate with UNRRA-CASAS on the La Martella project. The land reform 
board agreed to make a financial contribution to the village’s construction and 
maintenance as well as providing between five and six hectares of newly 
expropriated agricultural land to the village’s future residents.9 As a result the 
construction of the village was organized and financed by two different bodies. 
UNRRA-CASAS was responsible for the planning, financing and building of the 
projected two-hundred dwellings, the kindergarten, the social centre, artisan 
workshops, accommodation for the doctor and midwife, secondary roads as 
well as installing the village’s internal water distribution and sewage systems. 
The building costs would be covered by an ERP Counterpart Fund of 760 
million. The Ente di riforma (funded by the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno), instead, 
was entrusted with financing and building the parish church and rectory, the 
police station, local shops (post office, tobacconist, cafe , trattoria and 
guesthouse), the local council offices, the nursery, school buildings, the doctor’s 
surgery, electrical power lines, the link to the Puglian Aqueduct and the village’s 
main-road infrastructure. The estimated cost of this work was 225 million lire.10 
                                                             
8 Relazione sulla borgata di “La Martella” – Matera, National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA), UC-17 - La Martella; ARC Identifier 4319707 / MLR Number UD 
1262; File Unit from Record Group 469: Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1942-
1963; Department of State. International Cooperation Administration. Mission to Italy. 
Production and Technical Assistance Division. 
9 See letter from Gustavo Colonnetti, president of the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche and 
technical director of UNRRA-CASAS, to Aldo Ramadoro, president of the Ente di Riforma 
fondiaria Puglia e Lucania dated 9 April 1951. NARA, UC-17 - La Martella; ARC Identifier 
4319707 / MLR Number UD 1262; File Unit from Record Group 469: Records of U.S. Foreign 
Assistance Agencies, 1942-1963; Department of State. International Cooperation 
Administration. Mission to Italy. Production and Technical Assistance Division. 
10 See report entitled La Martella Village and Matera’s Cave Dwellers, dated 12 March 1953. 
NARA; ARC Identifier 4319707 / MLR Number UD 1262; File Unit from Record Group 469: 
Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1942-1963; Department of State. International 
Cooperation Administration. Mission to Italy. Production and Technical Assistance Division. 
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Despite the optimistic tone of the official literature produced to promote La 
Martella, the involvement of two separate bodies in the finance, construction 
and maintenance of the village would later result in a number of the project’s 
early problems.11 
In July 1950 the Centro Studi sull’Abitazione, at the behest of UNRRA-
CASAS, had entrusted local architect Ettore Stella and UNRRA-CASAS engineer 
Gian Battista Martoglio to draw up plans for the proposed village. Following 
Stella’s untimely death in February 1951 a group of Rome-based architects and 
engineers, made up of Ludovico Quaroni, Piero Maria Lughi, Michele Valori, 
Federico Gorio and Luigi Agati, were employed to oversee La Martella’s design.12 
A site seven kilometres outside Matera had been identified for the proposed 
village and was approved by UNRRA-CASAS on 16 February 1951. The location 
was chosen in an attempt to create an autonomous community still linked to 
Matera. The village was to be situated equidistant from the provincial capital on 
agricultural land redistributed by the reform board. The aim of this initiative 
was to reduce the hours that Matera’s agricultural workers spent travelling to 
and from their workplace and thus increase agricultural productivity.13  
As outlined in Chapter 3, the idea of building agricultural villages to 
house the Sassi’s inhabitants had been put forward in an ECA financed report 
                                                             
11 See in particular the booklet produced by the Mutual Security Agency (the renamed 
Economic Cooperation Act which administered Marshall Plan funding) entitled Il villaggio La 
Martella to mark La Martella’s inauguration. The pamphlet outlined details of the village’s 
planning, finance and construction and hailed the project as evidence of cooperation 
between UNRRA-CASAS and the land reform board. 
12 See Relazione sulla borgata di “La Martella” – Matera, National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA), UC-17 - La Martella; ARC Identifier 4319707 / MLR Number UD 
1262; File Unit from Record Group 469: Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1942-
1963; Department of State. International Cooperation Administration. Mission to Italy. 
Production and Technical Assistance Division. 
13 Quaroni’s presentation ‘Il borgo La Martella visto dal capo dei progettisti’ to the Italian 
Camera di commercio is reproduced in Antonio Terranova, Ludovico Quaroni: La città fisica, 
Laterza, Rome, 1981, pp. 57-63. 
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from 1950 for the Basento Valley land-reclamation syndicate.14 The study 
highlighted the long distances travelled by the Sassi’s smallholders and landless 
workers to and from agricultural land in Matera’s hinterland. Instead the report 
recommended transferring the estimated 1,100 day labourers and 1,000 small 
landowners that lived in the Sassi to purpose-built rural villages closer to the 
land that they worked. The remaining 900 artisan families would be re-housed 
in specially-built residential districts close to Matera’s urban centre.15 Despite 
pressure from the Ente di riforma to build individual farmhouses instead of the 
centralized agricultural villages favoured by UNRRA-CASAS, the decision was 
made to go with the latter in an attempt to maintain the Sassi’s social ties.16 
Quaroni and his colleagues based their design on the findings of the 
Commissione per lo studio della città dell’agro di Matera carried out by Friedrich 
Friedmann and his team of researchers in 1951.17 An attempt was made to 
recreate the collectivity of the Sassi on a social level in La Martella’s architecture 
and layout. Speaking about the design of La Martella, Quaroni noted it aimed to 
produce ‘una articolazione di superfici, volumi e colori in qualche modo non 
costituire un trauma per chi aveva abbandonato, con le miserie igieniche, la 
felice qualita  plastica dei Sassi e la sua disponibilita  alla vita associata degli 
abitanti.’18 The village was designed with curved streets which coalesced in a 
town centre situated at the top of a hill. Provision was also made in La Martella’s 
plans to build communal ovens on each street echoing one of the Sassi’s 
                                                             
14  Mazzocchi Alemanni and Calia’s report is examined in Chapter 3 of this thesis. See section 
3.1. 
15 See Nallo Mazzocchi Alemanni and Enzo Calia, Il problema dei Sassi di Matera, Consorzio di 
bonifica della Media Valle del Bradano, 1950, pp. 4-8. 
16 Terranova, p. 58 
17 See section 3.4 in Chapter 3 for further information on the work of Friedmann and his team.  
18 Terranova, p. 59 
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distinctive social and urban features. La Martella’s urban design was influenced 
by Adriano Olivetti who sought to develop ‘un modello di sviluppo urbanistico 
capace di far convivere le nuove scienze del territorio con l’attenzione al 
progresso e alla qualita  della vita del singolo e della comunita .’19 This 
philosophy was based on the industrialist’s admiration for the Tennessee Valley 
Authority which had promoted the democratic participation of the people 
affected in its development programmes at a grass-roots level.20  
During the planning stages residents of Matera’s cave dwellings were 
asked to choose their preferred house design from three available possibilities. 
The winning design was then subdivided into two categories: semi-detached 
houses for agricultural workers and distinct houses for artisans. The first 
category featured a kitchen-dining area, three bedrooms, a bathroom, a 
washroom, a storeroom, a barn, a hen-house, and a shed for a horse-drawn cart. 
Notably a small surveillance point, accessible from inside the main structure, 
was built beside each barn. It was large enough for a bed and had a hole in the 
wall at head height. The aim of this feature was to allow residents, who had 
hitherto housed their animals in their homes, to guard against potential 
rustling. The artisan houses were almost identical in design but had a workshop 
instead of a barn. Moreover, each house had a courtyard as well as an allotment 
of 750 metres squared.21   
Construction of La Martella’s road infrastructure started in September 
                                                             
19 Pippo Ciorra, Ludovico Quaroni 1911-1987, Electa, Milano, 1989, p. 105 
20 Casciato, p. 38. For a discussion of the Tennessee Valley Authority’s philosophy see Ekbladh, 
pp. 335-374. 
21 See Relazione per S.E. Il Ministro dei LL.PP. sul Borgo La Martella in agro di Matera, 20 March 
1952, NARA, UC-17 - La Martella; ARC Identifier 4319707 / MLR Number UD 1262; File Unit 
from Record Group 469: Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1942-1963; 
Department of State. International Cooperation Administration. Mission to Italy. Production 
and Technical Assistance Division. For a detailed discussion of La Martella’s architecture see 
Raguso, pp. 77-88. 
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1951 with the building of the first one-hundred houses getting underway in July 
of the same year. Pietro Campilli (Minister of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno), 
local DC leader Emilio Colombo, and Leland Burrows (vice-president of the ECA 
in Italy) officially inaugurated work on the village on 9 September 1951 - seven 
months before the enactment of the Special Law for the Sassi. The image of La 
Martella as a model for southern Italy’s future development was already present 
in press coverage of this event. In the official government press release to ANSA 
dated 8 September 1951, the laying of the first stone at La Martella was 
described as the start of ‘un programma di lavori di grande importanza per il 
risollevamento delle popolazioni agricole meno abbienti del Mezzogiorno.’22 By 
December 1952 the village’s road network was complete while a number of 
public buildings, including the cinema and the church, as well as the first batch 
of houses, were built in the summer of 1953.23 Despite the fact that only forty-
nine houses had been completed and the construction of a number of important 
public buildings had yet to start, De Gasperi inaugurated La Martella on 17 May 
1953. The Italian Prime Minister handed over the keys to the village’s first 
inhabitants in a public ceremony preceded by the formal ‘closing’ of their 
troglodyte homes. Later De Gasperi addressed approximately 30,000 people at 
an election rally held in Matera’s Piazza Vittorio Veneto. These two events 
played an important role in the promotion of the government’s southern reform 
                                                             
22 See ASM, Prefettura, Atti Amministrativi di Gabinetto (Ricovero 1990), busta 83, fascicolo 
675, sottofascicolo 14. The story was covered in a number of newspapers which adopted a 
similar tone and message: Luigi Limongelli, ‘Il risanamento di Matera si associa alle 
redenzione delle campagne Lucane’, Il Popolo, 11 September 1951, p. 12; Marroni, pp. 1 & 3; 
and Gino Spera, ‘Ritorno alla vita civile’, Il Mattino, 10 September, 1951, p. 1. Moreover, an 
official booklet outlining the scope and location of the project was produced to mark the 
inauguration of work on La Martella. See Ente per lo sviluppo della irrigazione e la 
trasformazione fondiaria in Puglia e Lucania, Borgata Rurale La Martella. Per il risanamento 
dei Sassi di Matera, Laterza, Bari, 1951. 
23 Friedmann, Miseria e dignità, p. 74  
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programme ahead of the general election on 7 June 1953.24 The next section will 
examine the depiction of De Gasperi’s election rally and La Martella’s 
inauguration in the national media focusing on how and why the image of La 
Martella was used to promote the DC’s reform policies in southern Italy.  
 
4.2 La Martella in official sources  
 
De Gasperi’s visit to Matera in 1953 received widespread coverage in the Italian 
national media and represents a high-profile moment when Matera was the 
focus of political and press attention. The examination of these media sources is 
crucial to understanding the role that Matera and La Martella played in 
promoting the Christian Democrats’ twin reform programme for southern Italy. 
The historian and journalist Leonardo Sacco has argued that De Gasperi’s 
involvement with the La Martella project was in fact minimal and that the DC 
took undue credit for a project that UNRRA-CASAS had pioneered.25 While De 
Gasperi and the DC may indeed have had a limited role in the planning and 
construction of La Martella as Sacco suggests, the Italian Prime Minister’s visit 
was a key moment in promoting the project nationally and internationally and 
his name would become indelibly linked to the village.26 The fact that De 
                                                             
24  Interviewed in 1993 the former ECA official Vincent Barnett claimed that La Martella had 
been built ‘partly for the symbolism of it, you know. The revivification [and] the renaissance 
of the South were bringing people out of their caves and into modern cities.’ This suggests 
that the La Martella project played a significant role in terms of official propaganda 
promoting reforms in southern Italy. Interview by Eric Christenson and Linda Christenson 
with Dr. Vincent Barnett (European Cooperation Administration Program Chief Italy), 
August 19 1993. 
25 Interview by author with Leonardo Sacco on 20 November 2011.   
26 A plaque placed outside La Martella’s post office and dedicated to De Gasperi was unveiled 
during a public ceremony presided over by Emilio Colombo and Aldo Ramadoro, head of the 
land reform board, on 5 September 1954. The plaque’s text attributes the village’s 
construction to the recently deceased DC leader and featured no mention of UNRRA-CASAS’s 
role in the project: ‘Ad Alcide De Gasperi, Eminente statista, ricostruttore dell’Italia artefice 
di questo solatio borgo sorto dal buio dei Sassi i Martellesi qui lo ricordano grande italiano e 
credente in Cristo in perenne riconoscenza della sua opera di civiltà cristiana esempio e 
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Gasperi chose to inaugurate La Martella, notwithstanding the fact that the 
village had begun its life as an UNRRA-CASAS initiative, suggests that the project 
was perceived to be of national significance in the promotion of the DC’s 
southern reform programme.  
La Martella was officially opened on 17 May 1953 in the run up to the 
general election held one month later. The choice of date for the inauguration 
ceremony was not casual as the special law for the Sassi had been passed 
exactly one year earlier. De Gasperi returned to Matera, however, in what was 
one of the lowest points of his political career. The DC had seen its support fall 
significantly from 48.5 per cent of the polls in the 1948 general election to 35.1 
per cent in the local elections of 1951-1952. At an international level De Gasperi 
was dealing with the question of Trieste, while in domestic politics the Italian 
prime minister had come under fire from the opposition and some members of 
his own party for the enactment of the so-called legge truffa on 13 March 1953. 
This change in electoral law meant that 65 per cent of parliamentary seats 
would be allocated to any party that obtained over 50 per cent of votes.27 Local 
opposition to the legge truffa in the Province of Matera manifested itself in 
strikes by braccianti affiliated to the CIGL and the PCI between December 1952 
and January 1953. On 5 January 1953 over 2,000 people in the town of Irsina in 
the Province of Matera marched behind a banner which read Abassa il Governo, 
Abassa De Gasperi, Non vogliamo la riforma della legge elettorale. Police used 
tear gas and fired shots to break up the demonstration. Scuffles between the 
authorities and protestors left a number of people injured including several 
                                                                                                                                                                            
guida ai governanti e ai popoli.’ The event was covered in the land reform board’s monthly 
publication for assignees Vita Contadina, October 1954, p. 5. 
27 Ginsborg, p. 143 
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carabinieri.28 Opposition to the legge truffa, however, was not restricted to the 
PCI stronghold of Irsina. A letter from the Prefect of Matera to the Italian 
Ministry of the Interior, dated 30 March 1953, noted that 240 of the 605 
workers employed on the construction of La Martella had held a 30 minute 
strike in protest against the new electoral law earlier the same day.29 
The Christian Democrats had suffered disastrous results in the local 
elections of 1951-1952 where its share of votes in southern Italy had dropped 
from the 48.5 per cent of 1948 to 30.3 per cent.30 Togliatti had also accused De 
Gasperi and his party of neglecting to finish the numerous public works projects 
undertaken since the establishment of the southern development programme in 
1950 claiming that: ‘avete [the DC] abbandonato la val d’Agri e andate in giro 
posando dappertutto la prima pietra ma senza mai ultimare i lavori.’31 Thus, the 
Italian Prime Minister’s visit to Matera to inaugurate La Martella provided the 
ideal opportunity to respond to Togliatti’s accusations. By tackling the much 
publicised problem of the Sassi through the construction of a purpose-built 
agricultural village, the DC could claim to be addressing the longstanding and 
broader problem of the questione meridionale. La Martella’s inauguration, 
                                                             
28 For accounts of the widespread popular protest against the legge truffa in the Province of 
Matera see the various police reports dated from December 1952 to April 1953, in ASM, 
Prefettura, Affari di gabinetto (Ricovero 1990), busta 134, fascicolo 1147, sottofascicolo 3, 
Provincia di Matera, elezioni politiche, Discussione alle Camere della nuova legge elettorale e 
manifestazioni di protesta contro la nuova legge. The same file contains a rich amount of 
documentation on the protest at Irsina including details of charges later brought against 36 
protestors.  
29 See letter dated 30 March 1953, in ASM, Prefettura, Affari di gabinetto (Ricovero 1990), 
busta 134, fascicolo 1147, sottofascicolo 3, Provincia di Matera, elezioni politiche, 
Discussione alle Camere della nuova legge elettorale e manifestazioni di protesta contro la 
nuova legge. 
30 For information on the local elections of 1951-1952 see Ginsborg, pp. 141-143. The 
immediacy of the Trieste question is underlined by the headline in the Communist daily 
L’Unità the day after De Gasperi’s visit to Matera: ‘Tracotanti affermazioni di Tito “l’Italia non 
avrà mai Trieste”’, L’Unità 18 May 1953, p. 8. 
31 Togliatti’s quote is reproduced in Raffaele Nigro, ‘Che Sud Fa: Ecco De Gasperi in Basilicata’, 
La Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno, 11 February 2005, p. 1. 
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therefore, was used to promote the work of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno and 
the land reform board with the aim of winning back the votes lost in southern 
Italy at the local elections of 1951-1952 prior to the upcoming general election 
in June 1953.  
Official sources covering De Gasperi’s second visit to Matera presented 
the event as a triumphant return. Three years on from his first visit to the city 
the Italian Prime Minister had kept his promise about resolving the questione 
materana. These themes are found in La Settimana INCOM’s newsreel Panorama 
pre-elettorale. De Gasperi a Matera. Meda a Milano. Bonomi a Frosinone which 
covers De Gasperi’s pre-election rally at Matera.32 The opening shot is a 
panorama of a packed Piazza Vittorio Veneto (Matera’s main square). The crowd 
hold banners in support of De Gasperi and the Christian Democrats. The voice-
over informs the viewer that the assembled crowd: ‘Applaudano al presente e 
all’avvenire. Oggi De Gasperi ha chiuso i primi Sassi. Ha assegnato le prime 50 
case del borgo La Martella.’33 An image of children cheering and applauding cuts 
to a mid-shot of De Gasperi standing on a stage under the banner: ‘Democrazia 
Cristiana: al servizio dell’Italia. A Matera si inizia il miracolo del superamento 
delle zone depresse’. This shot cuts to a montage of crowd scenes and close-ups 
in which De Gasperi speaks to the assembled audience. The voice-over 
summarises the salient points of the Italian Prime Minister’s speech: ‘Tutti i 
comuni della Lucania, dice, adesso avranno acqua e fognature. Sono stati spesi 
47 miliardi in sette anni. Noi non formuliamo promesse mirabolanti. 
                                                             
32 For the history and dissemination of official newsreels and documentaries see section 4.3 
below.  
33 Panorama pre-elettorale. De Gasperi a Matera. Meda a Milano. Bonomi a Frosinone (Italy, 
1953). 
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Promettiamo cose di cui prevediamo la soluzione.’34 Produced in the context of 
the forthcoming general election, the newsreel’s rhetorical message is explicit: 
the Christian Democrats are the party that deliver concrete solutions to Italy’s 
post-war problems. The transfer of 50 families from the Sassi to La Martella was 
used in official sources to illustrate this point.  
 Coverage of De Gasperi’s visit to Matera and La Martella in the Christian 
Democrat organ Il Popolo adopted a similar structure to the newsreel footage 
examined above. Two distinct images of the South were juxtaposed: the 
impoverished, backward and primitive Mezzogiorno of the Liberal and Fascist 
eras and the rapidly developing post-war South of the Christian Democrats. 
These two concepts were represented by the Sassi and La Martella respectively. 
Similar to their description in Carlo Levi’s Cristo si è fermato a Eboli, Il Popolo 
depicted the Sassi as Other to ideas of modernity. Matera’s iconic cave dwellings 
were presented as an embarrassing monument to the Italian state’s persistent 
neglect of southern Italy. Sixteen thousand men, women and children, it was 
claimed, were still residing in prehistoric conditions at the end of the Fascist 
ventennio. Families lived and died in cavernous homes which they were forced 
to share with their livestock.35 In contrast to past failures Il Popolo presented De 
Gasperi as ‘il salvatore del Mezzogiorno’ who ‘con un colpo solo ha cancellato un 
antico oblio vergognoso.’36 By closing a number of Sassi and rehousing the 
residents in new accommodation, the Christian Democrat newspaper claimed 
                                                             
34  Ibid. 
35 ‘Per tanti secoli il popolo di Matera ha accumulato meste giornate all’insegna della 
sofferenza e dell’inedia; per venti anni, durante la dittatura, dei “sassi” non si parlò agli 
italiani; essi ignorano che a Matera era sopravissuto un frammento dell’età paleolitica e che 
16 mila uomini donne e bambini con le mule e le loro casse ad un passo del letto, vivevano e 
morivano in buchi scavati nella roccia viva, come i nostri antenati nelle epoche tramandate 
dalla leggenda.’ Sandro Bevilacqua, ‘Il borgo “La Martella” ha accolto i primi abitanti’, Il 
Popolo, 18 May 1953, p. 1. 
36 Ibid., p. 1 
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that De Gasperi was tackling a national shame which no previous Italian 
government had been able to resolve.37 La Martella’s inauguration was 
portrayed as the first step in this process; it was presented as a concrete 
example of the government maintaining its election promises. 38    
Despite the fact that La Martella was incomplete on 17 May 1953, Il 
Popolo presented the project as a model-agricultural village and prototype for 
southern Italy’s future development. First, the article noted that the nascent 
community was served by a specially-built road network and water 
infrastructure.39 Second, the feature underlined that the new villagers were 
involved in the selection of what kind of housing had been built. In contrast to 
the Sassi’s inhospitable cave dwellings, the houses at La Martella were 
described as the epitome of a modern home complete with, amongst other 
features, three bedrooms, a dining room, a bathroom and an allotment.40 Third, 
the village was furnished with the essential public services needed in a 
functioning rural community: municipal buildings, a church, a post office, a 
                                                             
37 ‘Traducendo in realtà di azione politica e sociale una legge provvidenziale, il presidente del 
consiglio De Gasperi ha assistito alla chiusura delle prime grotte dei “sassi”, una piaga 
sinistramente famosa di questa città ed ha solennemente riaffermato l’impegno preso nel 
luglio 1950: l’opera di risanamento di una delle zone più infelici della penisola, abbandonata 
per secoli ad un destino di tristezza e di miseria, di disperazione e di morte, come appare in 
un celebre racconto, continuerà gigantesca e appassionata.’ Ibid., p. 1 
38 The coverage of De Gaperi’s inauguration of La Martella was mirrored in the weekly 
newspaper Il Giornale del Mezzogiorno as well as the monthly magazine Vita contadina in 
Puglia, Lucania e Molise. Both publications present Matera and La Martella as symbols of the 
past and the future of southern Italy respectively. Moreover, La Martella’s inauguration is 
used as an example of the Christian Democrat government maintaining its promises. See 
Giacomo Etna, ‘Da Eboli Cristo riprende la Marcia’, Il Giornale del Mezzogiorno, 25 May 1953, 
pp. 2 & 4 and Vita contadina in Puglia, Lucania e Molise, June 1953, pp. 8-9. Unfortunately 
distribution figures for both publications have not been forthcoming. La Martella’s 
inauguration was also covered in the English press which echoed the Italian coverage cited 
above. See ‘New Village for Cave Dwellers. Signor De Gasperi in South Italy’, The Times, 18 
May 1953, p. 6 and ‘Rehousing Italy’s Cave-Dwellers. Government’s Land Reform in South’, 
The Manchester Guardian, 19 May 1953, p. 7. 
39 ‘Questo borgo sorge su una altura al nord della strada Matera-Timmari. Ottimi collegamenti 
stradali lo allacciano alla rotabile già e con la comunale Gravina-Matera: è allacciato alla rete 
idrica dell’acquedotto pugliese ed alla rete della Società Lucana per le imprese 
idroelettriche.’ Sandro Bevilacqua, ‘Il borgo “La Martella”’, p. 1 
40 Ibid., p. 1 
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police station, a nursery, an elementary school, a vocational training workshop, 
a social assistance office, agricultural warehouses, and a general store.41 Finally, 
La Martella’s description in Il Popolo made it clear that the village’s construction 
was a direct result of cooperation between the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, the 
agricultural reform board and UNRRA-CASAS, i.e. the Christian Democrat 
government and US financial assistance.42  
During his speech at Matera, De Gasperi highlighted the importance of 
ERP funds to government reform in southern Italy. The Italian Prime Minister 
noted that ‘gli aiuti americani hanno contribuito alla risoluzione di molti 
problemi.’43 In the context of the upcoming election, however, the DC leader 
underlined that this investment would dry up if Italy changed sides in the Cold 
War: ‘non si puo  abbandonare la collaborazione politica internazionale, se non 
rinunciando ad una cooperazione soprattutto finanziaria ed economica.’44 While 
the DC presented itself as the party which continued to deliver reform in 
southern Italy, in contrast, the opposition parties on both the Left and the Right 
were described as obstacles to the Mezzogiorno’s continued development: ‘Non 
solo dall’estrema sinistra, ma anche dalla destra, si tenta di rallentare lo sforzo 
di ricostruzione, di rinascita: questo e  un tradimento e chi lo compie ne dovra  
                                                             
41 ‘Nel borgo – esso realizza una delle più superbe imprese del Governo democratico nel campo 
sociale e porta una luce di speranza in tante vite finora sgomente da un’inguaribile tristezza 
– trovano sede la delegazione comunale, la chiesa canonica, l’ufficio postale, la caserma dei 
carabinieri, l’asilo-nido e quello infantile, la scuola elementare, i laboratori per l’istruzione 
professionale, il centro per l’assistenza sociale, il centro aziendale con silos e  magazzini, il 
centro zootecnico, l’autorimessa con officina, le botteghe artigiane e i negozi di prima 
necessità.’ Ibid., p. 1 
42 ‘Il borgo della Martella – è una vera e propria cittadina innalzata con fondi dello stato con 
una spesa di miliardi  – è stato realizzato con finanziamenti della Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, 
tramite l’Ente di Riforma Puglia e Lucania per gli edifici pubblici, e con finanziamenti 
dell’Unrra-Casas per le abitazioni.’ Ibid., p. 1 
43 Ibid., p. 1 
44 Ibid., p. 1 
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pagare le conseguenze.’45 In the context of the coming election and the onset of 
the Cold War, therefore, Matera and La Martella were used as symbols of the 
Mezzogiorno’s past and the future. Through the depiction of the village’s 
inauguration the Christian Democrat leadership looked to communicate the 
message that it was delivering a concrete answer to the southern question. 
Furthermore, this solution was being achieved through the combined efforts of 
government reform and the ERP.46    
Predictably the Communist daily L’Unità offered a conflicting account of 
La Martella’s inauguration and De Gasperi’s pre-election rally at Matera. In 
contrast to the triumphalism found in official sources, Giorgio Amendola’s front-
page article, ‘Un inutile viaggio elettorale’ provided the Communist Party with 
the opportunity to launch a counter-offensive against Christian Democrat 
propaganda.47 The coverage of La Martella’s inauguration suggests that the 
village was of political importance in the context of the upcoming general 
election. L’Unità accused the DC of using public money to stage manage the 
election rally at Matera. The article claimed that employees of the Cassa per il 
                                                             
45 ‘Testimonianza di fraternità nazionale per le popolazioni dei “Sassi” lucani’, Il Popolo, 18 May 
1953, p. 1 
46 A monthly report from the chief of the local carabiniere, Salvatore Auriemma, to the Prefect 
of Matera dated 27 May 1953 suggests that the official propaganda campaign surrounding La 
Martella’s inauguration had an immediate impact at a local level in the build up to the  
general election of the same year: ‘Il partito democratico cristiano ha particolarmente 
sfruttato come propagandistico l’inaugurazione del nuovo borgo rurale “La Martella” nel 
comune di Matera, destinato ad accogliere una parte degli abitanti dei Sassi. L’inaugurazione 
ha avuto luogo il giorno 17 alla presenza del Presidente del Consiglio On/le De Gasperi. Con 
un grande comizio cui hanno partecipato circa 30 mila persone il succitato partito ha dato 
prova di aver raggiunta una solida organizzazione capillare e di essersi creato un notevole 
seguito in seno alla classe contadina. L’inaugurazione del nuovo borgo “La Martella”, nonché 
l’assicurazione che con la costituzione di altri villaggi rurali troveranno comoda e dignitosa 
abitazione gran parte delle famiglie che in atto alloggiano nelle “grotte” di Matera, famiglie 
che oltre la casa avranno anche terra ed assistenza, hanno segnato un punto non 
indifferente, ai fini elettorali, a favore della democrazia cristiana, in seno alla classe 
interessata.’ ASM, Prefettura, Atti Amministrativi di Gabinetto (Ricovero 1990), busta 82, 
fascicolo 669, sottofascicolo M,  Risanamento dei Sassi. Legge 17 maggio 1952, n. 619: Varie. 
47 Giorgio Amendola, ‘Un inutile viaggio elettorale’, L’Unità, 22 May 1953, p. 1 
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Mezzogiorno, under orders from their superiors, were ferried to Matera in 
trucks. Moreover, it alleged that the local prefect, police chief and state 
functionaries had been mobilised to organise the Christian Democrats’ day of 
pre-electoral propaganda.48  
However, according to Amendola, these efforts had been rendered 
ineffective by the village’s incomplete state. In contrast to official sources, 
L’Unità presented a negative image of La Martella. Rather than a model for 
southern development, it was argued, the village illustrated the failure of the 
government’s reform programme. The PCI organ reported that De Gasperi was 
meant to inaugurate ‘la piu  grande opera del regime del Mezzogiorno, l’unica 
portata a termine in cinque anni.’49 La Martella was billed in official sources as 
the first step in tackling the national shame embodied by the Sassi and by 
implication the southern question. Instead, Amendola stated, the Italian Prime 
Minister had handed over the keys to ‘22 casette di tufo mal costruite’ while 
3,000 families remained living in Matera’s cave dwellings.50 The article argued 
that the government could not even take credit for these hastily constructed 
buildings as they had been paid for by UNRRA-CASAS and not the 5 billion lire 
allocated under the special law for the Sassi. The implication was that rather 
than being a project to celebrate, La Martella embodied the government’s failure 
to tackle a national shame.51 
The failure to complete the La Martella project, as well as delays in 
                                                             
48 Ibid., p. 1 
49 Ibid., p. 1 (italics appear in original text) 
50 Ibid., p. 1 
51  ‘A Matera, dove più severo si leva dal Sasso l’atto di accusa del popolo meridionale contro i 
governi e le vecchie classi dirigenti, responsabili di quella e di altre vergogne, a Matera erano 
stati concentrati i massimi sforzi del governo dell’on. De Gasperi, che aveva assunto 
personalmente un “impegno d’onore”.’ Ibid. p. 1 
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constructing the additional rural villages and residential neighbourhoods 
proposed under the provisions of the special law for Matera, were blamed on 
the government’s southern reform programme. Amendola criticised the Cassa 
per il Mezzogiorno for wasting money and corrupting local politics. It was, he 
argued, ‘un nuovo cancro della vita meridionale, centro di speculazioni e di 
corruzione.’52 Moreover, the agricultural reform authorities were branded ‘nuovi 
esosi padroni, che agiscono contro i contadini assegnatari con tutto un pesante e 
costoso apparato burocratico.’53 The unfinished village of La Martella, according 
to Amendola, exemplified the failings of these two reform bodies.54 Thus, 
L’Unità’s 500,000 readers were presented with a negative image of La Martella 
in the run up to the general election on 7 June 1953. In contrast to the official 
image of the purpose-built rural village as the future of Mezzogiorno, the PCI 
daily depicted a project which embodied the government’s failure to resolve the 
problem of the Sassi and by implication the southern question.55  
Communist Party complaints about the failure to complete La Martella in 
time for its ceremonial opening were fully justified. As noted above just forty-
nine of the projected two-hundred houses were completed in time for De 
Gasperi’s visit and a number of public buildings had yet to be started. The PCI’s 
interest in La Martella, however, needs to be seen in the context of the upcoming 
general election and its accompanying propaganda campaign. Arguably the 
project was at too early a stage to be condemned to failure. The Communist 
                                                             
52 Ibid., p. 1 
53 Ibid., p. 1 
54 ‘I risultati di questi metodi si sono potuti ammirare a Matera. Su questi metodi, sul modo 
come viene speso dalla Cassa e dagli Enti il pubblico denaro, dovrà essere fatta luce al più 
presto, per indicare e colpire i responsabili.’  Ibid., p. 1 
55 The Giornale d’Italia attacked Amendola’s article in an editorial entitle ‘Rapaci nel cielo del 
Sud’. The article branded Amendola a liar and accused him of presenting misleading facts 
ahead of the general election. ‘Rapaci nel cielo del Sud’, Giornale d’Italia, 25 May 1953, p. 1. 
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Party’s relative silence on subsequent difficulties that the new-born community 
faced (which are examined in detail below) suggests that Amendola’s criticism 
of La Martella reflected a predictable attempt to win votes in the forthcoming 
election rather than a deep concern for the welfare and long-term development 
of a project for which his party had ultimately, albeit reluctantly, voted in favour. 
Thus Matera and La Martella became sites of political contest between the DC 
and PCI in the lead-up to the general election of 1953. Both parties used Matera 
as a symbol of the southern question in their pre-electoral propaganda. The 
Christian Democrats presented La Martella as the first step in resolving 
southern Italy’s economic and social problems. Conversely, for the Communist 
party the purpose-built village embodied the shortcomings of the government’s 
southern reform programme. It was DC rhetoric, unsurprisingly, which 
dominated representations of La Martella in government commissioned 
documentaries in the 1950s. The Sassi were presented as a symbol of the 
southern question and a national shame while La Martella, in contrast, 
embodied the impact that the government’s reform programme had made in 
southern Italy. Furthermore, as one of the first new villages to be completed in 
the context of land reform, documentary footage depicting La Martella provided 
an opportunity to present the social values that the Christian Democrats looked 
to promote in the mid-1950s, in particular the sanctity of the home and the 
Christian family. The next section will examine this official documentary footage 
in detail.  
 
4.3 Matera and La Martella in Centro Documentazione 
films 
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Alcide De Gasperi established the Centro di documentazione della Presidenza 
del consiglio dei ministri della Repubblica italiana in 1951. It was headed by 
Gastone Silvano Spinetti who had worked in the Fascist government press office 
before moving on to the Ministero della Cultura Popolare. The primary role of 
the Centro Documentazione according to Spinetti was ‘to document and 
disseminate, both at home and abroad, information on activities of the public 
administration, with a special focus on reconstruction.’56 Visual media was the 
Centro Documentazione’s preferred method for achieving these aims. It 
produced an illustrated magazine entitled Documenti di vita italiana while the 
photographic and film department produced posters, photos as well as 
newsreels and documentaries. The Centro Documentazione commissioned 
approximately 200 short films and documentaries during its nine-year lifespan 
from private production companies including Documento Film, Astra, Orizzonte 
Cinematografico, Atlante, Gamma, the reconstituted Istituto Luce and La 
Settimana INCOM.57 In order to ensure the dissemination of government 
documentaries throughout the peninsula, the Centro Documentazione issued a 
number of directives: official documentaries and newsreels had to be shown 
during the interval at feature films; production companies had to inform 
                                                             
56 Quoted in Maria Adelaide Frabotta, ‘Government Propaganda: Official Newsreels and 
Documentaries in the 1950s’, in Luciano Cheles and Lucio Sponza (eds.), The Art of 
Persuasion. Political Communication in Italy from 1945 to the 1990s, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 2001, p. 51. Unfortunately a large number of the files covering the 
activities of the Centro Documentazione listed in the inventory of the Archivio Centrale dello 
Stato in Rome have been misplaced. However, an English-language magazine from May 1951 
entitled Italian Affairs and an Italian-language magazine entitled L’Italia del popolo were 
located. Both magazines looked to publicize the Italian government’s post-war 
reconstruction efforts. See ACS, MI, Gabinetto, fasc. permanenti, Atti, Enti e Associazioni, 
busta 29 - 1, fasc. 879 E/1. 
57  Paola Bonifazio, ‘Work, Welfare, Bio-Politics: Italian and American Film Propaganda of the 
Reconstruction in the Age of Neorealism’, The Italianist, (2011), no. 31, p.157. For a 
comprehensive study of Centro Documentazione produced films see Bonifazio, Narrating 
Modernization; and Maria Adelaide Frabotta, Il governo filma l’Italia, Bulzoni editore, Rome, 
2002. 
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regional press offices of when and where newsreels were projected on a weekly 
basis; and official films were to be shown for a period of at least four days. With 
the number of cinemas in Italy rising from 14,676 in October 1952 to 15,500 in 
September 1953 cinematic images were more widely disseminated in Italy in 
the 1950s than ever before.58 Moreover, Centro Documentazione films were 
shown throughout the peninsula and islands via mobile cinema trucks. A 1956 
communique  from the Ministry of the Interior to various prefects noted that the 
aim of the cinemobili was to ‘proiettare ogni sera gratuitamente documentari di 
attualita  sull’opera di ricostruzione realizzata dal Governo nel dopoguerra e 
cortometraggi di varieta  nelle varie localita  d’Italia.’59 The importance of film as 
a medium of communication in a country with an illiteracy rate of 12.9 per cent 
in 1951 is summed up by Domenico Paolella, editor in chief and director of La 
Settimana INCOM: ‘In those days [the immediate post-war period] our 
newsreels represented the only audiovisual medium that showed Italians what 
was going on, given that television only started in 1954.’60 Therefore official 
newsreels and documentaries received wide circulation at a popular level 
during the scope of this study.   
 Centro Documentazione films and newsreels focused on Italy’s post-war 
reconstruction and emphasized the role that government reform and foreign aid 
played in this process. Although they were produced in the same historical 
                                                             
58 Frabotta, ‘Government Propaganda’, p. 52 
59 For details of the activities of Centro Documentazione mobile cinemas in 1956 see ACS, MI, 
Gabinetto, fasc. permanenti, Atti, Enti e Associazioni, busta 289, fascicolo 879/E. Moreover, 
documents found in the Archivio Sturzo in Rome reveal that in 1953 the DC’s propaganda 
office came to an agreement with Universal Films and Metro Goldwyn Mayer which allowed 
American feature films to be shown in local party headquarters and via its mobile cinema 
units in an attempt to attract more people to see DC propaganda films. See Archivio Storico 
dell’Istituto Luigi Sturzo (ASILS), Fondo Democrazia Cristiana (FDC), Segreteria politica, Atti 
dei segretari, 5, Guido Gonella, Uffici centrali, Circolari, scatola 11, fascicolo 13, Spes (1953). 
60 Frabotta, ‘Government Propaganda’, p. 5. For Italian literacy rates in the 1950s see Ginsborg, 
p. 440. 
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context as so-called Italian Neorealist cinema, the government sponsored films 
were diametrically opposed in style, tone and narrative structure to the works 
of, for example, De Sica, De Santis and Germi.61 While Neorealism focused on the 
uncertainties, difficulties and frustrations of a country in the aftermath of the 
Second World War and over twenty years of Fascist rule, the Centro 
Documentazione, in contrast, focused on reconstruction, economic growth and 
productivity. Consequently, the Centro Documentazione reduced the 
complexities of post-war Italy to images which eschewed the perceived 
verisimilitude of Neorealism, instead offering a more positive view of the 
present and an optimistic vision of the country’s future.62  
The British documentary tradition had a notable impact on the style, 
tone and narrative structure of Italian post-war reconstruction 
documentaries.63 The state- and commercially-sponsored British documentary 
movement roughly spanned the period 1929-1952 and produced over one 
thousand films. It was pioneered and heavily influenced by the Scottish 
filmmaker John Grierson. Grierson, who produced films for the Empire 
Marketing Board, the General Post Office, and later the British Ministry of 
Information during the Second World War, famously declared that: ‘I look on 
                                                             
61 Pierre Sorlin, ‘“La Settimana INCOM” messaggera del futuro: verso la società dei consumi’, in 
Augusto Sainati (ed.), La Settimana INCOM. Cinegiornali e informazione negli anni ‘50, 
Edizioni Lindau, Turin, 2002, p. 76. Notably Paola Bonifazio has identified the similarity of 
social situations and characters in a number of prominent neorealist films and government 
documentaries. She convincingly argues that the Centro Documentazione appears to have 
reacted to social issues addressed in Italian post-war cinema. However, in contrast to the 
bleak tone and lack of narrative resolution in many so-called neorealist films, the official 
documentaries have happy endings and reflect the values of reconstruction: hope for the 
future and employment. Italy’s social and economic problems are resolved thanks to 
government intervention and foreign financial aid. See Bonifazio, ‘Work, Welfare, Bio-
Politics’, pp. 155-180. 
62 Pierre Sorlin, Italian National Cinema, Routledge, London, 1996, p. 86 
63  Bonifazio, ‘Work, Welfare, Bio-Politics’, pp. 157-158 
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cinema as a pulpit and use it as a propagandist.’64 He believed that propaganda 
films were an essential tool for engaging and educating the wider public in a 
functioning mass democracy, and his theories on the role that government-
sponsored documentary films could play in instructing and informing 
democratic citizens were translated into Italian in the early post-war period.65 
Furthermore, the narrative structure of Griersonian documentaries appears to 
have influenced Centro Documentazione productions. The Griersonian 
documentary featured what Brian Winston has dubbed a ‘problem moment’ at 
the heart of its narrative; the social problem highlighted could be resolved if 
‘society is given over to the enlightened managers of industry and the experts in 
government.’66 As a result, Griersonian documentaries replaced in-depth 
analysis of social problems with a deus-ex-macchina resolution to the problems 
highlighted. Moreover, they communicated the message that no action was 
needed from the viewer apart from placing their trust in official experts and 
bureaucrats.67 This narrative structure was adopted in Centro Documentazione 
films. The social and economic problems they highlighted in post-war Italy were 
later resolved through a combination of state intervention and foreign aid.68  
The work of American documentary film-maker Pare Lorentz was 
                                                             
64  Quoted in Jack C. Ellis and Betsy A. McLane, A New History of Documentary Film, Continuum, 
London, 2005, p. 71. 
65  See Bonifazio, ‘Work, Welfare, Bio-Politics’, p. 158. Writing in 1942 about the need for 
propaganda in democratic societies Grierson claimed that ‘it is your democrat who most 
needs and demands guidance from his leaders. It is the democratic leader who most must 
give it. If only for the sake of quick decision and common action, it is democracy for which 
propaganda is the more urgent necessity.’ Quoted in John Grierson, ‘The Nature of 
Propaganda’, in Forsyth Hardy (ed.), Grierson on Documentary, Faber and Faber, London, 
1979, p. 109.  
66  Brian Winston, Claiming the Real. The Documentary Film Revisited, British Film Institute, 
London, 1999, p. 45  
67  Ibid., p. 47  
68  Bonifazio, ‘Work, Welfare, Bio-Politics’, pp. 157-158 
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another notable influence on Centro Documentazione productions.69 He 
produced films for the Resettlement Administration, a US federal agency 
established in the mid-1930s to relocate urban and rural workers displaced by 
the Dust Bowl to new state planned communities, and then in 1938 helped to 
create the United States Film Service. His two most important films in terms of 
their influence on Italian documentary makers were The Plow that Broke the 
Plains (1936) and The River (1937). The former examined the origins of the dust 
storms which afflicted the American Great Plains in the 1930s, while the latter 
film showcased the work that the Tennessee Valley Authority had carried out in 
the Mississippi Valley during the 1930s in an attempt to gain popular support 
for further state investment in the area. Lorentz’s films aimed to justify the need 
for expensive and at times unpopular official reform programmes.70 Similar to 
the Griersonian School of documentaries, ‘social problems were presented as 
passing phenomena, actively being corrected by the officials paying for the 
film.’71 Centro Documentazione films aimed to fulfil a similar function in the 
context of post-war Italy and appear to have taken their cue from Lorentz’s most 
famous works.  A supplemental element of Lorentz’s film-making that seems to 
have influenced Centro Documentazione productions is his use of score which 
integrated contemporary elements from folk and popular music. Virgil 
Thomson’s original scores for The Plow that Broke the Plains and The River, for 
example, incorporated elements from indigenous traditional music that reflect 
each film’s historical context and geographical setting. Meticulous attention was 
paid to writing and editing scores, ensuring that they dove-tailed smoothly with 
                                                             
69  For a detailed yet succinct outline of Lorentz’s career see Ellis and McLane, p. 81-91.  
70  Paul Wells, ‘The Documentary Form: Personal and Social ‘Realities’’, in Jill Nelmes (ed.), An 
Introduction to Film Studies, Routledge, London, 1996, p. 181  
71  Winston, p. 73  
225 
 
the film’s visuals.72 Both of these elements can be found in a number of official 
Italian post-war documentaries. Echoes of folk music can be heard in the 
musical accompaniment to Centro Documentazione films depending on the 
regional setting and it is clear that individual scores were composed specifically 
to balance the accompanying narrative and images. 
Italian reform documentaries used a past-to-present narrative structure 
to promote the image of a country that was evolving rapidly. Writing about the 
output of La Settimana INCOM, but applicable to Centro Documentazione films 
in general, Pierre Sorlin notes that: ‘beginning with a quick glimpse of the past, 
they stressed the improvements introduced by modern techniques and 
contrasted old ploughs with tractors or derelict farmhouses with hygienic 
modern cowsheds.’73 The past-to-present narrative structure gave the viewer 
the sense that not only was she or he witnessing Italy’s post-war 
transformation, but that they were actively taking part in it themselves.74 
Moreover, the narrative structure employed in Centro Documentazione films 
meant that Italy’s post-war social and economic problems could be presented as 
the legacy of Fascist rule against which the government reconstruction and 
reform efforts could be directly contrasted.75  
Following the implementation of land reform and the Cassa per il 
Mezzogiorno in 1950, southern Italy and the Islands featured heavily in Centro 
Documentazione films as the Italian government looked to promote its twin 
                                                             
72  See Ellis and McLane, p. 82-84.  
73 Sorlin, Italian National Cinema, p. 86 
74 Paola Bonifazio, ‘Italian Documentary Filmmakers and the Christian Democratic Road to 
Hegemony’, in Eugenio Bolongaro, Mark Epstein and Rita Gagliano (eds.), Creative 
Interventions: The Role of Intellectuals in Contemporary Italy, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
Newcastle, 2009, p. 60 
75 David Forgacs and Steven Gundle, Mass Culture and Society from Fascism to the Cold War, 
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2007, p. 218 
226 
 
reform programme. The primary intention of official films and newsreels 
depicting southern Italy was to promote the process of modernization, the 
development of southern agriculture and the effects of the Cassa per il 
Mezzogiorno. The protagonist of this transformation was the Italian state.76 
Paola Bonifazio has argued that Centro Documentazione films challenged the 
existence of divisive cultural differences between northern and southern Italy. 
Rather they focused on the perceived economic disparity between North and 
South. Southern economic backwardness was presented as a by-product of 
previous governments’ mismanagement combined with natural factors such as 
malaria, landslides, and the shortage of water. These problems would be 
overcome, it was claimed, thanks to the Italian government’s investment in 
infrastructure and new technology. Instead of cultural differences between 
North and South, Bonifazio contends, official reconstruction documentaries 
presented a discourse of modernization in which the dichotomy was ‘between 
those who work and those who are idle, between those who have a family and 
those who do not have one.’77 These points are reflected in the documentaries 
depicting Matera and La Martella examined below. Emphasis is placed on the 
need to provide new homes, improved employment conditions, and cement 
existing family bonds. The government-sponsored films underline the 
importance of patriarchal family values and the potential of southern Italy’s 
natural resources and workforce. Predictably non-domestic work depicted in 
Centro Documentazione films is male dominated. Women, in contrast, are 
mainly presented as mothers and housewives with a few notable exceptions.78  
                                                             
76 Frabotta, ‘Government Propaganda’, p. 55 
77 Bonifazio, ‘Italian Documentary Filmmakers’, p. 59 
78  See Bonifazio, ‘Work, Welfare, Bio-Politics’, pp.173-177.   
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Writing about the geography of film Jeff Hopkins contends that ‘the 
cinematic landscape is not … a neutral place of entertainment or an objective 
documentation or mirror of the “real”, but an ideologically charged cultural 
creation whereby meanings of place and society are made, legitimized, 
contested, and obscured.’79 The depiction of Matera and La Martella in 
government-sponsored documentaries exemplifies this point. The choice of 
camera angles, shots, soundtrack, voice-over, and editing made in the 
production of these films shaped how the three-dimensional profilmic space 
situated in front of the camera was presented as a two-dimensional film 
image.80 This process was politically charged. The illusionary cinematic 
landscape that these documentaries created aimed to promote government 
intervention in southern Italy and at the same time convey the societal values 
that the Christian Democrats looked to foster in post-war Italy. This cinematic 
space drew on and at the same time reinforced the concept that the Sassi were 
emblematic of the southern question. It created stereotypical images of the 
Mezzogiorno which were viewed by thousands of Italians. The chronological 
analysis of official documentaries depicting Matera and La Martella will provide 
an insight into how these ideas changed and developed during the 1950s.  
 
Accade in Lucania 
 
La Martella is featured in the documentary film Accade in Lucania (1953) which 
                                                             
79  Jeff Hopkins, ‘A Mapping of Cinematic Places: Icons, Ideology, and the Power of 
(Mis)representation’, in Stuart C. Aitken and Leo E. Zonn (eds.), Place, Power, Situation and 
Spectacle. A Geography of Film, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, London 1994, pp. 47-65. 
80  This framework for examining space in cinema draws on Natalie Fullwood, ‘Commedie al 
femminile: The Gendering of Space in Three Films by Antonio Pietrangeli’, Italian Studies, vol. 
65 (March, 2010), no. 1, pp. 85-106; and David Forgacs, ‘Antonioni: Space, Place, Sexuality’, 
in Myrto Konstantarakos (ed.), Spaces in European Cinema, Intellect, Exeter, 2000, pp. 101-
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showcases the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno’s public works programme in 
Basilicata. The documentary presents the region as one of Italy’s most 
underdeveloped territories which is undergoing a dramatic transformation 
thanks to government investment. The ten-minute film focuses on four distinct 
topics: irrigation, the region’s road network, its inadequate housing situation, 
and finally education. La Martella is used to highlight the impact that 
government intervention has had on Basilicata’s housing problems and to 
communicate the message that the move to modern housing strengthens rather 
than weakens traditional family bonds. The narrator informs the viewer that ‘tra 
le zone depresse d’Italia la Lucania godeva di un triste primato. Non si trattava 
di migliorare una situazione economica precaria, ma di creare tutto dal nulla o 
quasi.’81 The sequence begins with an extreme long shot of a hill-top town 
situated high above deserted country plains. It then cuts to an extreme long shot 
of the gravina, or valley which acts as the natural border to Matera’s Sassi, 
before cutting to a long shot of an abandoned farm house, a truck crossing a 
river at a ford, and shepherds tending to their flock on abandoned flatland. The 
discordant orchestral score used in the film’s opening sequence adds to the 
sense of desolation that the voice-over and visual images convey. La Martella is 
central to the sequence which focuses on housing. A shot of a hill-top town is 
juxtaposed with a montage of new farmhouses that the land reform board has 
built. The accompanying voice-over presents a stereotypical image of the 
prevailing urban makeup of southern Italy: ‘nel Meridione, la casa colonica era 
pressoche  sconosciuta. La popolazione rurale si era concentrata in grossi 
                                                             
81 Francesco De Feo, Accade in Lucania (Italy, 1953) 
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borghi.’82 The film claims, however, that thanks to the work of the land reform 
board, Basilicata is being rapidly transformed. La Martella is presented as the 
prime example of this modernization process. The establishing shot of the 
village pans right to left, from the parish church to a group of finished houses, 
giving the viewer a sense of La Martella’s scale. The narrator conveys the 
village’s importance as one of the first land reform villages to be completed: 
‘Oggi nelle zone di riforma le nuove case rurali sorgono con ritmo accelerato. 
Qua e la  villaggi destinati a diventare le future cittadine di questa nuova Lucania 
come il borgo La Martella nei pressi di Matera.’83 The accompanying mid-shot of 
Quaroni’s church reminds the viewer that La Martella is a community founded 
upon Catholic values.   
Furthermore, a short sequence featuring an agricultural family having 
lunch in one the village’s pristine new homes subtly conveys the social values 
that the DC looked to foster through its southern development programme. The 
implication of the scene is that modern housing protects the sanctity of the 
family. The sequence features a number of mid-shots of a patriarchal family 
sitting down to lunch. The father figure who sits at the head of the table cuts 
bread for his family, another middle-aged man pours wine for himself and the 
head of the household, while a traditionally dressed woman stands serving 
minestra to three young children. The domestic scene and the voice-over imply 
that the move from the Sassi to La Martella has fostered new social values 
amongst the former cave dwellers: ‘Una nuova casa, una nuova dignita  umana. 
Oggi gia  in molte zone il contadino lucano si raccoglie in ambienti luminosi e 
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sereni.’84 This concept of a new sense of dignity directly linked to improved 
housing echoes attitudes in Victorian Britain. Overcrowded and inadequate 
housing conditions were believed to foster immorality, laziness and bad 
manners as much as disease. Slum clearances, it was argued, not only improved 
health conditions, but could shape morality and protect the sanctity of the 
family.85 This sequence also needs to be understood in the context of the 
perceived links between housing and morality prevalent in official sources in 
the post-war period as examined in the second chapter of this thesis. The 
domestic scene depicted in Accade in Lucania appears to communicate a similar 
message. The move from troglodyte dwellings to La Martella’s modern houses, it 
is implied, has fostered a newfound self-respect amongst the village’s residents. 
The new home has strengthened rather than eroded traditional family values. 
Accade in Lucania, therefore, celebrates the arrival of modernization in 
Basilicata in the guise of government reforms following centuries of neglect. The 
La Martella sequence shows viewers that the DC’s post-war reform programme 
strenghtens traditional family values and underscores the Catholic Church’s 
central role in Italian society. The risanamento programme has delivered 
Matera’s cave dwellers from inadequate living conditions which fostered moral 
degeneracy. Writing about the Christian Democrats’ post-war electoral success, 
Rosario Forlenza has noted that they ‘answered a need for stability, security and 
reconciliation in a society emerging from years of warfare, and accordingly it 
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stressed the importance of family and of women.’86 This rhetorical message is 
clearly reflected in Accade in Lucania’s depiction of family life at La Martella.   
 
Paesi Nuovi and Cronache del Mezzogiorno 
 
The concept of La Martella as a symbol of southern Italy’s rapid transformation 
thanks to government reform is also conveyed in the documentaries Paesi Nuovi 
(1954) and Cronache del Mezzogiorno (1955).87 In these two films La Martella is 
presented as a fully functioning town with a vibrant community. This message is 
communicated in Paesi Nuovi through the juxtaposition of La Martella with a 
number of land reform villages either recently inaugurated or still under 
construction. In contrast to the half-finished villages profiled at the start of the 
film, La Martella is presented as a model town with a fully-formed and 
functioning community where there is work for all. This point is made explicitly 
in the voice-over which accompanies a wide shot of the village’s pristine houses: 
‘In uno dei piu  grossi borghi, borgo La Martella presso Matera, ormai la vita e  
nel suo pieno ritmo, la borgata si e  sviluppata, la gente attende al proprio lavoro, 
e ha preso abitudine alla nuova dimora, come se qui avesse abitato da sempre, 
mentre le case sanno ancora di calce.’88 This sense of La Martella’s rapid 
transformation into a prototypical village is further emphasized by the film’s 
narrative structure which describes Sundays in the new community. The market 
scene underlines the gender roles assigned in the new village. A group of 
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87 Paesi Nuovi (Italy, 1954) was made for the Centro Documentazione by the recently re-
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women wearing contemporary clothing are depicted buying material for clothes 
while the town’s men purchase farming equipment. Apart from a shot of a 
woman feeding some chickens, women’s role in agricultural work, especially 
physical labour, is not acknowledged in the film. The implication is that female 
manual labour does not fit the official vision for the new community. The 
market sequence culminates with a shot of La Martella’s residents entering the 
village’s church. The voice-over underlines that Catholicism is at the heart of 
community life: ‘la casa di Dio nata con le loro case, il lavoro per tutti una 
benedizione del cielo.’89 Paesi Nuovi, therefore, presents La Martella as a model 
town which embodies the societal values that the Christian Democrats looked to 
promote in post-war Italy: the traditional family, improved housing, 
employment, and the centrality of the Catholic Church.  
Cronache del Mezzogiorno promotes the impact that land reform and the 
Cassa del Mezzogiorno had in Calabria, Puglia, Sardinia, Sicily, and Basilicata in 
the early 1950s. It features a short sequence showcasing La Martella. Again the 
village’s apparent strong sense of community is underlined. This message is 
created through shots of the town’s residents congregating in the main square, 
children attending primary school and the local carabiniere officer with his 
children. The accompanying voice-over uses the past-to-present narrative trope 
to underline southern Italy’s rapid development. The new village is described as 
a place where ‘una gallina da cuocere e un uovo da bere non manca piu  a 
nessuno.’90 A number of panoramic and mid-shots depicting the new village are 
juxtaposed with dialogue describing the residents’ improved living conditions: 
                                                             
89 Ibid. 
90 Elio Tarquini, Cronache del Mezzogiorno (Italy, 1955) 
233 
 
‘e  la gente che viveva nei Sassi di Matera, la civilta  ha cancellato ogni cupezza.’91 
The sequence features no images of the Sassi and the voice-over provides no 
further description of Matera’s troglodyte homes. The implication, however, is 
that the Sassi need no introduction to the viewer and that the city’s name alone 
is enough to evoke an image of southern backwardness. Furthermore, the voice-
over suggests that La Martella’s living conditions have had a transformative 
effect on the villagers’ existential and moral wellbeing: they once lived like 
savages, but have now been civilized thanks to improved housing. Although the 
La Martella sequence is fleeting in the film’s overall context, its rhetorical 
message is clear. The construction of La Martella is the first step in resolving 
Matera’s widely publicized housing problems which had been dubbed a national 
shame. The village is a fully-functioning community which has removed the 
uncertainty of life in the Sassi through education, housing, and employment. The 
depiction of family life in Cronache del Mezzogiorno and Paesi Nuovi echoes the 
message in a letter from Mariano Rumor (the then head of the DC’s Ufficio studi 
propaganda e stampa) dated 16 June 1954 to the Christian Democrats’ weekly 
and periodic publications. The text was addressed directly to Italy’s rural 
workers. It looked to communicate four main points: the important role that 
rural culture could play in Italy’s post-war development, the sanctity of the 
traditional family, the right to education, the central role of Catholicism, and 
how these values had been protected and improved thanks to government 
reforms in southern Italy.92  
                                                             
91 Passante 
92  Rumor wrote that: ‘La Democrazia Cristiana, nel difendere la libertà attraverso la sua azione 
politica, di tutti questi anni, ha voluto difendere ciò che per voi è più sacro: la santità e la 
pace delle famiglie, la libera educazione dei figli, il rispetto della religione, le sane ed antiche 
tradizioni contadine, che, ereditate dai vostri padri, sono ancor oggi alla base della vostra 
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Borgate della riforma 
 
The use of Matera and La Martella to promote government reform reached its 
apex in the 1955 documentary Borgate della riforma.93 The film showcases a 
number of new villages in southern Italy that the land reform board had 
constructed including Borgo della Liberta , S. Rita and Gaudiano in Puglia; 
Rovalle in Calabria; and Scanzano, Policoro, and La Martella in Basilicata. The 
bulk of the film is shot from the perspective of an airplane passing overhead. 
This device is used to convey the vast scale of work carried out by the land 
reform board in the three regions. A select number of villages are profiled 
further at ground level. The film’s central sequence contrasts Matera’s Sassi and 
La Martella. Over half of the short documentary’s seven minutes and twenty-
three seconds focus on the Sassi and the purpose-built village. Borgate della 
riforma was produced in 1955 illustrating that Matera and La Martella 
continued to be important images in promoting state intervention in southern 
Italy at that point in time. The fact that the village was one of the first reform 
projects to be inaugurated would appear to explain its enduring importance. La 
                                                                                                                                                                            
vita comune. Non sempre la società italiana aveva compreso e valorizzato la civiltà contadina 
[which the communiqué implies is southern rural culture], che pure rappresenta tanta parte 
della vita italiana, né aveva saputo aiutare il vostro progresso, l’elevazione delle vostre 
condizioni di vita, il miglioramento della vostra cultura. Con una coraggiosa politica di 
rinnovamento – pur tra mille difficoltà – mediante la Riforma Agraria, la Cassa del 
Mezzogiorno, le opere di bonifica nelle aree depresse, la legge per la montagna, il piano 
dodecennale per l’agricoltura, l’impulso alla meccanizzazione, la creazione e la difesa della 
piccola proprietà contadina, la Democrazia Cristiana ha voluto invece porre all’ordine del 
giorno di tutta la Nazione il problema dello sviluppo del mondo contadino e quello della 
liberazione ed elevazione umana di quei contadini che erano in condizioni di maggiore 
abbandono e di più umiliante soggezione. Oggi tutta la Nazione è consapevole che il futuro 
della intera democrazia italiana passa anche attraverso il miglioramento delle condizioni 
sociali, economiche, spirituali ed umane del mondo contadino.’ ASILS, FDC, Segreteria 
politica, Atti dei segretari 6, Alcide De Gasperi, Uffici centrali, Circolari emesse dagli uffici, 
1953, Sc. 18, fasc. 11, Spes.  
93 Borgate della riforma was produced by Documento Film in 1955 and directed by Luigi 
Scattini. The film was shown together with Alfred Hitchcock’s Rear Window. For film’s full 
production credits see Frabotta, Il governo filma l’Italia, p. 115. 
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Martella could be juxtaposed with work in progress to underline that 
government intervention in southern Italy had already delivered concrete 
results. 
The Matera-La Martella sequence in Borgate della riforma echoes a 
number of British documentaries that focused on urban planning and promoted 
New Towns in the post-war period, e.g. The City (1939), When We Build Again 
(1943), Proud City (1945), New Town (1948), Planned Town (1948), and Home of 
Your Own (1951). These films shared a basic narrative structure: ‘The first 
[shot] was the image of the crowded and decrepit inner-city slum. The 
dilapidated state of the urban fabric symbolized the historic legacy of 
unplanned development, with the obligatory shots of children playing in the 
gutter emphasizing the waste of human potential.’94 Echoing the rhetorical 
strategies that Carlo Levi employed in his description of Matera, these 
sequences provided the moral imperative for government intervention and 
highlighted the need for urban planning to resolve social and housing problems. 
The latter half of the documentary focused on housing but underlined that 
building alone was not enough. Rather, ‘what was needed … were 
comprehensive approaches that saw rehousing the population as involving 
other key functions of the city – including transport, workplace and 
employment patterns, recreation, neighbourhood planning and post-war 
reconstruction.’95 A similar narrative structure is adopted in the Matera-La 
Martella sequence featured in Borgate della riforma. The Sassi are used to 
present the city’s inadequate housing conditions. La Martella, in contrast, is 
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presented as a model for resolving this problem. However, the village is not 
merely an answer to Matera’s housing problems according to the film. It has also 
been designed to provide employment, leisure activities and to foster a new 
rural community. Predictably this community reflects the societal values that 
the DC looked to promote in post-war Italy.  
The Matera sequence begins with an establishing shot of the Sassi and 
Matera’s distinctive gorge from the air. The musical accompaniment shifts from 
a playful aria to a discordant tone when the Sassi first appear on screen. 
Moreover, the voice-over hints at recurring themes in official documentaries 
that depict Basilicata: the region’s position outside of modernity, the struggle 
against untamed natural elements, and its previous neglect by the Italian state: 
‘Sono in volo sulla Lucania. La terra che sembrava dimenticata da Dio e dagli 
uomini. In questa zona depressa le citta  sorgevano sugli strapiombi quasi a 
distintiva difesa contro le forze della natura.’96 The juxtaposition of the 
narrator’s words with an aerial shot of Matera implies that the town is 
emblematic of southern Italy’s natural and economic problems. The sequence 
continues with a number of panoramic views of Sasso Caveoso interspersed 
with long shots of cave homes taken from the airplane above. This cuts to a mid-
shot of two children filmed at street level in the Sassi. High-angle framing is 
used to illustrate the Sassi’s distinctive urban layout: the descending pathway 
on which the children play doubles up as the rooftops of the houses below. The 
accompanying voice-over implies that the poverty of those living amongst the 
Sassi is moral as well as material: ‘Matera e  una vecchia citta  nata sulla roccia, 
ancora tristamente famosa per i Sassi, luogo di estrema miseria in cui vivevano 
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nel piu  grande squallore centinaia e centinaia di famiglie.’97 The narrator, 
however, makes it clear that hundreds of families used to live in extreme poverty. 
The implication is that the town’s age-old housing problems are finally being 
resolved thanks to government intervention.   
The next sequence focuses on Matera’s housing situation. It starts with a 
pan from left to right across the roofs of a number of homes before a crane shot 
downwards from the street level above reveals a vicinato below. The camera 
work looks to convey the density of homes amongst the Sassi. However, voice-
over rather than an internal shot is employed to describe the city’s distinctive 
housing situation: ‘le case sono scavate nella roccia e la vita si svolge sotto terra 
dove entra solamente un pallido raggio di sole.’98 Echoing Levi’s description of 
the Sassi, light and dark are repeatedly used as a metaphor for backwardness 
and modernity in the Matera-La Martella sequence. The film’s imagery implies 
that public works have delivered the Sassi’s inhabitants from darkness into the 
light, i.e. from their troglodyte homes to modern housing.  
A transitional sequence between the Matera and La Martella sections is 
used to convey the passage from the town’s past, embodied by the Sassi, to its 
future, symbolized by La Martella. A panning shot from Matera’s Cathedral 
moves to the right before the camera tilts upwards into the sky above the city. 
The soundtrack becomes more upbeat in conjunction with the tone of the voice-
over: ‘Non basta a scaldare il corpo e il cuore di chi soffre. Le porte di questi 
buchi stanno man mano chiudendosi e una nuova possibilita  di vita si offre a 
coloro che forse non credevano piu  alla vita.’99 The salvation offered to Matera’s 
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poor comes in the shape of alternative housing. The transitional sequence is 
shot from the perspective of the low-flying airplane. The on-board camera 
moves rapidly across the quickly changing terrain suggesting the fast pace of 
Matera’s transformation. The airplane passes above a new housing estate on the 
city’s outskirts before continuing its journey through the countryside near 
Matera showcasing additional new apartment blocks under construction. The 
voice-over makes it clear that the city’s housing problems are finally being 
resolved thanks to state intervention: ‘E accanto alla vecchia citta  ne e  sorta una 
nuova ... anche Matera ora puo  guardare all’avvenire con rinnovata fiducia.’100 
The future being referred to is embodied by the already ‘completed’ village of La 
Martella which is the focus of the film’s next section.  
Borgate della riforma’s La Martella sequence is the most detailed 
cinematic document of the village in the years following its inauguration. This 
section of the film implies that housing conditions are not only linked to 
physical health and fears about hygiene, but also to the existential wellbeing of 
Sassi residents. It opens with a panoramic-establishing shot of the village from 
the air before cutting to a long shot of La Martella from above. Notably the 
soundtrack changes along with the visual transition from Matera’s hinterland to 
La Martella: the discordant elements are replaced with a melodic orchestral 
refrain with hints of regional-folk music. The first scene in this sequence 
conveys the improved health conditions that La Martella offers its new residents 
in comparison to the Sassi. It opens with a long-shot of the village taken from 
the air before cutting to a mid-shot of young children playing in the garden of a 
pristine new house while a group of women sit sewing in the garden. The 
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children at La Martella are noticeably better dressed than those depicted in the 
earlier Matera sequence. The voice-over underlines the improved sanitary 
conditions of La Martella’s new residents. ‘Non piu  case scavate nella roccia, ma 
abitazioni con giardini dove le donne e i bambini possono finalmente godersi il 
sole.’101 Again light is used to symbolize health conditions. The implication is 
that La Martella’s residents have been delivered from the dark and unsanitary 
conditions of the Sassi to their new pristine homes. Moreover, similar to the 
other Centro Documentazione films depicting La Martella, women in the new 
village are assigned the role of domestic workers, wives and mothers.    
The next scene showcases La Martella’s housing. A mid-shot of an 
assignee working in the allotment at the back of his house is used to depict the 
hardworking nature of the village’s new inhabitants. It again underlines the 
gender roles assigned to residents: women are domestic workers while men 
work in agriculture. The sequence continues depicting two horse-drawn 
carriages passing each other on the village’s main road. The shot is framed to 
show the abundant space and resulting accessibility that La Martella offers to its 
residents in contrast to the narrow terraced streets of the Sassi. The voice-over 
reinforces this point: ‘Lo stile architettonico e  in armonia con le caratteristiche 
strade transitabili in tutti sensi. Che confronto con i sentieri inaccessibili dei 
Sassi.’102 Finally, La Martella is presented as a fully functioning and autonomous 
community. This is achieved by showcasing the village’s public buildings from 
the public meeting house, the Church, the cinema – still under construction – 
and the Post Office with a man shown posting a letter. The voice-over notes that: 
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‘la vita della borgata e  autonoma. I principali servizi sono assicurati: la casa di 
ritrovo, la chiesa di ardita architettura, il cinema ancora in costruzione e la 
posta. C’e  tutto no?’103 La Martella, therefore, is depicted as a model village 
which provides housing, work as well as spiritual and material sustenance to its 
residents. The film presents the village as a pioneering project which could be 
replicated throughout southern Italy. This point is implied in the documentary’s 
latter half which focuses on new towns under construction and destined to 
house new rural communities. Despite the reassuring tone of the narrator, 
however, the La Martella project encountered numerous problems in its early 
life which are examined in detail below. These problems had come to a head in 
1955 when Borgate della riforma was shot, illustrating the gap between life at 
La Martella and the village’s role in the promotion of official reform in southern 
Italy. 
Writing in the context of the intervento straordinario, Maria Adelaide 
Frabotta argues that: ‘as in any large-scale reconstruction it was necessary to 
create myths and offer projects which promised a better future.’104 The 
depiction of La Martella in Centro Documentazione commissioned films 
exemplifies this point. The village was portrayed as a fully-functioning 
community built from scratch which represented the first step in resolving the 
problem of the Sassi thanks to the combined resources of the Cassa per il 
Mezzogiorno, agrarian reform and the ERP. In contrast, the Sassi provided a 
ready-made symbol of the southern question. They embodied southern Italy’s 
difficult past which, according to government rhetoric, had been finally left 
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behind. In the context of Italy’s post-war housing crisis, the depiction of La 
Martella in Centro Documentazione films provides an insight into the values 
that the Christian Democrats looked to communicate to viewers. The sanctity of 
the nuclear family, central to the DC’s rhetoric, was linked to the sanctity of the 
home. The concept that housing could shape morality is one of the undertones 
of Centro Documentazione films depicting Matera and La Martella. The 
organization of Matera’s former cave dwellers into normative family units and 
the resulting improvement in their moral wellbeing is one of the supplemental 
themes implied in the depiction of La Martella in official propaganda films.  
Cinema continued to be Italy’s preferred commercial mass entertainment 
in the mid-1950s. As a result the images of Matera and La Martella in Centro 
Documentazione productions examined above were shown widely. While the 
majority of cinemas and thus audience members were concentrated in 
provincial capitals and large towns, the fact that, as outlined above, it was 
compulsory to show Centro Documentazione newsreels and documentaries 
means that regular cinema-goers would have been exposed to images of Matera 
and La Martella as symbols of the southern question and a model for southern 
development respectively.105 It is difficult to gauge the impact that these films 
had at a popular level. However, as this chapter has attempted to show, Italian 
cinema audiences in the immediate post-war period were presented with 
images of the South, the nuclear family and normative gender roles directly 
filtered through the DC’s political lens as Italy’s ruling party looked to promote 
its twin reform programme, social values, and version of Italian national 
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identity. Images of Matera and La Martella played an important role in this 
process during the 1950s.  
 
4.4 Limitations of the La Martella project 
 
La Martella fell short of the original vision for an autonomous rural community 
set out by its planners and many of its buildings were lying in a state of 
disrepair by the late 1960s.106 Despite being hailed as a model for the future of 
southern development due to its combination of cutting-edge town planning 
theories, Neorealist architecture as well as funding from the ERP and the Cassa 
per il Mezzogiorno, the reality of the project was in stark contrast to the utopian 
image portrayed in the official sources examined above as well as contemporary 
architectural and urban planning periodicals and documentaries.107 A number 
of factors hampered the project from the outset and contributed to its slow 
decline. First, there was a lack of coordination between the different 
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organizations involved in completing the village’s construction, i.e. UNRRA-
CASAS and the land reform board. In a letter to Emilio Colombo dated 27 August 
1953, Giuseppe Lamacchia, the mayor of Matera, noted that ‘il mancato 
coordinamento delle attivita  esplicate dagli enti in parola e la mancata 
collaborazione nel quadro della visione unitaria della vita del borgo hanno 
prodotto vaste e profonde fratture che incidono sensibilmente sullo sviluppo del 
borgo.’108 This lack of coordination continued during La Martella’s early life and 
delayed the provision of a number of the village’s public buildings and essential 
services. By February 1955, 90 of the projected 200 projected houses at La 
Martella had been occupied by families from the Sassi. The village had a 
population of approximately 1,000 residents. The new town, however, was still 
without a post office, a suitable school building, a public telephone, a working 
doctor’s surgery, a resident doctor and midwife as well as adequate public 
transport facilities.109 Furthermore, there were structural problems with the 
village’s newly built homes. The leakage of rainwater in 1954 had rendered a 
number of houses uninhabitable forcing residents to leave their homes 
temporarily.110 Moreover, the communal ovens, designed to recreate the social 
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fascicolo 675, sottofascicolo 9. “Rete elettrica”; ASM, Prefettura, Atti Amministrativi di 
Gabinetto (Ricovero 1990), busta 83, fascicolo 675, sottofascicolo 10. “Rete idrica e 
fognante”; ASM, Prefettura, Atti Amministrativi di Gabinetto (Ricovero 1990), busta 83, 
fascicolo 675, sottofascicolo 13. “Borgo La Martella – Collegamento telefonico”. 
110  A letter from Romano Pasquinageli, head of the local carabinieri, to the town’s Prefect, dated 
18 November 1954, noted that three families were forced to abandon their homes at La 
Martella ‘per forte infiltrazione acqua e difetto costruzione’. See ASM, Prefettura, Atti 
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ties of the Sassi, were not completed in time for the village’s opening in 1953 
following a dispute between the two companies responsible for their 
construction.111 Instead the women of La Martella were ferried to and from 
Matera once a week to use the Sassi’s public ovens. The failure of the village’s 
only shop, managed by the land reform board, to provide adequate supplies of 
essential foodstuffs and cooking supplies (including bread, oil, salt, wine and 
salt) further exacerbated the situation. As a result La Martella was still 
completely dependent on the provincial capital and its residents were forced to 
make regular bus trips to Matera at a cost of 100 lire each way.112 
Furthermore, the process of allocating land and housing to La Martella’s 
residents created social disharmony within the new community. In order to 
ensure that the village would be self-sufficient the Commissione Speciale dei 
Sassi, following advice from UNRRA-CASAS, had decided to allocate houses to 
families who owned or rented at least three hectares of land in the vicinity of La 
Martella. The existing plot of land would then be augmented by an allocation 
from the land reform board (this type of farm was known as a quota while small 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Amministrativi di Gabinetto (Ricovero 1990), busta 83: fascicolo 675, sottofascicolo 1. 
“Matera –Risanamento Sassi – L. 17-5-1952, no. 619 – Borgo rurale La Martella –Famiglie 
assegnatarie delle case e delle terre”.   
111  In a letter addressed to the local prefect, dated 12 June 1953, Giuseppe Spanò, captain of the 
local carabinieri noted that: ‘Fra abitanti Villaggio “La Martella” persiste malcontento da 
parte degli assegnatari  per la mancata costruzione del forno.’ Problems with communal 
ovens in the village were still apparent in 1958. A letter from Enrico Stellacci, the then 
captain of Matera’s carabinieri, to the local prefect, dated 5 July 1958, notes that 30 women 
protested outside the police barracks at La Martella unhappy with the conditions of oven 
facilities. See Archivio di Stato di Matera, Prefettura, Atti Amministrativi di Gabinetto 
(Ricovero 1990), busta 83, fascicolo 675, sottofascicolo 11. “Costruzione forno da pane”.  
112  Friedmann, Miseria e dignità, p. 71. For detailed correspondence on the delayed completion 
of La Martella’s communal ovens see ASM, Prefettura, Atti Amministrativi di Gabinetto 
(Ricovero 1990), busta 83, fascicolo 675, sottofascicolo 11. “Costruzione forno da pane”. The 
letter of complaint about food supplies, the lack of farrier, and a barber can be found in 
Archivio di Stato di Matera, Prefettura, Atti Amministrativi di Gabinetto (Ricovero 1990), 
busta 83, fascicolo, sottofascicolo 12. “Borgo La Martella – Varie”. 
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farms allocated to landless peasants were called poderi).113 There were a total of 
90 new homes available in the first batch of houses built. As noted above, forty-
nine land reform assignees and their families had been transferred to La 
Martella on 17 May 1953. Another eight assignees and their families moved to 
the village in November of the same year. Fifty-eight families renting land near 
La Martella were earmarked as potential assignees for the remaining 33 houses. 
However, only 13 were interested in moving to the new village. The remaining 
families deemed the three hectares of additional land that the reform board had 
offered as too small to meet their farming needs. This refusal was telling of 
popular attitudes towards La Martella, as the land offered would have 
transformed these agricultural workers from short-term tenant farmers into 
small landowners.114   
In January 1954 only 10 of the 58 families that the land reform board had 
originally shortlisted for rehousing were transferred to La Martella. The 
remaining 23 houses were assigned in February 1954 to families chosen by 
UNRRA-CASAS and the local town council. However, these families were not 
eligible for land from the reform board; rather they were granted housing under 
the provisions of the special law for the Sassi. The 23 newly-transferred 
families, predominately landless and some from homes that had been defined as 
suitable for renovation, called on the reform board to provide them with land 
and work. Writing in 1955 about the lessons that needed to be learned from La 
Martella, Fedele Aiello argued that placing families assigned land and housing 
by the agricultural reform board in the same village as those evacuated from the 
                                                             
113  Foot, Modern Italy, pp. 115-116 
114  Aiello, pp. 63-64 
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Sassi under the terms of the Special Law had created a dangerous division in La 
Martella’s fledgling community.115 This division was illustrated in a letter of 
protest from landless residents to the local prefect, bishop and land reform 
office dated 13 October 1955. The failure to provide land meant that the nine 
signatories and their families had effectively been without work and income 
since moving to the village in February 1954.  
 
Di fronte a questa situazione abbastanza precaria fanno appello alle 
autorita  intestate affinche  prendano in seria considerazione la questione 
in oggetto, vogliono richiamare l’Ente di Riforma e farla subito 
all’assegnazione, altrimenti questi lavoratori della terra che sono stati 
spostati, chi per le case malsane e chi per le famiglie numerose non 
possono restare inermi, senza terra e senza lavoro, peggiorando giorno 
per giorno le loro condizioni di vita. Fanno voti affinche  vengano adottati 
tutti i provvedimenti onde evitare le continue agitazioni e i continui 
disagi che l’incombe giorno per giorno. Attuare quella che e  la vera 
giustizia e serieta  nell’assegnazione delle terre ed evitare dissidi fra i 
lavoratori stessi.116 
 
When UNRRA-CASAS proposed creating an agricultural cooperative for the 23 
landless families in spring 1954, the Ente di riforma decided to include the new 
residents amongst its assignees. As a result the land reform board became La 
Martella’s most influential public body.117  
Land allocation, however, did not fully resolve La Martella’s social or 
labour problems. Some of the plots assigned to residents were situated as far 
from La Martella as they were from Matera thus nullifying one of the project’s 
main aims, i.e. to move small landowners closer to their workplace and increase 
                                                             
115  For a detailed account of housing allocation at La Martella see Aiello, p. 63-64. 
116  See ASM, Prefettura, Atti Amministrativi di Gabinetto (Ricovero 1990), busta 161, fascicolo 
1370. Moreover, an article in the regional newspaper Basilicata in October 1955 reported 
that eleven families transferred to La Martella were still waiting to receive agricultural land 
from the reform board and as a result were living in dire poverty. Despite numerous efforts 
to obtain the land promised to them, including letters to local and national politicians as well 
as the reform board, no indication had been given about when the situation would be finally 
resolved. ‘Nuovamente alla ribalta il villaggio “La Martella”. Undici famiglie sono ancora 
senza terra’, Basilicata, 23 October 1955, p. 1. 
117  Aiello, pp. 64-65 
247 
 
agricultural productivity. Speaking about the land allocated to his family after 
their transfer to La Martella, Angelo Raffaele Belfiore noted that ‘dall’allogio che 
ci avevano dato, per raggiungere la campagna, vicino Santa Maria d’Irsi, ci 
volevano quasi 5 ore. Troppo lontano. La promessa di assegnarci la terra sotto 
casa non fu mantenuta.’118 Furthermore, there were problems with the quality 
of land that the reform board had distributed. A letter of complaint signed by 
ten assignees at La Martella to the local prefect and mayor, dated 19 November 
1953, claims that much of the land distributed was rocky, infertile and wholly 
unsuitable for agriculture. The letter alludes to the social divisions that land 
allocation had created amongst the village’s assignees.119 There were, in 
addition, problems in expropriating the required amount of land needed for La 
Martella’s new residents. A letter from the Prefect of Matera, dated 7 June 1955, 
to the president of the Consorzio del Medio Bradano notes that the agricultural 
reform board was struggling to find the required 260 hectares of land needed 
for the 68 families scheduled to move to La Martella.120 
The various teething problems during La Martella’s early life caused 
widespread discontent amongst the village’s residents. This manifested itself in 
popular protest which culminated in the so-called marcia su Matera on 3 
February 1955. Following a public meeting the night before, between 50 and 80 
residents from the village travelled to the provincial capital by bus to protest 
                                                             
118  See Doria, p. 75.  
119  ‘È nostra convinzione che gli abitanti di La Martella abbiano gli stessi diritti ... fin del 
momento del nostro primo ingresso nel nuovo borgo facemmo presente alla S.V. che le quote 
assegnateci non erano rispondenti ai nostri desideri ed ai più elementari principi di giustizia 
in quanto formate in gran parte da terreno inadatto alla coltivazione e alla produzione. 
Alcune quote sono costituite interamente da buone terre, altre da buona parte di terreno 
roccioso, altre da rilevante quantità di terreno incoltivabile.’ ASM, Prefettura, Atti 
Amministrativi di Gabinetto (Ricovero 1990), busta 83, fascicolo 675, sottofascicolo 5. 
“Rapporti degli assegnatari con l’Ente riforma fondiaria”. 
120  ASM, Prefettura, Atti Amministrativi di Gabinetto (ricovero 1990), busta 82, fascicolo 669, 
sottofascicolo 2 
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against infrastructural problems with housing; the lack of postal and telephonic 
services; the failure to supply a blacksmith, a barber, and a local land reform 
office; and the degradation of the village’s internal road network.121 Together 
with the local priest and a number of social workers that UNRRA-CASAS had 
provided the village, the protesters delivered a petition to the relief agency’s 
local offices and the Prefect of Matera.122 The ‘march on Matera’ provoked 
debate about La Martella’s social conditions in the local press. Criticism of the 
village’s troubled development was led by the Matera-based weekly Basilicata, 
which was closely linked to Adriano Olivetti’s Comunità movement and the 
erstwhile Action Party.123 According to an article published on 13 February 
1955, the protest earlier that month had removed ‘il velo alla patina edulcorata 
ed ufficiale che avvolge quello che – comunque – e  da giudicare come il primo 
serio tentativo di adeguare la riforma agraria e l’edilizia rurale alla realta  della 
vita contadina.’124 Moreover, Basilicata claimed that rivalry between the land 
reform board and UNRRA-CASAS had resulted in the former deliberately 
obstructing the village’s completion.125 In contrast, the local ecclesiastical 
                                                             
121  Restucci and Tafuri, p. 49 
122  This narrative of events was reported in an article by Leonardo Sacco which appeared in Il 
Mondo on 15 September 1955 and later reproduced in his book Matera contemporanea. 
Cultura e società, Basilicata editrice, Matera, 1982, pp. 50-55. However, the police report of 
the incident makes no mention of the involvement of either the priest or social workers. See 
the letter from captain of the local carabinieri, Michele Frangipane, dated 3 February 1955, 
to the both the Prefect and police headquarters at Matera. Archivio di Stato di Matera, 
Prefettura, Atti Amministrativi di Gabinetto (Ricovero 1990), busta 83, fascicolo 675, 
sottofascicolo 1. “Matera –Risanamento Sassi – L. 17-5-1952, no. 619, Borgo rurale La 
Martella, Famiglie assegnatarie delle case e delle terre”. 
123  For a history of the Basilicata newspaper, which ran from 1954 to 1962, see Baglieri, Fabbri 
and Sacco, pp. ix-xxvii. 
124  ‘La Martella vuol vivere’, Basilicata, 13 February, 1955, p. 1 
125 ‘L’Ente di Riforma non ha mai visto favorelmente il nuovo villaggio, per diverse ragioni: 
perchè il proprietario delle case è un altro ente, l’UNRRA-CASAS, che vi svolge una diretta 
opera di assistenza sociale; e tutta l’iniziativa, dalla concezione urbanistica al tipo di 
ambiente sociale che ne deriva, e più ancora ne può derivare; non è in linea con l’idea 
dell’Ente di Riforma stesso. Perciò l’atteggiamento adottato verso questa vera e propria 
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newspaper, L’Eco di Matera blamed La Martella’s problems on the social, 
political and religious backwardness of the village’s new inhabitants. An article 
in its July 1955 edition claimed that La Martella’s social and political 
development was being impeded by an egoism which pervaded the village’s 
daily life. Furthermore, the new community was spiritually deficient: turnout at 
Catholic mass was reported to be poor and a number of residents were, instead, 
reported to be attending an Evangelical service in return for material reward.126 
The new community’s social and spiritual poverty, according to the article, was 
nothing more than could be expected from former inhabitants of the Sassi.127  
The protest on 3 February 1955 was the catalyst behind a public debate 
about La Martella’s various problems. Two public meetings entitled Presente e 
avvenire della Martella were held on 17 February and 17 March 1955 to discuss 
the village’s on-going difficulties. The meetings were attended by approximately 
30 to 40 people including provincial representatives of the main political 
parties, local journalists and a number of the village’s residents.128 During the 
first meeting an unnamed La Martella resident gave a speech that catalogued 
the practical difficulties the villagers had experienced since moving to the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
“anomolia” che è La Martella è stato deciso e continuo: ostacolare il completamento del 
villaggio, impedire la sua piena realizzazione.’ Ibid. p. 1 
126 ‘Ci chiediamo se la popolazione evacuata aveva quella ricchezza spirituale (non solo 
religioso, ma anche più strettamente umana, cioè sociale e politica) tanta necessaria anche in 
un risanamento economico. Dopo aver esaminato quei tre elementi – sociale, politico e 
religioso – che dovrebbero essere il tessuto connettivo, le premesse fondamentali della 
creazione di una comunità moderna e democratica, ci siamo accorti che qualsiasi anelito 
sociale, o coscienza politica, o spirito religioso, è in deficienza.’ See Sacco, Matera 
contemporanea, p. 53. 
127 ‘È impossibile che tutto questo modo di vivere sia sorto come per incanto: ha indubbiamente 
le sue radici profonde nella tradizione e nelle abitudini che la gente ha portato al borgo dal 
suo luogo d’origine, cioè dal sasso.’ Excerpts from the Eco di Matera article are reproduced in 
Sacco, Matera contemporanea, p. 53. 
128  Details of the two meetings are outlined in reports from the local police commissioner to the 
Prefect of Matera dated 21 February and 18 March respectively. See ASM, Prefettura, Atti 
Amministrativi di Gabinetto (Ricovero 1990), busta 70, fascicolo 652: Matera situazione 
locale – ordine pubblico (1952-1956). 
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widely-publicized project. The speaker underlined that tensions between 
UNRRA-CASAS and the land reform board had had a negative impact on the lives 
of La Martella’s residents: ‘siete impegnati in lotte fra di voi e volete riversarne 
su di noi le conseguenze; e  tempo che vi mettiate d’accordo e ci lasciate in 
pace.’129 However, notably no officials from the land reform board or UNRRA-
CASAS attended either meeting.  
Although La Martella’s post office was finally opened on 1 April 1955 
problems with the primary school building and the village’s medical service 
persisted.130 The team of UNRRA-CASAS social workers that provided adult 
education courses and social assistance in the village ceased working at La 
Martella in June 1955. Their removal from the town appears to have been 
directly linked to their involvement in the popular protest on 3 February of the 
same year as well as accusations that they were in fact communists.131 The 
UNRRA-CASAS social workers employed at La Martella, however, denied 
accusations of political bias. Moreover, they warned that their removal from the 
village would increase the gap between the state and the new community and 
                                                             
129  Giovanni Dello Jacovo, ‘Il villaggio La Martella, due anni dopo’, Cronache meridionali, (1955), 
no. 7-8, pp. 497-501 
130  See ASM, Prefettura, Atti Amministrativi di Gabinetto (Ricovero 1990), busta 83, fascicolo 
675, sottofascicolo 3. “Borgo rurale La Martella, Ufficio postale e telegrafico”; ASM, 
Prefettura, Atti Amministrativi di Gabinetto (Ricovero 1990), busta 83, fascicolo 675, 
sottofascicolo 6. “Edificio scolastico”; ASM, Prefettura, Atti Amministrativi di Gabinetto 
(Ricovero 1990), busta 83, fascicolo 675, sottofascicolo 8. “Assistenza sanitaria-medico-
ostretica e armadio farmeutico”. 
131  A report dated 8 December 1954 written by Aaron Schreiman, an industrial engineer from 
New Jersey, following a visit to La Martella earlier the same year was critical of the amount 
of influence, in his opinion, that UNRRA-CASAS social workers had over the life of the village: 
‘The government workers at La Martella (these social workers are also government 
employees) are a group whose experience in solving problems is limited by their working 
through governmental agencies. They have had little or no experience with other methods of 
solving problems. Hence their approach is very apt to be, “The government should do the 
job.” Such thinking in 1918 by the Russian planners led to the Communist State where the 
government knows what is best for everyone. Similar thinking will, in its mildest form, lead 
in Italy to the Socialist State.’ See NARA, UC-17 - La Martella; ARC Identifier 4319707 / MLR 
Number UD 1262; File Unit from Record Group 469: Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance 
Agencies, 1942-1963; Department of State. International Cooperation Administration. 
Mission to Italy. Production and Technical Assistance Division. 
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allow the PCI to fill the void.132 Writing about the incident in 1960 the local 
journalist and historian Leonardo Sacco claimed that the UNRRA-CASAS social 
workers, one of whom was his brother, were removed from La Martella because: 
‘agli occhi di alcuni ambienti governativi l’assistenza sociale dello UNRRA aveva 
il grave difetto di non essere “politicizzata”, e di favorire anzi l’autonoma 
organizzazione degli assegnatari, evitando la solita strada del paternalismo.’133 
The request for UNRRA-CASAS to discontinue its provision of social services in 
the village was, according to Sacco, personally delivered by Emilio Colombo, the 
then undersecretary for agriculture, to the head of UNRRA-CASAS.134 Sacco 
traces the slow demise of the original vision for La Martella to the removal of 
UNRRA-CASAS’s social workers from the village. Instead the land reform board 
assumed responsibility for social care at La Martella with UNRRA-CASAS 
increasingly marginalized from the project’s development.135 This culminated in 
February 1960 when the land reform board bought the 167 houses and public 
buildings that UNRRA-CASAS had financed and built at La Martella. This brought 
UNRRA-CASAS’s direct involvement in a project that it had pioneered to an end. 
The additional 62 houses scheduled for completion in 1956 were never 
constructed.136 During the discussions about the second Special Law for the 
                                                             
132  Laura Sasso Calogero, ‘La lezione di La Martella’, Nord e Sud, (1955), no. 12, pp. 50-54. 
133  Sacco, ‘La Martella nel ‘60’, in Baglieri, Fabbri and Sacco, pp. 403-406.  
134  Sacco, Matera contemporanea, pp. 46-48 
135  A report dated 13 May 1955 entitled ‘Appunto per L’On. Colombo sulla situazione de “La 
Martella”’ which outlined UNRRA-CASAS’s work in the village claimed that ‘se ragioni 
d’ordine dovessero richiedere che, per uniformità d’indirizzo nella risoluzione dei problemi 
di riforma e trasformazione fosse opportuno che il settore dell’assistenza sociale e famigliare  
venga svolto esclusivamente dall’Ente di Riforma in quanto gli assegnatari del borgo sia 
direttamente che indirettamente sono interessati all’opera di tale Ente, la Prima Giunta può 
far cessare tale sua attività nel borgo.’ See ACS, Ministero dell’Interno, Direzione generale 
servizi civili, Attività assistenziali italiane e internazionali, busta 93, documentazione 
generale. 
136  For details on the negotiations between UNRRA-CASAS and the land reform board see ACS, 
MI, Direzione generale servizi civili, Attività assistenziali italiane e internazionali, busta 93, 
documentazione generale.  
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Sassi in the Italian Senate on 26 February 1958, Emilio Colombo referenced La 
Martella’s early problems but claimed that: ‘ora [1958] la borgata funziona.’137 
The problems with La Martella’s public services and infrastructure, however, 
were still present in the 1970s and 1980s. The village’s roads and footpaths 
were not maintained and had fallen into a state of disrepair; there were 
problems with the postal service and refuse collection; the local doctor’s 
surgery had been closed and subsequently illegally occupied; the public 
transport links to Matera were expensive and unreliable; and the local police 
station had been shut down.138  
La Martella’s slow demise prompts the question why a project hailed as a 
model for southern development was seemingly allowed to fall into disrepair? 
As outlined above the rivalry between UNRRA-CASAS and the land reform board 
appears to have been the primary reason for the catalogue of errors that 
characterized the village’s early development. However, La Martella’s problems 
persisted even after UNRRA-CASAS was no longer involved in the project. A 
number of contemporary sources blamed the village’s decline on the land 
reform board which, it was argued, was under the DC’s direct control. The Ente 
di riforma’s actions at La Martella, it was claimed, reflected a wider Christian 
Democrat policy of using land reform as a means to politically control southern 
                                                             
137  See Senato della Repubblica, Finanziamento integrative per il risanamento dei “Sassi” di 
Matera, Disegno di legge n. 619, seduta del 26 febbraio 1958 reproduced in Cresci, pp. 353-
356. 
138 See the various documents in ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 84, fascicolo 680, Matera 
- Situazione sociale del Borgo La Martella, and in particular the letter of complaint from the 
local section of Comunità Braccianti to the Prefect of Matera dated 20 April 1970. Speaking in 
1993 about La Martella, former ECA official Vincent Barnett claimed that: ‘within a year or 
two, the people were going back to their caves [laughs] because they liked the community 
life of the caves better than they liked the artificially-structured things that happen when 
some planners build you a city as the way you ought to live, instead of the way you like to 
live.’ Interview by Eric Christenson and Linda Christenson with Dr. Vincent Barnett 
(European Cooperation Administration Program Chief Italy), August 19 1993. 
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landless workers rather than an attempt to improve social and economic 
conditions. This conclusion dominates the existing literature on La Martella. 
Writing in 1955 for the Communist periodical Cronache del Mezzogiorno, 
Giovanni Dello Jacovo claimed that the agricultural reform board was the agent 
of a government which had used land allocation as a means of social control. La 
Martella was a prime example of this strategy. The village was a ‘monumento 
eretto ai perfidi sistemi di un regime che proclama gli assegnatari piccolo 
proprietari e li vuole invece servi della gleba, chiusi nei campi di 
concentramento dei comprensori di riforma.’139 Leonardo Sacco came to a 
similar conclusion in an article originally published in Il Mondo in 1955. He 
claimed that the land reform board had come under increasing pressure to 
adhere to the DC’s demands at Matera. La Martella’s failings were the result of a 
‘composito programma che da vari ambienti e centrali preferiva la 
trasformazione degli abitanti dei Sassi in sottoproletariato o piccolissima 
borghesia – per assicurarsene il controllo politico.’140 It is clear that agrarian 
reform, together with the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, was crucial in the DC’s 
construction of political consensus in post-war southern Italy. However, as Paul 
Ginsborg has noted ‘this strategy was not planned and executed according to 
some preconceived blueprint, but was rather a series of contingent responses 
which none the less reveal an underlying unity of intent.’141 Land reform was a 
reaction to peasant land occupations in Calabria, Basilicata and Puglia in the late 
1940s and an attempt to halt communist gains in southern Italy. It was hoped 
that the transformation of landless agricultural workers into small landowners 
                                                             
139  Dello Jacovo, p. 501 
140  Sacco, Matera contemporanea, pp. 52-55 
141 Ginsborg, p. 139 
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would diffuse social unrest and foster political consensus amongst assignees.142 
However, in the context of La Martella the opposite seems to have happened. 
Social unrest and tensions were caused by the village’s lack of amenities and the 
failure to provide adequate farm land to new residents. Thus the question 
remains: if the DC directly controlled the land reform board why did it 
apparently allow such a high-profile project to fail? 
One potential explanation is the relationship between the DC and the 
land reform board. The argument that the Ente di riforma was under the DC’s 
direct influence appears to neglect the government party’s factious nature and 
its inability to maintain control over the numerous post-war public bodies and 
collateral organizations it had established. While the image of an all-seeing and 
all-controlling Christian Democratic Party that pursued a programmatic 
strategy of social control in southern Italy has proved to be seductive for 
historians of post-war Matera, it is a viewpoint which overlooks the complex 
matrix of political rivalries and infighting that defined the DC at national and 
local levels in the 1950s. As Rosario Forlenza has argued, the DC was a ‘dynamic 
and complex phenomenon, conditioned by circumstances and contingencies 
rather than by programmatic or ideological assumptions.’143 The development 
programme at Matera, similar to the intervento straordinario, appears to have 
been undertaken for short-term political gains rather than as part of a 
systematic government strategy ‘to dictate politically sanctioned lifestyles and 
to transform Materans’ beliefs and allegiances, their values and ideology’ as has 
                                                             
142  The limited scope of land reform and the marginalization of the southern landowning classes 
meant that direct political gains at a national level were ultimately negligible. Land reform 
affected only 3 per cent of the Italian peninsula and 1 per cent of the Republic’s agricultural 
workers; just 15 per cent of braccianti were allocated expropriated land. See King, Land 
Reform, pp. 210-225. 
143  Forlenza, pp. 331-349 
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been recently claimed.144 It seems more fruitful, therefore, for historians to 
approach government intervention at Matera as having been reactive, malleable, 
and conditioned by contemporary political exigencies rather than part of a long-
term and coherent political strategy.  
Archival documents from the Archivio Sturzo in Rome suggest that the 
relationship between the DC and the land reform board at Matera was not as 
straightforward as presented in the contemporary critiques cited above. Rather 
it mirrored the internal rivalries of the governing party and the tension between 
national and local party branches. The complex relations between local and 
national DC politicians and the land reform board could offer a supplemental 
explanation for La Martella’s continued problems after UNRRA-CASAS had 
ceased to be involved in the project. A report written in 1955 by Michele 
Tantolo, DC Provincial Secretary for Matera, implies that there were tensions 
between the DC’s local branch at Matera and the land reform board. It suggests 
that there was a gap between the governing party’s local and national 
representatives. Tantolo delivered a damning assessment of the land reform 
board in his report. He claimed that ‘troppi dirigenti, a parte la loro 
impreparazione strettamente e squisitamente sociale, non solo non sono 
democratici cristiani, quand’anche sono feroci avversari del nostro Partito e dei 
suoi rappresentanti periferici.’145 Moreover, he claimed that it was ‘pressoche  
impossibile scalzarli, perche , nella maggior parte dei casi, sono emanazioni di 
                                                             
144  Toxey, Materan Contradictions, p. 55. Toxey describes the Sassi’s post-war evacuation as an 
‘act of violence’ in which ‘the government of Rome essentially colonized Matera. Its 
paternalistic purpose ... was to transform the orientalized peasants who lived a communally 
sufficient lifestyle (by necessity) into Italian citizens and consumers dependent on the state 
political and economic systems.’ Ibid., pp. 55-56. 
145 ASILS, FDC, Segretaria politica, Atti dei segretari 7, Amintore Fanfani, Uffici centrali, 
Corrispondenza con gli organi periferici, scatola 69, fascicolo 5, Convegno dei segretari 
provinciali e regionali del Mezzogiorno, Castelgandolfo 6-8 gennaio 1955 (testa di relazione 
riguardante la provincia di Matera). 
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gruppi clientelistici strettamente legati a questo o a quel papavero, ovvero, a 
questo onorevole o a quell’altro, s’intende, democratici cristiani.’146 While it is 
difficult to corroborate Tantolo’s implication that senior DC politicians had 
provided non-party members jobs with the land reform board, nonetheless the 
report suggests that there were internal rivalries and power struggles within 
the governing party. A memorandum dated 4 April 1955 claims that the Ente di 
riforma had fired the head of the DC’s local section at Pisticci for political 
activism amongst assignees. This activity had been viewed unfavourably by his 
supervisors who are described in the report as ‘probabilmente mangiapreti.’147 
The implication, similar to Tantolo’s report above, is that the reform board was 
staffed by people openly hostile to the DC. Rather than an organization under 
the direct control of the Christian Democrats then, the archival sources cited 
above suggest that the land reform board was not a public body which simply 
adhered to the ruling party’s political requests on a local level. Thus, the 
relationship between the DC and the Ente di riforma appears to have been more 
complex and nuanced than previously thought. The land reform board could 
have been an example of what Paul Ginsborg dubbed the DC’s ‘uncontrollable 
monsters’, i.e. public bodies and collateral organizations that the governing 
party at times struggled to influence and control.148 The complex relationship 
between the land reform board and the Christian Democrats outlined above, 
coupled with the internal divisions within the ruling party itself, could offer a 
supplemental reason why La Martella struggled to live up to the image of a 
                                                             
146 Ibid. 
147 See ASILS, FDC, Segretaria politica, Atti dei segretari 7, Amintore Fanfani, Uffici centrali, 
Corrispondenza con gli organi periferici, scatola 64, sottofascicolo 6, Corrispondenza con 
Matera. 
148  Ginsborg, p. 157 
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model for southern development as depicted in official sources even after 
UNRRA-CASAS was no longer involved in the project.  
The archival sources consulted for this study show that Emilio Colombo, 
Basilicata’s most important post-war politician, was kept constantly informed of 
La Martella’s various problems as well as complaints about the village from 
residents and visitors.149 If Colombo was one of the papaveri referred to in 
Tantolo’s report, that suggests he held influence over various employees of the 
land reform board. Therefore, the question remains why, if Colombo wielded 
such influence, would he have allowed an important project in terms of 
government propaganda to fall into anonymity and disrepair. It seems, above all, 
that La Martella’s slow decline over a twenty-year period reflected dwindling 
political interest in the project at a national level, and in the wider risanamento 
effort at Matera in general, from the late 1950s onwards. Its symbolic capital 
had dwindled to zero. The project had been important primarily in terms of 
political propaganda. The village’s development, moreover, needs to be viewed 
in the context of wider social and economic upheavals in post-war Italy. The 
economic boom of 1958-1963 saw Italy become a predominately industrial 
nation. This period was also marked by migration, both internal and external 
which included a rural exodus as millions of Italians swapped the countryside 
                                                             
149 See for example a report on La Martella by the Cassa per Mezzogiorno dated 21 May 1955 in 
ACS, Ministero dell’Interno, Direzione generale servizi civili, Attività assistenziali italiane e 
internazionali, busta 93, documentazione generale; and a letter dated 5 March 1955 from a 
priest who had been so disappointed following his visit to La Martella that he wrote a letter 
of complaint to Amintore Fanfani who later forwarded it to Colombo. The priest wrote that: 
‘sono rimasto alquanto deluso nell’osservare e sentire. Parlai con una persona qualificata del 
Villaggio, degna di fiducia (non potei accostare altre persone perché avevo poco tempo 
disponibile a anche perché credetti sufficiente la testimonianza sua) “Molto fumo (l’arrosto 
c’è ma non nella qualità che si desidererebbe o che si aspettrebbe [sic]) molti mangiano 
attorno a un così deliziosi piatto, molto sciupio di denaro, molti capi e sottocapi, ingegneri e 
sottoingegneri, molti guadagni illeciti ecc”.’ ASILS, FDC, Segretaria politica, Atti dei segretari 
7, Amintore Fanfani, Uffici centrali, Corrispondenza con gli organi periferici, scatola 64, 
sottofascicolo 6, Corrispondenza con Matera. 
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for Italy’s rapidly growing provincial capitals and the many centres of industrial 
and economic growth.150 As a result land reform was relegated in terms of 
political importance as the aspirations of many Italians turned away from 
agriculture. In the context of La Martella this is reflected in the fact that the 
village no longer featured in official propaganda in the late 1950s. The project 
seems to have had a finite value in the context of promoting the government’s 
southern development programme, in particular land reform, and was no longer 
of political relevance at the end of the 1950s following the onset of the economic 
miracle. The political disinterest in La Martella appears to have been apparent 
at a local and regional level. During a talk given in the village’s Communist 
section on 9 May 1980, Giambattista Barberino, the PCI’s regional counsellor for 
Basilicata, denounced ‘lo stato di abbandono in cui resa detta Borgata e la 
mancata esecuzione di opera per l’irrigazione delle campagne circostante.’151 
The village’s political abandonment was blamed on the disinterest of local 
politicians, in particular the DC, and the land reform board. While Barberino’s 
words need to be viewed in the context political canvassing, contemporary 
press accounts of La Martella present a similar description of a village that was 
no longer of political interest and had thus been left to slowly deteriorate.152       
The sense of frustration that La Martella’s residents felt at their apparent 
                                                             
150 For the data on interregional migration see Ginsborg, p. 219 and Foot, Modern Italy, p. 138; 
for information on the post-war rural exodus see Corrado Barberis, ‘The agricultural exodus 
in Italy’, Sociologia Ruralis, vol. 8 (1968), pp. 179-188; for overseas emigration in the post-
war period see Amoreno Martinelli, ‘L’emigrazione transoceanica fra gli anni quaranta e 
sessanta’, in Piero Bevilacqua, Andreina De Clementi and Emilio Franzina, (eds.), Storia 
dell’emigrazione italiana, Donzelli Editore, Rome, 2001, pp. 369-384 and Federico Romero, 
‘L’emigrazione operaia in Europa (1948-1973)’, in Bevilacqua, De Clementi and Franzina, pp. 
397-414. 
151 ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 84, fascicolo 680, Matera - Situazione sociale del Borgo 
La Martella 
152 See the press clippings from the 1970s and 1980s in ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 
84, fascicolo 680, Matera - Situazione sociale del Borgo La Martella 
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abandonment can be gauged in a letter of protest dated 8 April 1972, signed by 
80 assignees and sent to the Italian Prime Minister; the local prefect and mayor; 
Emilio Colombo; the regional president; the DC regional secretary and the land 
reform board. The letter was written in the wake of eviction orders served to a 
number of residents who had refused to accept the terms of a new housing 
agreement proposed by the land reform board. The village’s inhabitants had 
originally been promised the possibility of redeeming their mortgages 
according to the original value that UNRRA-CASAS had stipulated in the 1950s. 
However, the land reform board wanted to remove this guarantee from the new 
housing contract. The petition expressed the frustrations that a community, 
hailed as a model for southern development in the mid-1950s, had accumulated 
over the intervening twenty-year period: 
I cittadini di La Martella sono stati i pioneri dell’esperimento di riforma 
agraria e di sfollamento dei Sassi mediante la costituzione di un borgo 
rurale con rappresentanze di altre categorie sociali (artigiani, 
commercianti, ecc.) e hanno per cio  affrontato e subito straordinari 
sacrifici personali e familiari di natura spirituale e morale ed anche 
economica essendo rimasti isolati dalla citta  privi dei conforti e dei 
servizi di cui normalmente godono altri cittadini, con conseguenti 
maggiori spese, pur rimanendo nella piu  assoluta poverta .153 
 
Conclusion 
 
Notwithstanding the problems with the La Martella project, the village became 
one of the key images utilized by the DC in the early 1950s to promote its 
reform programme for southern Italy. La Martella was one of the first joint Cassa 
per il Mezzogiorno and land-reform projects to be inaugurated and thus had a 
unique political and historical significance in the context of publicizing the 
intervento straordinario. As outlined above, Matera and La Martella were 
                                                             
153 ASM, Prefettura (Ricovero 90), busta 84, fascicolo 692, La Martella Ente di Riforma 
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juxtaposed in official sources to promote southern Italy’s rapid transition from 
‘backwardness’ to ‘modernity’. The village was used to espouse the message that 
improvements to housing and infrastructure would strengthen rather than 
erode traditional family and community bonds. However, the project had 
initially been the brainchild of UNRRA-CASAS. It was co-opted into the wider 
reform programme undertaken at Matera following De Gasperi’s first visit to the 
town in 1950 and the mounting political and media focus on a city that had been 
dubbed a national shame. La Martella’s failure to live up to its billing as a model 
for southern development revealed the coordination problems and internal 
rivalries between the official bodies involved in the project’s construction and 
management. The village’s continued uneven development suggests that the 
relationship between the land reform board and the Christian Democrats may 
have been more complex than the image previously presented in the existing 
literature. Above all, however, it seems that the political interest in the village’s 
maintenance ran parallel to its role in promoting the DC’s southern reform 
programme. This suggests that La Martella was ultimately, as Marcello Fabbri 
has suggested, ‘come opera da regime da mostrare e fotografare.’154 Once land 
reform had declined in political importance in the late 1950s with the onset of 
the economic miracle, Matera, the so-called capital of southern Italy’s civiltà 
contadina, and La Martella, land reform’s model village, all but disappeared from 
official sources and the village slowly fell into a state of neglect. Behind the 
veneer offered by the numerous official images of La Martella, therefore, was the 
reality of a project that had failed to deliver on the promises of De Gasperi and 
his party. As a result, the village which was hailed as a model for southern 
                                                             
154 Quoted in Francione, p. 113 
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development in fact became a monument to the intervento straordinario’s many 
limitations.155
                                                             
155 Research visits to La Martella in 2010 and 2011 revealed that the village has been 
reinvented as an industrial zone and hamlet of Matera with thirty-two houses recently built 
in a new residential area called Ecopolis in 2009. Notably on 25 May 2012 La Martella’s first 
ever library was opened. The local historian and journalist Leonardo Sacco donated his 
personal archive to the village under the proviso that the public library would be dedicated 
to the memory of Adriano Olivetti. For further information on La Martella today see Vito 
Orlando and Mariana Pacucci, La Martella 50 anni dopo: situazione attuale e prospettive di 
rinascita del borgo. Risultati dell’indagine socio-religiosa, Matera, 2004; and Francione, pp. 
119-129. 
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Conclusions 
 
Oggi su Matera e  calato il silenzio: solo dei gruppi di tecnici stranieri o 
alcuni studenti delle Facolta  di Architettura continuano a interessarsi 
all’esperimento effettuato e alle consequenze che ne sono derivate … La 
“storia” di Matera e  nata con i primi interventi della Riforma agraria, e 
dalle prospettive di mutamento del latifondo ha preso slancio e vita; tutti 
i programmi hanno avuto come bara la soluzione del problema 
contadino. Oggi che l’indirizzo politico e  mutato, che della Riforma si 
tende a parlare solo come un capitolo chiuso, anche la “storia” di Matera 
rientra in questo libro di cui si vuol scrivere l’indice.1  
 
The above quote comes from an article that the architect and urban planner 
Carlo Aymonino wrote in 1959 about the risanamento programme for the Sassi. 
It reflects the fact that by the time the second special law for Matera was passed 
on 21 March 1958 the Sassi were no longer considered a pressing political 
concern. Following the implementation of the first special law for Matera and 
the resulting risanamento programme, the Christian Democrats claimed to have 
resolved a national shame and taken the first step in tackling the southern 
question. Instead the city became a laboratory for urban planners and architects 
and an important source for government propaganda promoting the intervento 
straordinario. Official patriotic narratives produced in the context of Matera 
switched from shame to pride. However, Matera’s time in the political and media 
spotlight was limited. The years of Italy’s post-war economic miracle were 
marked by rural exodus as millions of Italians swapped the countryside for the 
country’s rapidly growing provincial capitals and centres of industrial and 
economic growth.2 The issue of land ownership, which had inspired thousands 
of braccianti to occupy the great estates in the immediate post-war years, 
ceased to have the same political currency at a national level. Instead from the 
                                                             
1  Carlo Aymonino, ‘Matera: mito e realtà’, Casabella continua, (1959), no. 231, pp. 11-12 
2 See Foot, Modern Italy, p. 138 and Ginsborg, p. 219. 
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late 1950s the Christian Democrat government turned its attention to a 
programme of industrial development for southern Italy.3 In this broader 
historical context, Matera’s symbolic role as the capital of southern rural culture 
and emblem of the southern question diminished in political importance. The 
fact that no government ministers attended Spine Bianche’s inauguration in 
1959, and that there was no national press coverage of this event, suggest that 
by that point in time the Sassi had lost their political value in official 
propaganda.4 In the 1960s Matera and the Sassi had all but disappeared from 
political debate, official sources and the national press. As a result the city faded 
back into provincial obscurity.        
The Italian state spent over 35 billion lire on rehousing Sassi residents 
from 1952 onwards. Despite this investment a number of cave homes continued 
to be occupied into the 1970s: over 2,395 dwellings were still in use in 1958 and 
approximately 420, albeit illegally, as late as 1971.5 Two further special laws for 
the Sassi were passed in 1967 and 1971 and a national competition on how to 
preserve the then largely uninhabited 29-hectare site was held in 1974.6 From 
an urban centre that had housed an estimated 15,000 people in the 1950s, the 
Sassi had become a ghost city that was used as an illegal rubbish dump and 
associated with petty crime. A preservation order was passed in 1986, however, 
and the Sassi’s elevation to a UNESCO World Heritage site in 1993 saw Matera’s 
former slums rebranded as a cultural treasure that needed to be preserved. A 
                                                             
3  For a brief summary of this process see Piero Bevilacqua, pp. 98-102. Instead for a more 
detailed account see Salvatore Cafiero, Storia dell’intervento straordinario nel Mezzogiorno 
(1950-1993), Piero Lacaita Editore, Manduria, 2000. 
4  Pontrandolfi, p. 154 
5 Ibid., p. 186 
6  For an overview of debates in the 1960s about what to do with the Sassi see Restucci and 
Tafuri, pp. 70-83; for a summary of the public competition for preserving the Sassi see the 
articles in Basilicata, no. 1-3, 1977, pp. 23-31. 
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process of repopulation and urban regeneration began in the 1990s and today 
the site is a popular tourist destination.7 
This research project has examined how and why Matera came to be 
seen as a national shame and a symbol of the southern question post-1945. It 
has shown the impact that these concepts had on the city’s post-war history. It 
contends that notions of national shame and the southern question are 
conditioned by the historical contexts in which they are produced and are not 
fixed or universal givens. They change across time and space. Studies of 
nationalism and the southern question, therefore, need to be carried out on a 
micro-level to avoid broad generalizations. The case-study of Matera has shown 
that notions of the city as a symbol of the southern question originated in Carlo 
Levi’s description of Matera in Cristo si è fermato a Eboli and gained cultural 
currency at political and intellectual levels due to the book’s commercial and 
critical success in the immediate post-war period. The notion of Matera as Other 
to ideas of modernity was appropriated in the context of discourses of national 
shame as post-war Italy’s two main parties, the Christian Democrats and the 
Italian Communist Party, looked to forge political identities and build electoral 
consensus. Moreover, the image of Matera as a symbol of the southern question 
was a key image in promoting the DC government’s twin reform programme for 
southern Italy. The Sassi were used to represent southern Italian poverty in 
contrast to the images of modernization produced to publicize the work of the 
land reform board and the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. Furthermore, this thesis 
has traced the impact that notions of Matera as a national shame and symbol of 
                                                             
7  For a discussion of the preservation efforts undertaken at Matera since 1986 and the urban, 
economic and social changes that they have engendered see Toxey, Materan Contradictions, 
pp. 235-300. 
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the southern question had on the city’s social and urban fabric in the 1950s. 
Despite the fact that living standards at Matera were comparable with many 
other parts of Italy in the immediate post-war period, political and media 
pressure resulted in the enactment of special legislation for Matera’s cave 
homes on 17 May 1952. The Sassi were slowly emptied in the following decades 
and new rural and urban housing projects built to accommodate their 15,000 
residents. Matera’s social and urban topography was transformed irrevocably. 
This thesis has shown that narratives of national shame and the southern 
question were central to this process. 
On a micro-level this thesis has made an original contribution to the 
large body of work on post-war Matera. It has drawn on previously unused 
primary sources and employed original methods for examining the city’s post-
war history. In particular the concepts of national shame and the southern 
question had been largely overlooked or under theorised in the existing 
literature. The current research project has aimed to fill that gap. This research 
project has situated Matera’s post-war history in the broader context of 
historical processes at a national and international level. The risanamento 
programme needs to be examined in the context of Cold War politics, land 
reform, Italy’s post-war economic boom, and the rural exodus of the 1950s. This 
thesis has challenged the prevalent argument in the existing literature that the 
special’s laws limitations reflected a deliberate Christian Democrat strategy to 
push landless workers out of agriculture and into industry. Rather the primary 
sources consulted for this study suggest that the risanamento programme’s 
problems were the result of a lack of institutional coordination, political 
infighting, the failure to consult the local population, and fading political interest 
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in a project whose propaganda value diminished in importance in the late 
1950s.  
Furthermore, this thesis has contributed to the existing body of 
knowledge on the history of the southern question. The majority of work 
carried out on this topic has focused on the Liberal period. In contrast, this 
research project has examined narratives of the southern question generated in 
the context of post-war Matera. The notion that Matera was a symbol of the 
southern question saw the city become a testing ground for how to resolve the 
Mezzogiorno’s perceived social and economic problems. Generic models were 
applied to a specific local case with limited results. This project has shown that 
competing and contrasting ideas of the Mezzogiorno were created and used to 
promote modernization programmes for southern Italy post-1945. These 
narratives were shaped by the historical context in which they were created: the 
push for land reform, Cold War politics, and the intervento straordinario. These 
concepts, moreover, had a concrete impact on government policy and southern 
Italy’s social and urban development. The current research project has 
endeavoured to make a modest contribution to the existing body of research on 
the southern question. However, more work on images of the Mezzogiorno in 
the post-war period is needed. Archival research for this thesis revealed that a 
large body of official newsreel and print material was produced in the 1950s to 
promote land reform and Cassa per il Mezzogiorno.8 Hitherto this material has 
                                                             
8  For example, during the research phase of this project numerous copies of the monthly 
magazine Vita Contadina that the agricultural reform board produced in the 1950s for the 
families that had been assigned land and housing were consulted. In addition, the Istituto 
Luce’s online archive provides access to the large number of newsreels and documentaries 
produced to publicise government initiatives in southern Italy in the post-war period. See 
http://www.archivioluce.com/archivio/ (accessed 26/07/2013). 
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been largely ignored.9 A comprehensive study of these sources would provide a 
greater understanding of post-war notions of the South and shed light on the 
complex interplay between discourse, politics and official policy during a period 
of great social, cultural, and urban change.  
 In addition, the current research project has looked to make an original 
contribution to the study of Italian national identity and the history of emotions. 
Studies of Italian nationalism have tended to focus on the Liberal period. The 
current research project, in contrast, has examined notions of Italian 
nationalism in a post-war context. The patriotic narratives that Matera 
generated during the scope of this study reveal that there were competing 
notions of Italian national identity. These concepts were one of the ways in 
which political identities were forged in a Cold War context. The DC and the PCI 
looked to define the national ‘we’ and concurrently accuse their political 
opponents of being ‘bad’ patriots. This thesis has shown that broad 
generalizations about the feelings of Italians, or in fact any group of people, need 
to be avoided. Rather historians need to focus their attention on the emotional 
scenarios that were created and the specific emotional communities which 
shaped these narratives at a micro-level. The theoretical framework used to 
examine national shame in the context of post-war Matera could potentially be 
used to study patriotic narratives in different cultural, temporal and 
geographical contexts.   
 Through the use of hitherto neglected archival sources this research 
project has looked to register the absent voices of the 15,000 people that the 
                                                             
9  Paola Bonifazio has recently examined notions of the South in a number of official 
documentaries, but arguably a lot more work remains to be done on this topic. See the third 
chapter in Bonifazio, Narrating Modernization. 
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risanamento programme directly affected. These sources, however, are 
fragmentary in nature and the history of post-war Matera from below remains 
to be written. Although a number of recent studies have incorporated an oral 
history component, this is an area of study that could be developed further in 
future research. A community-based project in which local residents interview 
older relatives that were moved from the Sassi to new housing could be a 
successful avenue for large-scale data collection in this regard. Vernacular 
photography is another primary source that could be used to examine the 
experiences and perspectives of former Sassi dwellers post-1945. The Museo 
virtuale della memoria collettiva di Matera has collected a large body of photos 
depicting various aspects of life in post-war Matera.10 These images are 
available via their website, but hitherto no comprehensive study of these 
important sources appears to have been undertaken. They provide a potential 
window into the lives of the people that notions of Matera as a national shame 
and symbol of the southern question most directly affected. 
 This thesis is a history of how and why the city of Matera came to be seen 
as a national shame and a symbol of the southern question in the post-war 
period. The discursive construction of these ideas was a politically charged 
process. These narratives were produced in the context of emerging Cold War 
rivalries and the battle for electoral consensus in a country that was rebuilding 
itself in material, social, cultural and political terms following twenty years of 
Fascist rule and the destruction of the Second World War. The imaginings of the 
nation and of the South generated in the context of post-war Matera were 
created through words and images, but they had concrete effects. They 
                                                             
10  See http://www.muvmatera.it/ (accessed 22/07/2013). 
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mobilized political opinion, influenced government policy, shaped Matera’s 
urban landscape, and transformed the lives of 15,000 people permanently.
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